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ABSTRACT
Microblogging services such as Twitter, Sina Weibo, and Tumblr have been emerging
and deeply embedded into people’s daily lives. Used by hundreds of millions of users
to connect the people worldwide and share and access information in real-time, the
microblogging service has also became the target of malicious attackers due to its
massive user engagement and structural openness. Although existed, little is still
known in the community about new types of vulnerabilities in current microblogging
services which could be leveraged by the intelligence-evolving attackers, and more
importantly, the corresponding defenses that could prevent both the users and the
microblogging service providers from being attacked. This dissertation aims to un-
cover a number of challenging security and privacy issues in microblogging services
and also propose corresponding defenses.
This dissertation makes fivefold contributions. The first part presents the social
botnet, a group of collaborative social bots under the control of a single botmaster,
demonstrate the effectiveness and advantages of exploiting a social botnet for spam
distribution and digital-influence manipulation, and propose the corresponding coun-
termeasures and evaluate their effectiveness. Inspired by Pagerank, the second part
describes TrueTop, the first sybil-resilient system to find the top-K influential users in
microblogging services with very accurate results and strong resilience to sybil attacks.
TrueTop has been implemented to handle millions of nodes and 100 times more edges
on commodity computers. The third and fourth part demonstrate that microblogging
systems’ structural openness and users’ carelessness could disclose the later’s sensitive
information such as home city and age. LocInfer, a novel and lightweight system, is
presented to uncover the majority of the users in any metropolitan area; the disserta-
tion also proposes MAIF, a novel machine learning framework that leverages public
content and interaction information in microblogging services to infer users’ hidden
i
ages. Finally, the dissertation proposes the first privacy-preserving social media pub-
lishing framework to let the microblogging service providers publish their data to
any third-party without disclosing users’ privacy and meanwhile meeting the data’s
commercial utilities. This dissertation sheds the light on the state-of-the-art security
and privacy issues in the microblogging services.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Microblogging services such as Twitter, Sina Weibo, and Tumblr have been emerg-
ing and deeply embedded into people’s daily lives. As of September 2015, Twitter—
the most popular microblogging system in the world—has 320 million monthly active
users. People have been using microblogging systems in social networking, massive
information campaigns, public relationships, political campaigns, pandemic and crisis
situations, business marketing, crowdsourcing, and many other public/private con-
texts.
Used by hundreds of millions of users to connect the people worldwide and share
and access information in real-time, the microblogging service has also became the
target of malicious attackers due to its massive user engagement and structural open-
ness. Although existed, little is still known in the community about new types of
vulnerabilities in current microblogging services which could be leveraged by the
intelligence-evolving attackers, and more importantly, the corresponding defenses that
could prevent both the users and the microblogging service providers from being at-
tacked.
In this dissertation, we aim to uncover a number of challenging security and pri-
vacy issues in microblogging services and also propose corresponding defenses. The
rest of this report is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 studies the consequences of and corresponding defenses against social
botnets in the context of microblogging services. Specifically, Online social networks
(OSNs) are increasingly threatened by social bots which are software-controlled OSN
accounts that mimic human users with malicious intentions. A social botnet refers to a
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group of social bots under the control of a single botmaster, which collaborate to con-
duct malicious behavior while mimicking the interactions among normal OSN users to
reduce their individual risk of being detected. We demonstrate the effectiveness and
advantages of exploiting a social botnet for spam distribution and digital-influence
manipulation through real experiments on Twitter and also trace-driven simulations.
We also propose the corresponding countermeasures and evaluate their effectiveness.
Our results can help help OSNs improve their bot(net) detection systems.
Chapter 3 further presents a novel defend scheme against the social botnets (or
sybil users) in the application of finding top-K influential users in the microblogging
services. To start with, influential users have great potential for accelerating infor-
mation dissemination and acquisition on Twitter. How to measure the influence of
Twitter users has attracted significant academic and industrial attention. Existing
influence measurement techniques are vulnerable to sybil users that are thriving on
Twitter. Although sybil defenses for online social networks have been extensively
investigated, they commonly assume unique mappings from human-established trust
relationships to online social associations and thus do not apply to Twitter where
users can freely follow each other. This chapter presents TrueTop, the first sybil-
resilient system to measure the influence of Twitter users. TrueTop is rooted in two
observations from real Twitter datasets. First, although non-sybil users may incau-
tiously follow strangers, they tend to be more careful and selective in retweeting,
replying to, and mentioning other users. Second, influential users usually get much
more retweets, replies, and mentions than non-influential users. Detailed theoreti-
cal studies and synthetic simulations show that TrueTop can generate very accurate
influence measurement results with strong resilience to sybil attacks.
Chapter 4 investigates one privacy threat on microblogging services, namely find-
ing the majority users in any metropolitan area. Specifically, most Twitter users do
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not disclose their locations due to privacy concerns. Although inferring the location
of an individual Twitter user has been extensively studied, it is still missing to effec-
tively find the majority of the users in a specific geographical area without scanning
the whole Twittersphere, and obtaining these users will result in both positive and
negative significance. In this chapter, we propose LocInfer, a novel and lightweight
system to tackle this problem. LocInfer explores the fact that user communications
in Twitter exhibit strong geographic locality, which we validate through large-scale
datasets. Based on the experiments from four representative metropolitan areas in
U.S., LocInfer can discover on average 86.6% of the users with 73.2% accuracy in
each area by only checking a small set of candidate users. We also present a coun-
termeasure to the users highly sensitive to location privacy and show its efficacy by
simulations.
Chapter 5 discloses another privacy issue on Twitter, namely inferring users’ ages.
The age information of microbloggers can be very useful for many applications such
as viral marketing and social studies/surveys. Current microblogging systems, how-
ever, have very sparse age information. In this chapter, we present MAIF, a novel
framework that explores public content and interaction information in microblogging
systems to explore the hidden ages of microbloggers. We thoroughly evaluate the
accuracy of MAIF with a real-world dataset with 54,879 Twitter users. Our results
show that MAIF can achieve up to 81.38% inference accuracy and outperforms the
state of the art by 9.15%. We also discuss some countermeasures to alleviate the
possible privacy concerns caused by MAIF.
Chapter 6 considers how to prevent the microbloggers’ privacy disclosure men-
tioned above. We first identify a text-based user-linkage attack on current social
media data publishing practices, in which the real users of anonymous IDs in a pub-
lished dataset can be pinpointed based on the users’ unprotected text data. Then we
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propose a framework for differentially privacy-preserving social media data publish-
ing for the first time in literature. Within our framework, social media data service
providers can publish perturbed datasets to provide differential privacy to social media
users while offering high data utility to social media data consumers. Our differential
privacy mechanism is based on a novel notion of -text indistinguishability, which
we propose to thwart the text-based user-linkage attack. Extensive experiments on
real-world and simulated datasets confirm that our framework can enable high-level
differential privacy protection and also high data utility at the same time.
We summarize our work and present several future work in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
THE RISE OF SOCIAL BOTNETS: ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
2.1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) are increasingly threatened by social bots (52)
which are software-controlled OSN accounts that mimic human users with malicious
intentions. For example, according to a May 2012 article in Bloomberg Businessweek,
1 as many as 40% of the accounts on Facebook, Twitter, and other popular OSNs
are spammer accounts (or social bots), and about 8% of the messages sent via social
networks are spams, approximately twice the volume of six months ago. There have
been reports on various attacks, abuses, and manipulations based on social bots (51),
such as infiltrating Facebook (26) or Twitter (23; 53), launching spam campaign
(57; 62; 132), and conducting political astroturf (119; 120).
A social botnet refers to a group of social bots under the control of a single botmas-
ter, which collaborate to conduct malicious behavior while mimicking the interactions
among normal OSN users to reduce their individual risk of being detected. For ex-
ample, social bots on Twitter can follow others and retweet/answer others’ tweets.
Since a skewed following/followers (FF) ratio is a typical feature for social bots on
Twitter (141), maintaining a balanced FF ratio in the social botnet makes it much
easier for individual bots to escape detection. Creating a social botnet is also fairly
easy due to the open APIs published by OSN providers. For example, we successfully
created a network of 1,000 accounts on Twitter with $57 to purchase 1,000 accounts
instead of manually creating them.
1http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-24/likejacking-spammers-hit-social-media
5
Despite various studies (58; 151; 59) confirming the existence of social botnets,
neither have the greater danger from social botnets been unveiled nor have the coun-
termeasures targeted on social botnets been proposed. In this chapter, we first report
two new social botnet attacks on Twitter, one of the most popular OSNs with over
302M monthly active users as of June 2015 and over 500M new tweets daily. Then
we propose two defenses on the reported attacks, respectively. Our results help un-
derstand the potentially detrimental effects of social botnets and shed the light for
Twitter and other OSNs to improve their bot(net) detection systems. More specifi-
cally, this chapter makes the following contributions.
Firstly, we demonstrate the effectiveness and advantages of exploiting a social
botnet for spam distribution on Twitter. This attack is motivated by that Twitter
currently only suspends the accounts that originate spam tweets without punishing
those retweeting spam tweets (11). If the social botnet is organized as a retweet tree in
which only the root originates spam tweets and all the others merely retweet spams, all
the social bots except the root bot can escape suspension. Given a set of social bots,
we formulate the formation of the retweeting tree as a multi-objective optimization
problem to minimize the time taken for a spam tweet to reach a maximum number
of victim Twitter users at the lowest cost of the botmaster. Since the optimization is
NP-hard, we give a heuristic solution and confirm its efficacy with real experiments
on Twitter and trace-driven simulations.
Secondly, we show that a social botnet can easily manipulate the digital influence
(30; 143) of Twitter users, which has been increasingly used in ad targeting (144; 6),
customer-service improvement (75), recruitment (66), and many other applications.
This attack stems from the fact that almost all existing digital-influence tools such as
Klout, Kred, and Retweet Rank, measure a user’s digital influence exclusively based
6
on his 2 interactions with others users on Twitter. If social bots collaborate to ma-
nipulate the interactions of target Twitter users, they could effectively manipulate the
victims’ digital influence. The efficacy of this attack is confirmed by real experiments
on Twitter.
Finally, we propose two countermeasures to defend against the two reported at-
tacks, respectively. To defend against the botnet-based spam distribution, we main-
tain a spam score for each user and update the score whenever the corresponding
user retweets a spam. The user is suspended if his spam score exceeds a predefined
threshold. To defense against the botnet-based influence manipulation attacks, we
propose to find sufficient credible users and only use the interactions originated from
these credible users for digital-influence measurement. Moreover, based on the mea-
surement in Section §2.4, we design a new model to compute the influence score
which is resilient to the manipulation from a single credible social bot. We confirm
the effectiveness of both defenses via detailed simulation studies driven by real-world
datasets.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. §2.2 introduces the construction
of a social botnet on Twitter. §2.3 and §2.4 show the efficacy and merits of using the
social botnet for spam distribution and digital-influence manipulation, respectively.
§2.5 details and evaluates two countermeasures. §2.6 discusses the related work. §3.7
concludes this chapter.
2.2 Building a Social Botnet on Twitter
In this chapter, we focus on networked social bots in Twitter, so we first outline
the Twitter basics to help illustrate our work. The readers familiar with Twitter
can safely skip this paragraph without any loss of continuity. Unlike Facebook, the
2No gender implication.
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social relationships on Twitter are unidirectional by users following others. If user A
follows user B, A is B’s follower, and B is A’s friend. In most cases, a user does not
need prior consent from another user whom he wants to follow. Twitter also allows
users to control who can follow them, but this feature is rarely used. In addition,
users can choose to unfollow others and block their selected followers. A Twitter user
can send text-based posts of up to 140 characters, known as tweets, which can be
read by all its followers. Tweets can be public (the default setting) and are visible
to anyone with or without a Twitter account, and they can also be protected and
are only visible to previously approved Twitter followers. A retweet is a re-posting of
someone else’s tweet. A user can retweet the tweets of anyone he follows or does not
follow, and his retweets can be seen by all his followers. Moreover, a user can reply
to a tweet and ensure that specific users can see his posts by mentioning them via
inserting “@username” for every specific user into his posts. Finally, each user has a
timeline which shows all the latest tweets, retweets, and replies of his followers.
We construct a social botnet on Twitter consisting of a botmaster and a number of
social bots which are legitimate Twitter accounts. Twitter accounts can be manually
created or purchased at affordable prices. For example, we bought 1,000 Twitter
accounts with $57 from some Internet sellers for experimental purposes only. The
botmaster is in the form of a Java application, which we developed from scratch
based on the OAuth protocol (7) and open Twitter APIs. It could perform all the
Twitter operations on behalf of all social bots to make the bots look like legitimate
users.
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2.3 Social Botnet for Spam Distribution
2.3.1 Why the Social Botnet for Spam Distribution?
As the popularity of Twitter rapidly grows, spammers have started to distribute
spam tweets which can be broadly defined as unwanted tweets that contains malicious
URLs in most cases or occasionally malicious texts (62; 132; 35). According to a study
in 2010 (62), roughly 8% of the URLs in tweets are malicious ones that direct users
to scams/malware/phishing sites, and about 0.13% of the spam URLs will be clicked.
Given the massive scale of Twitter, understanding how spam tweets are distributed
is important for designing effective spam defenses as we will demonstrate in § 2.5.
The simplest method for spam distribution is to let social bots distribute spam
tweets independently from each other, which we refer to as the independent method.
In particular, the botmaster can instruct every bot to directly post spam tweets
which can be seen by all its followers. According to the Twitter rules, 3 the accounts
considered as spam originators will be permanently suspended. Since there are so-
phisticated techniques such as (131; 95) detecting malicious URLs, this independent
approach may subject almost all social bots to permanent suspension in a short time
window.
A more advanced method, which we propose and refer to as the botnet method,
is to exploit the fact that Twitter currently only suspends the originators of spam
tweets without punishing their retweeters. In the simplest case, the botmaster forms
a single retweeting tree, where every bot is associated with a unique vertex and is
followed by its children bots. Then only the root bot originates spam tweets, and all
the others simply retweet the spam tweets from their respective parent. Given the
same set of social bots, both methods can distribute spam tweets to the same set
3http://support.twitter.com/articles/18311\#
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of non-bot Twitter users, but only the root bot will be suspended under the botnet
method. Obviously, the botnet method is economically beneficial for the botmaster
because it involves non-trivial human effort or money to create a large social botnet.
We use an experiment on Twitter to validate our conjecture for the independent
method. Our experiment uses three different social botnets with each containing 100
bots. The experiment proceeds in hours. At the beginning of every hour, every bot
in the same botnet almost simultaneously posts a spam tweet comprising two parts.
The first part is different from every bot and randomly selected from the list of tweets
returned after querying “music,” while the second part is an identical malicious URL
randomly selected from the Shalla’s blacklists (http://www.shallalist.de/) and
shortened using the bitly service (http://bitly.com) for use on Twitter. We find
that all the bots in the three botnets are suspected in two, five, and six hours. Based
on this experiment, we can safely conjecture that the independent method will cause
most bots in a larger botnet to be suspended in a short period, thus putting the
botmaster at serious economic disadvantage.
We use a separate set of experiments to shed light on the advantage of the botnet
method. In this experiment, we first use 111 bots to build a full 10-ary tree of depth
two, i.e., each node except the leaves has exactly 10 children. The experiment proceeds
in hourly rounds repeatedly on these 111 bots. At the beginning of every hour of the
first round, the root bot posts a spam tweet, while all its descendants merely retweet
the spam tweet after a small random delay. Then we replace the suspended bot by a
random bot alive from the same network, re-organize the bot tree, and start the next
round. We totally run the experiments for five rounds, in each of which only the root
bot is suspended after six hours on average, and all other bots who just retweet the
spams (with five times) remain alive. To check whether the bots will be suspended
by retweeting more spams, we reduce the spamming frequency from one per hour to
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one per day, and repeat the experiment for ten more rounds, and all the retweeting
bots were still alive at the end of the experiment. In addition, we use the similar
methodology to test three other different botnets of 2, 40, and 100 bots, respectively,
and obtain the similar results.
It has been very challenging in the research community to conduct experimental
studies about the attacks on online social networks and also the corresponding coun-
termeasures. In the experiments above, we have to control the social bots to post ma-
licious URLs to evaluate Twitter’s suspension policy, which may harm benign users.
To minimize the negative impact on the legitimate users, we adopted a methodology
similar to (26; 132; 101; 152). Specifically, none of the purchased accounts followed
any legitimate user and thus were very unlikely to be followed by legitimate users,
which greatly reduced the possibility of the posted spams being viewed by legitimate
users. In addition, we deleted every spam tweet immediately after the experiment
to further avoid it being clicked by legitimate users. Our experiments clearly show
that Twitter has a much more strict policy against posting original spam tweets than
retweeting spam tweets.
2.3.2 Optimal Social Botnet for Spam Distribution
§2.3.1 motivates the benefits of using the social botnet for spam distribution on
Twitter. Given a set of social bots, what is the optimal way for spam distribution?
We give an affirmative answer to this important question in this section.
Problem Setting and Performance Metrics
We consider a botnet V of n bots, where each bot i ∈ [1, n] can be followed by
other bots and also other Twitter users outside the botnet (called non-bot followers
hereafter). Let Fi denote the non-bot followers of bot i. Note that Fi ∩ Fj may
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be non-empty (∀i 6= j), meaning that any two bots may have overlapping non-bot
followers. We further let F = ⋃ni=1Fi. How to attract non-bot followers for the bots
is related to social engineering (37) and orthogonal to the focus of this chapter. Note
that it is very easy in practice for a bot to attract many non-bot followers, as shown
in (23; 26; 59; 151).
The botmaster distributes spam tweets along one or multiple retweeting trees, and
the vertices of every retweeting tree corresponds to a disjoint subset of the n bots.
In addition, every bot in a retweeting tree is followed by its children. As discussed,
the root of every retweeting tree will originate spam tweets, which will appear in
the Twitter timeline of its children bots and then be retweeted. The distribution of
a particular spam tweet finishes until all the bots on all the retweeting trees either
tweet or retweet it once and only once.
Given a set V with n bots and F , we propose three metrics to evaluate the efficacy
of botnet-based spam distribution.
• Coverage: Let C denote the non-bot receivers of a given spam tweet and be
called the coverage set. The coverage of spam distribution is then defined as
|C|
|F| ∈ [0, 1].
• Delay : We define the delay of spam distribution, denoted by τ , as the average
time for each user in C to see a given spam tweet since it is generated by the
root bot. A user may follow multiple bots and thus see the same spam tweet
multiple times, in which case only the first time is counted.
• Cost : We use |S| and |S˜| to define the cost of spam distribution, where S
denotes the indices of suspended bots after distributing a given spam, and S˜
denotes the set of non-bot followers will be lost due to the suspension of S, i.e.,
S˜ = C \ (⋃i∈V\S Fi).
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The above metrics motivates three design objectives. First, we obviously want
to maximize the coverage to be one, which happens when all the n bots participate
in spam distribution by belonging to one retweeting tree. Second, many malicious
URLs in spam tweets are hosted on compromised servers and will be invalidated once
detected, and Twitter will remove spam tweets as soon as they are identified. It is
thus also important to minimize the delay. Finally, since it incurs non-trivial human
effort or money to create bots and attract followers for them, it is critical to minimize
the cost as well.
Design Constraints
A major design challenge is how to circumvent Twitter’s suspension rules 4 that are
evolving in accordance with changing user (mis)behavior. We classify the suspension
rules into strict and loose ones. Violators of strict rules will be immediately sus-
pended. The strict rule most relevant to our work is that the users originate spam
tweets containing malicious URLs will be suspended. In contrast, a violator of loose
rules will initially become suspicious and later be suspended if his violations of re-
lated loose rules exceed some unknown threshold Twitter defines and uses internally.
Examples of loose rules include repeatedly posting others’ tweets as your own or the
same tweet, massively following/unfollowing people in a short time period, etc. In
addition, the research community have discovered many useful loose rules for spam-
tweet detection such as those in (78; 82; 125; 123; 131; 150; 157) which are likely
to be or have been adopted by Twitter into their evolving suspension-rule list. As
discussed, we use the botnet method for spam distribution in order to largely circum-
vent this strict rule. In the following, we introduce five design constraints related to
some loose rules we consider most relevant. By following these constraints, the social
4http://support.twitter.com/articles/18311#
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bots can cause much less suspicion to Twitter and thus are much less likely to be
suspended.
1. The maximum height of a retweeting tree is K = 10 according to (78). Hence
we claim that any spam tweet will not be retweeted more than 10 times.
2. A bot only retweets the spam tweets posted by its parent bot on the retweeting
tree it follows, as retweeting the tweets from non-followed users is known to be effective
in detecting spam tweets (123).
3. Any spam tweet from an arbitrary bot will be retweeted by at most 100r percent
of its followers. As r approaches one, the bot will become increasingly suspicious
according to community-based spam detection algorithms (56; 35). Recall that the
followers of any bot i ∈ [1, n] comprise other bots and also non-bot users (i.e., Fi).
Note that non-bot followers rarely retweet spam tweets in practice, but we require all
bot followers to retweet spam tweets. Then bot i can have no more than d r|Fi|
1−r e bot
followers.
4. The retweeting lag at any hop j ∈ [1, K] is a random variable ti which follows
a hop-wise statistical distribution according to (78), as it is quite abnormal for a user
to immediately retweet a post once seeing it. Here the retweeting lag is defined as
the time elapsed when a bot sees a spam tweet until it retweets it.
5. The social bots within the first M hops will be suspended once Twitter finds
that they are involved in (re)tweeting a spam tweet. This constraint is motivated by
recent findings (151) that spammer accounts on Twitter tend to be connected and
clustered by mutual followings. It is thus reasonable to assume that Twitter either
have been utilized or will soon utilize these research findings to suspend the accounts
involved in distributing a spam tweet within the first M > 0 hops. After introducing
this constraint, we relax the third one by allowing arbitrary topology in the first M
hops because all of its bots will be suspended.
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M = 3
(a)
(b)
(c)
c = 5
Figure 2.1: Exemplary Retweeting Trees With 12 Bots, Where M = 3 And the
Botmaster’s Suspension Budget is c = 5.
Problem Formulation
Give the above design objectives and constraints, we now attempt to formulate
botnet-based spam distribution as an optimization problem. The major challenge
lies in the infeasibility of simultaneously achieving the maximum coverage, the min-
imum delay, and the minimum cost. Fig. 2.1 shows an example with 12 bots and
M = 3, and we assume that every bot has the same number of non-bot followers. In
one extreme shown in Fig. 2.1(a), we can minimize the delay τ by letting every bot
be a root bot, but the cost is obviously the maximum possible because all the bots
will be suspended. In the other extreme shown in Fig. 2.1(b), we can form a single
retweeting tree with exactly three bots within the first three hops, in which case we
can achieve the minimum possible cost, but the achievable delay will always be larger
than that in the first case no matter how the retweeting tree beyond three hops is
formed. In addition, we assume for the second case that the retweeting tree can in-
clude all the 12 bots, leading to the same coverage of one as in the first case. If there
are too many bots, however, some of them may not be able to be incorporated into
the retweeting tree due to the first and third constraints, and the resulting coverage
will be smaller than that of the first case.
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To deal with the above challenge, assume that the botmaster has a suspension
budget c ∈ [M,n] bots, referring to the maximum number of suspended bots it can
tolerate. Note that the more bots in the first M hops, the more non-bot followers
in F closer to the root bot which can receive a given spam tweet in shorter time,
and thus the smaller the delay. Under the budget constraint, the minimum delay can
hence be achieved only when there are exactly c bots within the first M hops, as
shown in Fig. 2.1(c) with c = 5.
What is the optimal way to form a retweeting tree as in Fig. 2.1(c) given the
cost, coverage, and delay requirements? Recall that the cost is defined by |S| and
|S˜|. Since |S| = c under the budget constraint, we just need to minimize |S˜|. To
mathematically express the cost and coverage requirements, we let {Vk}Kk=1 denote K
disjoint subsets of the bot indices {1, . . . , n}, where K = 10 is the maximum height
of the retweeting tree (see Constraint 1), Vk denote the bot indices at level k of the
retweeting tree, and
⋃K
k=1 Vi ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. If the optimal retweeting tree eventually
found is of depth K∗ < K, the sets {Vk}Kk=K∗+1 will all be empty. Recall that Fi
denotes the set of non-bot followers of bot i ∈ [1, n] and that F = ⋃ni=1Fi. Then
we have S˜ = C \ (⋃i∈Vk,k∈[M+1,K∗]Fi) and the coverage set C = ⋃i∈Vk,k∈[1,K]Fi ⊆ F
and need to maximize |C|. Since S˜ ⊆ C, we can combine the cost and coverage
requirements into a single metric |S˜||C| and then attempt to minimize it.
It is a little more complicated to derive the delay. As discussed, a non-bot user
may follow multiple bots at different levels, in which case it is considered a follower on
the lowest level among those. Let Φk denote the set of non-bot followers at k ∈ [1, K].
It follows that Φ1 = Fi (i ∈ V1) and Φk =
⋃
i∈Vk Fi−
⋃k−1
l=1 Φl for k ∈ [1, K]. According
to Constraint 4, it takes
∑k
j=1 tj for a spam tweet to reach level-k non-bot followers,
where tj denotes the retweeting lag of hop j ∈ [1, K], and t1 = 0. Since there are
totally |Φk| non-bot followers at level k and |C| non-bot followers across all levels, we
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can compute the delay as
τ =
1
|C|
K∑
k=1
k∑
j=1
tj|Φk| .
Finally, we reduce the three-objective optimization problem to the following single-
objective minimization problem.
min f({Vk}Kk=1) = αβ
|S˜|
|C| + (1− α)τ
s.t.
K⋃
k=1
Vi ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
Vi ∩ Vj = φ, ∀i 6= j ∈ [1, K]
|
M⋃
k=1
Vi| ≤ c
∑
i∈Vk
d r|Fi|
1− re ≥ |Vk+1|,∀k ∈ [M − 1, K − 1]
(2.1)
We have two remarks here. First, α ∈ [0, 1] is a adjustable weight that reflects the
relative importance of coverage and delay, and β is a fixed scaling factor to unify two
different objective units. Second, the last constraint is due to the aforementioned
third design constraint.
The above optimization problem can be viewed as a variation of classical set
partition problem (SPP), which is NP-hard. In what follows, we introduce a heuristic
approximation solution by constructing a collection of disjointed subsets {Vk}Kk=0 from
the botnet set.
Heuristic Solution
Our intuition is to use all the budget c and fill the first M hops of the retweeting
trees with the bots having the lowest suspension cost in terms of the number of lost
non-bot followers. We then recursively place the bots with the highest number of
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non-bot followers from level M + 1 to the last level, in order to reduce the average
latency as well as cost.
To begin with, our approximation is built on the solutions to the traditional
maximum coverage problem (or MaxCover) and the minimum coverage problem
(MinCover), which is to select k sets from a collection of subsets of a ground set so
that the their union is maximized (34) or minimized, respectively. MaxCover and
MinCover problems are both NP-hard and have greedy approximation algorithms
by iteratively selecting the maximum or minimum subset after extracting the selected
elements, respectively.
Our solution consists of the following two steps. First, given the budget c for S
and that all the followers in S˜ will be lost because of the suspension, we minimize
the objective |S˜| by using MinCover to choose c bots as S˜ with the minimum total
number of non-bot followers. In doing so, we can determine the union of the bot set
for the first M level. The bot subset in each level will be determined later. Here
we just assume that S˜ has been divided into the M groups, each corresponding to
the bots in one of the first M levels. Second, we construct {Vk}Kk=M+1 to greedily
increase the coverage C and at the same time lower the average delay T . Specifically,
assuming that we have known VM , to determine VM+1, we first set the cardinality
of VM+1 be equal to
∑
i∈Vkd
r|Fi|
1−r e according to the last constraint in (2.1) and then
use MaxCover to choose a subset of |VM+1| bots from the remaining bot set with
the maximum number of non-bot followers. We repeat this greedy selection for every
level k = M + 2, . . . , K.
The remaining problem is how to partition S˜ into M subsets, each corresponding
to one of the first M levels. A heuristic observation here is that we need to maximize
|VM |, as the more non-bot followers of the social bots in the Mth level, the more social
bots in level M+1 and subsequent levels, and also the lower average delay according to
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the last constraint in (2.1). Given the budget |S˜| = c, we obtain |VM |max = c−M +1
when the retweeting forest has a single tree whose first M − 1 levels form a straight
line, as shown in Fig. 2.1(b). The bots in the Mth level is then determined by using
MaxCover to choose the c − M + 1 bots from S˜ with the maximum number of
non-bot followers.
To determine the level for each of the remaining M−1 bots, we sort the remaining
M − 1 bots in S˜ in the descending order according to the number of their non-bot
followers and assign them to the corresponding level, e.g., the bot with the highest
number of non-bot followers will be assigned to the first level. Note that it is possible
that after we maximizing the number of bots at the Mth level, the remaining bots
are less than the allowed on the Mth level, so the (M + 1)-th is not full. To further
reduce the average delay in such cases, we move the exceeding bots in the Mth level
to the first level.
After determining {Vi}Ki=1 from the social-bot set {1, . . . , n}, we can then build
the final retweeting forest (tree). Specifically, the number of retweeting trees is equal
to the cardinality of V1, which is one if the (M + 1)-th level is full or greater than
one otherwise. We then randomly choose one social bot from V1 to be the root of
the retweeting tree with more than one level, which is followed by the bots from the
second to Mth level determined by V2 to VM , respectively. Finally, we build the level
from k = M + 1 to K by selecting certain number of social bots from Vk according
the last constraint in Eq. (2.1).
2.3.3 Trace-driven Evaluation
We conduct trace-driven simulations to compare the performance of spam distri-
bution using the independent and botnet methods, as well as evaluating the tradeoffs
among the multiple goals in the botnet method.
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The evaluation for independent bots is straightforward. In particular, given the
bot set V with |V| = n, we place all the bots in the first level which will be suspended
completely. We then have C = S˜ = n, and τ = 0. The single objective in Problem
(2.1) is thus f = α.
To evaluate the botnet method, we set up the simulations according to existing
measurement data and heuristics. We set K = 10, and t1 = 0, ti = 0.5i hour for
i = 2, . . . K according to (78). To build {Fi}ni=1, we generate |Fi| according to the
Gaussian distribution with µ = 32 as the average number of followers in the dataset
of (78). We also set the variance to σ2 = 5, generate a legitimate follower set F with
|F| = 6000, 5 and randomly choose |Fi| followers from the set F for each bot i. In
addition, according to (151), the average path length of the spammer community is
2.60, so we set M = 3 to suspend the bots in the first three hops of F . Finally, we
set β to one and the retweeting ratio r = 0.2. Due to space constraints, we focus on
on the impact of α, c, and n and do not report the impact of |F|, σ2, r, M, or β in
this chapter.
Fig. 2.2 compares the independent and botnet methods using the objective func-
tion f with different weights α. As stated before, f is simply equal to α for the
independent case because τ = 0 and S˜ = C. For the botnet method, the objective
f is the weighted sum of |S˜||C| and the delay τ . When α is small, τ has higher impact
on f than |S˜||C| , while when α is large,
|S˜|
|C| will dominate f . Specifically, we can see
from Fig. 2.2a that when α = 0.4, the independent method outperforms the botnet
method with smaller f . However, as shown in Fig. 2.2b, when α increases to 0.65, the
botnet method can achieve lower f than the independent method does. This trend
is more obvious for the same reason in Fig. 2.2c where α = 0.9.
5For the Gaussian distribution with µ = 32 and σ2 = 5, the probability for generating a negative
|Fi| is negligible.
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Figure 2.2: Performance Comparison of Independent and Botnet Methods in Spam
Distribution at Different αs in Terms of the Single Objective f .
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Figure 2.3: Performance Comparison of Independent and Botnet Methods in Spam
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Figs. 2.3 compare the two methods in terms of separate objectives including the
number of lost legitimate followers and the average delay under different budget
|S| = c. We can see that both methods have the same coverage |C|, which is equal to
|F|, as well as the maximum value of C. In addition, we can see from Fig. 2.3b that
the delay of the independent method is zero, while that of botnet method could be
on the order of hours. Finally, Fig. 2.3a shows that the botnet method has significant
advantage than the independent method in terms of |S˜|, the number of lost legitimate
followers, as |S˜| is always equal to |F| for the independent scheme.
Finally, the botnet size n also has some impact on separate objectives in the
botnet case. Fig. 2.3a shows that |S˜||C| decreases as n increases. The reason is that the
larger n, the more bots with less non-bot followers will be assigned to the first M
levels, resulting in smaller |S˜| and thus larger |S˜||C| . In addition, Fig. 2.3b shows that
the larger n, the higher the average delay τ , which is also expected.
In summary, from the view point of the botmaster, these evaluations show that
the botnet scheme is more flexible than the independent method when considering
multiple objectives of the spam distribution at the same time.
2.4 Social Botnet for Digital-influence Manipulation
In this section, we first briefly introduce digital influence and then experimentally
show the efficacy of using the social botnet to manipulate digital influence.
2.4.1 Rise of Digital Influence
Digital influence is one of the hottest trends in social media and is defined as “the
ability to cause effect, change behavior, and drive measurable outcomes online” in
(122). The huge commercial potential of digital influence is in line with the increas-
ingly recognized importance of word-of-mouth marketing on social networks. There
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are also growing business cases in which various companies successfully promoted
their services/products by reaching out to most influential social-network users in
their respective context (122).
The future of digital influence also relies on effective tools to measure it. As re-
ported in (122), there are over 20 popular digital-influence software vendors such as
Klout (1) , Kred (2), Retweet Rank (3), PeerIndex (8), TwitterGrade (10) and Twit-
alyzer (9). Every vendor has its proprietary method to compute an influence score
for a given user based on his activities within his affiliated social network such as
Twitter, Facebook, Google+, and LinkedIn, and higher scores represent greater influ-
ence. As shown in Table 2.1, Klout, Kred, and PeerIndex use normalized scores with
different average values and scales, while RetweetRank, TweetGrader, and Twitalyzer
represent digital-influence scores using percentile.
The typical business model of digital-influence vendors is based around connect-
ing businesses with individuals of high influence. Companies have paid to contact
individuals with high influence scores in hopes that free merchandise and other perks
will influence them to spread positive publicity for them. For example, in 2011 Chevy
offered 139 3-day test drives of its 2012 Sonic model to selected participants with the
Klout score of at least 35 (144). As another example, it has been reported that some
recruiters have used the digital-influence scores to select qualified candidates (66).
In addition, customer service providers like Genesys prioritize customer complaints
according to their digital-influence scores to avoid the amplification of complaints by
influential users in OSNs (75). Klout announced a growth of 2,000 new partners over
a one year period in May 2012.
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2.4.2 Botnet-based Digital-influence Manipulation
Given the great potential of digital influence, whether it can be maliciously ma-
nipulated is an important research issue. For example, assume that malicious users
could collude to significantly increase their influence scores. A company using the
digital-influence service may consider them most influential and choose them as the
targets of important marketing campaigns by mistake, thus having potentially huge
financial loss, while malicious users can potentially benefit, e.g., by getting free sam-
ple products. In addition, malicious users may attract more legitimate followers who
tend to follow most influential users and thus become more influential.
As the first work of its kind, we now explore the feasibility of using the botnet to
manipulate digital influence. Our studies involve three most popular digital-influence
vendors for Twitter users: Klout, Kred, and Retweet Rank. For clarity, we summarize
their key features as follows.
• Klout: The Klout score of a Twitter user is on the scale of 1 to 100 and updated
daily based on how frequently he or she is retweeted and mentioned in the last
90 days. The average Klout score is close to 20, and the score of the 90th
percentile is over 50. 6
• Kred: The Kred score of a Twitter user is on the scale of 1 to 1,000 and
updated in real time according to how frequently he or she is retweeted, replied,
mentioned, and followed on Twitter in the last 1,000 days. 7
• Retweet Rank: It ranks the users based on how many times they each have been
retweeted recently and how many followers/friends they each have. 8 Retweet
6http://therealtimereport.com/2012/04/11/how-good-is-your-klout-score/
7http://kred.com/rules
8http://www.retweetrank.com/view/about
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ranks are updated on an hourly basis, and a retweet rank of x means that the
corresponding user is the xth most influential on Twitter. A retweet rank score
can also be translated into a percentile number ranging from 1 to 100, indicating
how the user score comparing with other Twitter users.
Given a social botnet of n bots, we want to investigate whether it is feasible to
generate an arbitrary influence score di for every bot i ∈ [1, n] under each of the
above three tools. Since every bot is usually indistinguishable from a legitimate
user, our investigation can also shed light on the feasibility of using the botnet to
manipulate the influence score of an arbitrary Twitter user. Since every digital-
influence vendor (including the above three) usually keeps confidential its detailed
algorithm for computing influence scores, our studies are purely based on real Twitter
experiments. According to (122), we conjecture that the following three factors play
the important role in determining a user’s digital-influence score.
• Actions. Both the number and the type of actions have large impacts on a user’s
digital-influence score. Intuitively, the more actions the user can attract, the
higher his digital-influence score. Moreover, different types of actions may have
different impacts. For example, retweeting or replying should be more indicative
than following because the latter has been shown to be more vulnerable to fake
(151).
• Audiences. Given a target user u, we define all the users who have retweeted or
replied u’s tweets, or mentioned or followed u as u’s audiences. We conjecture
that the larger the audience size, the higher the digital-influence scores. The
intuition is that the target user is more influential if each of his 100 tweets is
retweeted by a different user than all 100 tweets are retweeted by the same one
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user. We also conjecture that the higher the digital-influence scores his audience
have, the higher the target user’s digital-influence score.
• Popularity of tweets. The digital-influence score of a target user is determined
by the popularity of his tweets. We want to explore how the distribution of
tweets popularity determine the target user’s overall influence.
Based on these factors, we then present how to orchestrate the social botnets to
manipulate the digital-influence scores.
Impact of Different Actions
Since almost all digital-influence tools measure a Twitter users digital influence as
his ability to drive others to actions, our first experiment aims to evaluate the social
botnet’s impact with following, retweeting, and mentioning. We do not consider
replying, as replying is treated by Twitter as a special type of mentioning and is thus
expected to have the same effect as mentioning actions.
The first set of experiments involves n = 1, 000 social bots, each of which has no
interaction with any other Twitter account and hence is not scored by Klout, Kred,
or Retweet Rank. Note that Klout assigns an influence score of 10 to new users, while
Kred and Retweet Rank both assign a zero score to new users. We randomly choose
three disjoint groups, each containing 10 social bots and performing a unique action.
For every social bot in the following group, we add 10 randomly chosen social bots as
followers each day of the first 10 days and then 100 followers each day of the next 10
days. Likewise, every social bot in the retweeting (or mentioning) group is retweeted
(or mentioned) by randomly chosen social bots 10, 100 and 1000 times each day in the
first, second, and the last 10 days, respectively. Since different vendors have different
schedules for score updating, we report the social bots’ influence scores observed at
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Figure 2.4: Manipulating Digital Influence by Following and Retweeting.
every midnight. In addition, since the three vendors have different score scales, we
normalize different influence scores with respect to the corresponding maximum scores
to facilitate direct comparison. In particular, we show x/100 and y/1000 for a Klout
score x and a Kred score y, respectively, and report the percentile score for Tweet
Rank.
Figs. 2.4a∼2.4b show the impact of following and retweeting 9 actions on Klout,
Kred, and Retweet Rank influence scores, where every data point is the average
across the same group. We can see from Fig. 2.4a that the Klout influence score is
not affected by the number of followers, while both Kred and Retweet Rank influence
scores increase as the number of followers increases. This indicates that a social
botnet can easily boost the Kred and Retweet Rank influence scores of its members
by purposely following each other. Moreover, we can see from Fig. 2.4b that all three
types of influence scores increase as the number that a user is retweeted increases.
9Mentioning action has similar result with retweeting (161). We omitted here due to space
constraints.
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On the one hand, this makes much sense, as the higher the frequency in which a user
is retweeted, the higher influence of that user has in its local neighborhood. On the
other hand, this also renders the influence score measurement system vulnerable to
social botnets, as colluding social bots can fake arbitrarily high retweeting frequency
for any target user.
We can also see from Figs. 2.4a and 2.4b that none of our experiments has been
able to escalate a user’s influence score to an extremely high value, and we conjecture
that there are two reasons for such difficulty. First, the audience size is limited,
as we only have 1,000 social bots for experiment. We will show in the next set of
experiments that the audience size has a large impact on the digital-influence scores.
Second, it is likely that all the vendors have set up rules such that it is extremely
difficult to achieve almost full digital-influence scores (1; 2; 3). Nevertheless, at the
end of the experiments, Table 2.1 shows that all the digital-influence scores being
manipulated have exceeded the 90-th percentile.
Impact of Different Audience Sizes
In this set of experiments, we measure the impact of different audience sizes on
digital-influence scores. Recall that we define a user u’s audiences as the set of users
who have retweeted, mentioned, or followed u. We then try to answer the following
questions. First, for two users with different audience sizes but the same numbers of
actions, will the one with more audiences have a higher digital-influence score than
the other? Second, it there an upper limit for a single social bot to manipulate the
influence score of a target user? There could be two alternative answers to each of the
two questions. On the one hand, if the digital-influence scores are related to both the
number of incoming actions and the audience size, a single user should have limited
power to manipulate the target user’s influence score, and we thus need a large social
29
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Figure 2.5: Manipulation by Social Botnets with Different Audience Sizes.
botnet to manipulate the target user’s influence score to some extremely high value.
On the other hand, if the digital-influence scores may not relate to the audience size,
then 100 incoming actions from 100 different social bots would yield the same result
as 100 incoming actions from a single social bot.
To verify which of the two conjectures is correct, we build three social botnets with
1, 10, and 100 bots, respectively. For each social botnet, we set 10 target users and
retweet 100 tweets of each target each day for seven days. In other words, each bot
in the three social botnets retweets 100, 10, and 1 times per day, respectively. Fig 2.5
shows the digital-influence scores of the 30 targets. As we can see, the audience size
has no impact on both Kred and Retweet Rank scores but has large impact on the
Klout scores. Specifically, the larger the audience size, the higher the Klout scores,
and vice versa. Moreover, the Klout scores experience a sharp increase in the first day
and then increase much slower in the following days. As a result, a single social bot
can manipulate a target user’s Kred and Retweet Rank scores with a large number
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Figure 2.6: Manipulation by Acting on Different Number of Tweets.
of actions, while both large audience sizes and significant actions are necessary to
obtain high Klout scores. We also conclude that Klout is more resilient to the social
botnet than Kred and Retweet Rank.
Impact of Tweet Popularity
From the first set of experiments, we can see that the retweeting is the most effective
way to manipulate a target user’s digital-influence score. Given the same audience,
the attacker can either retweet a single tweet of the target user to make this tweet very
popular or retweet many of target user tweets so that each tweet will be less popular.
We would like to answer which strategy will yield higher digital-influence score, i.e.,
whether tweet popularity has any impact on the digital-influence scores? To answer
this question, we build a social botnet with 100 bots. We then select two groups with
each containing 10 target users for manipulation. For the first group, each target first
publishes a tweet, which is then retweeted by all the 100 social bots; while for the
second group, each target user publishes 100 tweets, each of which is retweeted by
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one social bot. We repeat this process daily and measure the digital-influence scores
of the 20 targets. As we can see from Fig 2.6, the tweet popularity has no impact
on both Klout and Kred scores and limited impact on the Retweet Rank score. In
particular, adopting the second strategy will lead to a slightly higher Retweet Rank
score of the target user.
Speed of Digital-influence Manipulation
Our last experiment targets evaluating how fast influence scores can be manipulated.
Same with the last set of experiments, we choose the retweeting as the action due to
its effectiveness. For this purpose, we randomly select another three different groups
of social bots, each containing 10 target bots. Every bot in the first, second, and
third groups is retweeted 10, 100, and 1,000 times every day by random bots until
the scores reach the 90th percentile, which corresponds to 50, 656, and 90 in Klout,
Kred, and Retweet Rank, respectively.
Fig. 2.7 further shows the impact of retweeting frequency on the change of influence
scores, where every data point represents the average across the same bot group. In
particular, we can see that the number of days needed to increase the group average
influence score from the initial value to 80-th or 90-th percentile is approximately
inversely proportional to the retweeting frequency. In addition, we can see that for
all three vendors, it is possible by retweeting 1000 times per day to reach the 80-th
percentile and the 90-th percentile with only one and two days, respectively.
Remarks
We have two remarks to make. First, at the end of the experiments, no account was
suspended by Twitter, as none of the accounts had conducted illegitimate activities
such as spamming and aggressively following and unfollowing which could trigger sus-
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Figure 2.7: Under Different Retweeting Speeds, the Number of Days Needed to Ma-
nipulate Digital Influence Scores from Nothing into 80-th and 90-th Percentiles.
pension by Twitter. In addition, both the spam distribution and the digital influence
manipulation attacks show that social botnet has significant advantage over isolated
bots. In particular, even though the attacker can disseminate spams to the same le-
gitimate recipients using isolated bots, those isolated bots will be quickly suspended
under Twitter’s current policy or its variation and thus incurs significant cost for the
attacker. Moreover, it is extremely difficult for the attacker to boost a single bot’s
digital influence score solely by letting the target bot tweet or retweet other legitimate
users’ tweets, as long as the digital influence is not entirely determined by outgoing
interactions, as it is difficult for bots to attract incoming interactions from legitimate
users.
2.5 Defenses
In this section, we propose two countermeasures for the two attacks above, re-
spectively.
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2.5.1 Defense Against Botnet-based Spam Distribution
Recall that in social botnet-based spam distribution, the attacker exploits retweet-
ing trees to distribute spams (i.e., tweets with malicious URLs) such that only the
bots on the first M (e.g., M = 1 in Twitter currently) levels of retweeting trees will
be suspended.
To defend against this attack, we propose to track each user’s history of participat-
ing in spam distribution and suspend a user if his accumulated suspicious behaviors
exceed some threshold. Specifically, for each user v we maintain a spam score sv,
which is updated every time user v retweets a spam. Once sv exceeds a predefined
threshold, user v is labeled as a spammer and suspended.
We now discuss how sv is updated. Our intuition is that the closer the user to
the spam source, the more likely he is a member of the social botnet. The reason is
that social botnet usually prefers shorter retweeting path for fast spam dissemination,
while a spam tweet traversing a long retweeting path, i.e., sequentially retweeted by
many accounts, incurs large delay and gives more time for Twitter to detect them.
To reflect this idea, whenever a user retweets a spam, we update his spam score as
sv = sv + γ
d , (2.2)
where d is the number of retweeting hops between the spam source to v, and γ ≤ 1 is
the attenuation factor of distance. Note that d = 0 if user v is the source of a spam.
In this way, any user who has retweeted spams is punished by having his spam score
increased. Once a user’s spam score exceeds certain predetermined threshold, the user
is suspended. Note that Twitter currently suspends a user whenever he has published
one spam tweet. To mimic the current Twitter policy, we can set the threshold as
one.
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Evaluation
Similar to Section 2.3.3, we built a Twitter subnet composed of 6000 legitimate users
and 400 social bots. Each social bot has |Fi| legitimate followers, where |Fi| is drawn
from Gaussian distribution with µ = 32 and δ2 = 5, and each social bot follows
all other social bots. We assume that the attacker builds the optimal retweeting tree
according to Section 2.3.2. We adopt similar parameters as in Section 2.3.3 by setting
M = 3, α = 0.2, c = 10, and K = 10.
To model the spam campaign, we conduct the experiment in multiple rounds. In
each round, we randomly select one social bot to publish a spam tweet and other
social bots that have not been suspended to retweet the spam tweet according to the
retweeting forest. We assume that the legitimate users retweet the spam occasionally
with probability β. At the end of each round, we update the spam scores for each
bot and legitimate user according to Eq. (2.2). If sv ≥ 1 for some user v, we remove
v from the simulated network. We then start the next round by randomly selecting a
bot as the new source and continue the spam distribution. To reduce the randomness,
we repeat each experiment 100 times and report the averages.
We evaluate the proposed defense in comparison with three other baseline defenses
as follows.
• Defense I. The original defense that suspends the users in the first M levels
from the spam source, which is considered by the attacker to launch the optimal
spam distribution as discussed in Section 3.2.
• Defense II. Any user who retweets δ spams is suspended, regardless of its
distance to the spam source, where δ is a system parameter.
• Defense III. Assume that user v has retweeted a spam tweet t within M hops
from the source and that t has been retweeted by nt users in total. The spam
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score for v is updated as
sv = sv + 1/ log(1 + nt) .
Defense III extends Defense I and II by taking the popularity of individual spam
tweet into account. The intuition is that the more users retweet a spam tweet,
the more deceiving the spam tweet, and the less likely that any individual user
who retweets it is a bot. We also use the system parameter δ as the suspending
threshold for this defense scheme.
• Defense IV. The proposed defense.
We use four metrics to compare the proposed defense with the three baseline
defenses. To begin with, let Nbots and Nlegit be the numbers of social bots and
legitimate users, respectively. Also let Sbots and Slegit be the numbers of suspended
social bots and legitimate users, respectively. We define the following four metrics.
• True positive rate (TPR): the ratio of the suspended bots over the total bots,
which can be computed as Sbots/Nbots. This metric is also referred to as recall.
• False positive rate (FPR): the ratio of suspended legitimate users over all the
legitimate users, which can be computed as Slegit/Nlegit.
• Precision: the ratio of suspended bots over all suspended users, which can be
computed as Sbots/(Slegit + Sbots).
• Overall performance: TPR − P · FPR where P is the penalty parameter for
FPR.
We adopted overall performance here because FPR has much larger impact than TPR
from the service provider’s point of view, as suspending a legitimate user damages its
reputation and incurs much severer consequences than a social bot evading detection.
36
Round
0 2 4 6 8 10
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
.=0.9
.=0.8
.=0.7
.=0.6
.=0.5
(a) True Positive Rate
Round
0 2 4 6 8 10
Fa
ls
e 
Po
si
tiv
e 
R
at
e
#10-4
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
.=0.9
.=0.8
.=0.7
.=0.6
.=0.5
(b) False Positive Rate
Figure 2.8: The True and False Positive Rates with Different γs.
Fig. 2.8 shows the true positive and false positive rates with different γs which are
the attenuation factors of distance. As we can see, the proposed defense could quickly
detect all the social bots when γ is large. Specifically, when γ = 0.9, all the social
bots can be detected and suspended in the second round. Moreover, as expected, the
ratio of true suspension at the same round will decrease as γ decreases. Finally, there
is an anticipated tradeoff between false and true positive rates for different γs. The
larger γ, the higher true positive rate but also the higher false positive rate, and vice
versa. In the following experiments, we set γ = 0.7 by default.
Fig. 2.9 compares the proposed defense with the three baselines under different
βs, i.e., the probability of a legitimate user retweeting a spam tweet. We can make
five observations here. First, Fig. 2.9a shows that β has no impact on the TPR,
but Fig. 2.9b shows that the larger β, the higher FPR for all four defenses, which is
consistent with the definition of β. Second, Fig. 2.9a shows that Defense II has the
highest TPR = 100% in every round. The reason is that when δ = 1.0 all the social
bots will be suspended after the first round. Defense IV has the second highest
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Figure 2.9: Performance Comparison.
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TPR and needs about five rounds to approach 100%. Defense I and III both have
lower TPR because they only examine the users in the first M = 3 levels instead of
the whole network. Third, Fig. 2.9b shows that the FPR of the proposed defense is
lower than those of Defenses I and II but slightly higher than that of Defense III.
This is because Defense I and II have much less restrict conditions for suspending
users than Defense IV. Fourth, Fig. 2.9c shows that Defenses IV and III have the
precision close to 100% after the first and sixth rounds, respectively, as they both
incur low false positives and sufficiently high true positives. Defense III has 0%
of precision before the sixth round because it did not suspend any social bot in the
first five rounds. In contrast, both Defense I and II have relatively low precision
because they misclassified many normal users as bots. Finally, Fig. 2.9d shows that
the proposed defense has better overall performance than all three baselines with
penalty factor P varying from 10 to 10000. The reason is that Defense IV has much
lower FPR than Defense I and II and higher TPR than Defense III. In summary,
the proposed defense outperforms all three baselines as it can effectively detect social
bots while being friendly to legitimate users.
2.5.2 Defense Against Digital-influence Manipulation
As discussed in Section 2.4, all the digital-influence software vendors consider
the number of actions and/or the audience size as the major factors in evaluating a
user’s digital-influence, which makes them vulnerable to the social botnet. To address
this vulnerability, we propose a new digital-influence measurement scheme inspired
by (63). The key idea is to find sufficient credible users and only use the actions
from them to compute digital-influence scores for other users. Specifically, given a
social network with user set V and all the actions (including following, retweeting,
mentioning, and replying) among the users, we first find a subset V ∗ ⊆ V of users
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that are credible.
We then define the digital-influence score of each user v based on the actions from
the credible user set V ∗. Specifically, assume that user v has received aj actions from
each user j ∈ V ∗. The digital influence score for v is then given by as
score(v) =
∑
j∈V ∗
f(aj) (2.3)
where
f(aj) =

aj if aj = 0, 1,
1 + λ · exp(− 1
aj
) else,
(2.4)
and λ is a system parameter that represents the maximum impact of actions from a
single user on one’s score. In practice, we can set λ = 1 such that a single user could
contribute the score by at most 2. It is easy to see that the above score definition takes
both the number of actions and the audience size into account, which captures the key
ideas behind Klout, Kred, Retweet Rank scores as well our findings in Section 2.4.2.
The challenge is then how to find the credible user set V ∗. To tackle this challenge,
we observe that although the actions among the social bots and from the social bots
to the legitimate users are unpredictable, legitimate users usually carefully choose
whom to interact, so there are much fewer actions from legitimate users to social
bots. Based on this observation, we first find a small number of trusted users, which
could either be the verified users maintained by Twitter or manually verified.
We then assign each trusted user some initial credits and distribute the credits
along the action edges in multiple rounds. In each round, every user with credits keeps
one unit of credit for himself and distributes the remaining credits to his neighbors
along the action edges. The credit distribution process terminates when no user has
extra credits to distribute. Since legitimate users are more likely to receive credits
than social bots during the process, every user who has received at least one unit of
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credit is considered credible.
More specifically, we first construct an action graph for credit distribution. Given
the user set V and all their actions during the period T , we build a weighted and
directed action graph G = (V,E), where each user corresponds to a vertex in V , and
there is an arc eij from user i to user j an edge with the weight wij if user i has
retweeted, replied, or mentioned user j for wij times during the period T . We do not
consider the following action because it has been reported that normal users could
carelessly follow back whoever has followed them (151; 59).
We then design a credit distribution scheme on G = (V,E), which consists of seeds
selection, initial credit assignment, iterative credit distribution, and termination. To
initiate credit distribution, we first select a seed set S from V which are trusted users
such as the verified users maintained by Twitter or manually verified, and partition
the whole graph into a tree of multiple levels, in which the seed users occupy the
first level, their one-hop outgoing neighbors occupy the second level, and so on. A
node is assigned to the highest level if its incoming neighbors appear at different
levels. We then assign each seed s with the amount of credits proportional to the
sum of weights of its outgoing edges, i.e., wo(s)Ctotal/
∑
s∈S wo(s), where Ctotal is the
total amount of initial credits, and wo(s) is the sum of weights of the seed s’s all
outgoing edges. We then distribute the credit from the seed users along the tree level
by level. Specifically, if a user v at the nth level has c(v) units of credit, he holds one
unit of credit for himself and distributes the remaining c(v)− 1 units of credit to its
outgoing neighbors at the (n + 1)th level, where the amount of credits received by
neighbor v′ is proportional to the edge weight evv′ . In other words, neighbor v′ receives
wvv′(c(v)−1)/
∑
u∈O(v)wvu units of credits. The credits could only be distributed from
one level to the immediate higher level and are rounded to the closest integer. The
credit distribution terminates if none of the nodes has any extra credit to distribute
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to its outgoing neighbors.
The choice of Ctotal represents the tradeoff between true and false positive rates.
On the one hand, with a larger Ctotal, we could discover more credible users and
compute digital-influence scores for more legitimate users at the cost of more social
bots obtaining credits and being labelled as credible users. On the other hand, a
smaller Ctotal will result in fewer credible users being discovered as well as fewer
social bots being labelled as credible users. As in (135), we set Ctotal = O(
√|V |) to
strike a good balance between true and false positive rates. The idea is that at the
end of credit distribution, approximately Ctotal users will each hold one unit of credit
and be labelled as credible. If we set Ctotal = O(
√|V |) and the interaction graph is
well-connected, with high probability there exists at least one arc from some credible
users to each of the |V | users while the credit distribution will terminate in O(log |V |)
levels with decreasing credits per arc such that each attack arc from legitimate users
to social bots is expected to receive only O(1) of credits (135).
Evaluation
We follow the approach taken by (155; 29; 160) to evaluate the performance of the
digital-influence measurement scheme. Specifically, we first use the Twitter geo-search
API (13) to collect the users in a specific metropolitan area and then crawl the latest
600 tweets of each user to extract the interactions such as retweets, replies, and
mentions. We create four datasets from the four representative area in U.S. as shown
in Table 2.2.
For each dataset, we build one ground-truth network composed of both legitimate
users and social botnets. Specifically, we first build one legitimate action subgraph
from the interactions among the legitimate users in the that area, where each vertex
corresponds with one legitimate user, and an edge from one user to another corre-
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Table 2.2: Four Action Networks for Evaluation, Where ’F’ and ’I’ Refer to Following
and Interaction, Respectively.
Area #Users #F-edges #I-edges (#Weights)
Tucson (TS) 28,161 830,926 162,333 (669,006)
Philadelphia (PI) 144,033 5,462,013 1,434,375 (4,972,689)
Chicago (CI) 318,632 14,737,526 3,631,469 (12,010,986)
Los Angeles (LA) 300,148 18,333,774 4,391,542 (14,048,838)
sponds to interaction from the former to the latter. We further create a completely-
connected social botnet with the same number of social bots as the legitimate users.
We then construct a ground-truth network by connecting the legitimate action sub-
graph and the social botnet with a number of attack edges from legitimate action
subgraph to the social botnet. Here we assume that there is no edge from the social
botnet to the legitimate action subgraph, which is clearly in favor of the social bots,
as the social bots would only lose credits through such edges.
The attack edges are constructed in the following way. Assuming that there are
total g edges in the legitimate action subgraph, we create ωg attack edges with unit
weight, where ω is the ratio representing attack strength. As in (160), we vary the ω
from 10−5 to 10−4 of the total edges in each legitimate subgraph. We use ground-truth
networks to conduct the credit distribution and find the credible user subset V ∗.
As in (29), we consider two types of attacks. In the random attack, we randomly
choose ωg legitimate users and connect each of them to one randomly chosen social
bot with an attack edge. In this case, the attacker is unaware of which users are seed.
In the seed-targeting attack, we create ωg attack edges between the social botnet and
ωg users randomly chosen from 100ωg legitimate users with shortest distances to the
seeds. This type of attack mimics the case that the attacker tries to acquire positions
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close to the seed users to gain more credits during credit distribution. For both
attacks, we assume that the social botnet can arbitrarily distribute received credits
internally. For example, suppose that the social botnet receives Cbots credits after
the credit distribution, they distribute these credits to Cbots social bots each with one
credit, such that all Cbots bots become credible users.
We evaluate the performance of the proposed digital-influence measurement scheme
using the following metrics.
• Top-K-percent accuracy. Let U1 be the list of legitimate users ranked by their
total numbers of incoming interactions. Also let U2 be the list of legitimate
users ranked by their digital influence scores obtained by applying the proposed
digital-influence measurement scheme to the ground-truth network. Further let
U1(K) and U2(K) be the top-K-percent users in U1 and U2, respectively. The
top-K-percent accuracy is defined as |U1(K)∩U2(K)||U1(K)| . The more accurate of the
proposed scheme, the higher the ratio of common users in these two top-K lists,
and vice versa.
• Social-bot influence ranking. Let bot b be the bot with the highest digital
influence score output by the proposed digital-influence measurement scheme.
Social-bot influence ranking is defined as b’s rank in percentile in U1. The lower
the bot’s percentile, the higher resilience to the social botnet, and vice versa.
Fig. 2.10 and Fig. 2.11 show the top-10-percent accuracy and the social-bot influ-
ence ranking under two types of attacks with attack strength varying from 10−5 to
10−4. In general, we see similar trend in all scenarios for all the four datasets, mean-
ing that the results are consistent across different datasets. Moreover, in all cases,
the accuracy is always larger than 70%, meaning that the proposed digital-influence
measurement scheme can discover 70% of top-10% influential users under the social
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Figure 2.10: The Performance under the Random Attack.
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Figure 2.11: The Performance under the Seed-targeting Attack.
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botnet attack. We can also see in Fig. 2.10a and Fig. 2.11a that the the accuracy is
insensitive to the change of attack strength. The reason is that the top influential
users attract actions from many legitimate users, who have higher chances to acquire
the credits and become credible users in the presence of attack edges. In contrast, as
shown in in Fig. 2.10b and Fig. 2.11b, the social-bot influence ranking increases as
the attack strength increases under both types of attacks. This is expected, because
as attack strength increases, more social bots will acquire credits to become credible
users and affect target bots’ influence scores. We can also see from Figs. 2.10b and
2.11b that the social-bot influence ranking is below top 40% and top 20% under the
random attack and seed-targeting attack, respectively.
Fig. 2.10b and Fig. 2.11b also compare the proposed defense with the existing
influence measurement vendor Kred. 10 As we can see, the bot’s influence score
could always rank at the first position because we assumed that there are infinite
actions between any two bots in the botnet. In contrast, the proposed scheme could
effectively defend against the manipulation from social botnets.
Fig. 2.12 shows the impact of K on the top-K-percent accuracy, which generally
increases until to 100% when K increases from 10 to 100. Overall, the accuracy is
higher than 70% in the figures, and K = 10 in previous experiments is representative
among the worst cases.
In summary, experiment results show that the proposed digital-influence measure-
ment scheme is resilient to the social botnet attack.
2.6 Related Work
In this section, we discuss the prior work tightly related to our work in this chapter.
10we choose Kred because only Kred has publish its influence score model on http://kred.com/
rules.
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Figure 2.12: The Impact of K on the Top-K-percent Accuracy.
The social botnet has received attention only recently. Ferrara et al. summarized
the research on social bots in (52). Boshmaf et al. showed that a social botnet is very
effective in connecting to many random or targeted Facebook users (i.e., large-scale
infiltration) (26). The work in (152; 53) shows how the spammers become smarter to
embed themselves into Twitter. Messias et al. used two sicalbots to manipulate the
Klout and Twitalyzer scores by following and tweeting actions(101). Our preliminary
work (161) was independently done from (101) and shows how social bots could
cooperate to manipulate the influence scores of Klout, Kred, and Retweet Rank.
There is a rich literature on spam detection in OSNs. The first line of work
such as (157; 123; 131; 56; 125; 82; 150; 20; 141; 83) considers independent spam
bots and comes up with different methods to characterize and detect them. For
example, Song et al. found that the distance between the sender and receiver of
a message is larger for spammers than legitimate users (123). Zhang et al. found
that automated spammers usually show some temporal pattern which can be used
for detection (157). Another features and the corresponding machine learning effort
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can be found in (131; 56; 125; 82; 150; 20; 141; 83). Some of these results such as
(123) have been incorporated into our design constraints in § 2.3.2.
The second line of work such as (57; 62; 132; 35; 151; 59) focuses on character-
izing and detecting organized spam campaigns launched by an army of spam bots.
We discover a new method for effective spam campaign in this chapter, and whether
the results in (57; 62; 132; 35; 151; 59) can be directly or adapted to detect our
method is certainly challenging and worthy of further investigation. Moreover, spam
bots are evolving towards more intelligence. Yang et al. found that instead of sep-
arate communities, spam bots embedded themselves into the network by building
small-world-like networks between them and also maintaining tight links with ex-
ternal legitimate users(151). Meanwhile, Ghosh et al. discovered the similarly rich
connections between spam bots and the legitimate users(59). Our work is consis-
tent with this trending and explore the new attacks by using the spam bots’ growing
intelligence.
There are effective solutions such as (29; 138; 139; 135; 154; 155) to detecting
Sybil accounts in distributed systems under the control of a single attacker. These
solutions commonly assume that the link between two accounts corresponds to a
real social relationship difficult to establish and impossible to forge. Moreover, all of
these system assume that the connection is undirected. In this chapter, we designed
the defense scheme for directed and weighted Twitter network by using the similar
observation that the amount of interactions from a legitimate user to a social bot
is usually far less than that in the reverse direction in § 2.5.2. We also found that
using the interaction network yields better defense performance than the following
networks. Although § 2.5.2 has illustrate an example by using the trustworthiness of
interactions to defend against the specific digital-influence manipulation attack, we
can use the same observation but different methods to identify the social botnets and
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then eliminate them from the microblogging system.
Also related is the research on computing the digital influence score (30; 143; 16).
For example, Cha et al., compared three influence ranking lists in Twitter by counting
the number of retweets, mentions and followers and found that the influenced defined
by the number of followers is very different with the other two metrics (30). Bakshy
et al. (16) proposed to measure user influence based on his ability to post the tweets
that generates a cascade of retweets. This line of research does not consider the
impact of the social botnet. This work is also different from our previous work (160)
which focuses on finding the sybil-resilient top-K influential users in Twitter.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we firmly validated the efficacy and merits of botnet-based spam
distribution and digital-influence manipulation on Twitter through thorough exper-
iments and trace-driven simulations. We also propose the countermeasures corre-
sponding to these two attacks and demonstrate their effectiveness.
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Chapter 3
TRUETOP: A SYBIL-RESILIENT SYSTEM FOR USER INFLUENCE
MEASUREMENT ON TWITTER
3.1 Introduction
Influential Twitter users have great potential for accelerating information dissem-
ination and acquisition. For example, to launch a viral marketing campaign for a new
product via Twitter, a known strategy is for the marketer to seed the product with a
few selected influential users who can potentially influence a disproportionately large
number of others and also quickly trigger a cascade of influence. As another example,
in the event of a national crisis, the governmental authority can conduct a massive
information campaign by disseminating truthful information via influential users to
effectively achieve strategic goals and also counteract rumors. As the last example,
to have realtime situational awareness about a physical region of interest, military
agencies can recruit volunteers in the target region via influential Twitter users there
and then outsource the collection of in-situ information to the volunteers.
The strong promise of influential users leads to the growing attention on how to
measure the influence of a Twitter user (30; 78; 143; 16). There are also over 20 com-
mercial tools available for measuring twitterers’ online influence. Common to these
research proposals (30; 78; 143; 16) and commercial tools is to capture the qualita-
tive feature of online influence as “the ability to cause effect, change behavior, and
drive measurable outcomes online” (122) and to quantify a twitterer’s online influence
based on his/her interactions with others.
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The rise of social bots (52) or sybils (45) in general on Twitter is jeopardizing
trustworthy influence measurement. In a sybil attack, the adversary coordinates
many fake accounts (also called bots or sybil users hereafter) to unfairly overpower
non-sybil users. Despite various efforts to detect sybil users on Twitter (20; 62; 125;
131; 56; 133), sybil users are still thriving on Twitter. For example, a recent study (4)
revealed that at least 10% of Twitter users are sybil users. Given the exclusive reliance
of existing influence measurement techniques on user interactions, the adversary could
coordinate his sybil users to create arbitrary interactions to inflate their influence
scores on Twitter. Since influence scores are relatively defined, the adversary could
also effectively deflate the influence scores of non-sybil Twitter users. According to
our recent study (161), an adversary controlling 1,000 sybil users can quickly generate
an influence score in the 95th percentile for any sybil user under popular influence
measurement tools such as Klout (1), Kred (2), and Retweet Rank (3). In a similar
study (101), Messias et al. used two social bots to successfully obtain high Klout
scores.
The lack of sybil-resilient influence measurement services on Twitter can be detri-
mental. Specifically, there is a growing market for influence measurement services
with more than 20 service providers available (122). If these service providers fail to
provide trustworthy measurement results due to sybil attacks, they will have extreme
difficulty getting customers and surviving, and their customers could not achieve
effective information dissemination or acquisition as expected.
The root cause for the vulnerability of existing influence measurement techniques
to sybil attacks lies in the incautious use of user interactions. Specifically, Twitter
permits four types of publicly visible user interactions, including follow, retweet, reply,
and mention. The interactions about any user can be further classified into incoming
interactions towards him and outgoing interactions from him. Since a sybil user can
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freely follow, retweet, reply to, and mention other sybil or non-sybil users, extensive
outgoing interactions are fairly easy to create and thus unsuitable for sybil-resilient
influence measurement. In addition, since sybil users could easily get many legitimate
followers (59; 151; 126), the number of followers each user has should also be ruled out.
In contrast, we observe from real Twitter data that non-sybil users tend to be more
selective in retweeting, replying to, and mentioning other users. This observation is in
line with the real-life scenario: one may exchange business cards with many strangers
but will be more cautious in choosing whom to further interact with. This means that
incoming retweets, replies, and mentions are much more trustworthy information for
measuring user influence. Existing influence measurement techniques, however, use
all incoming and outgoing interactions in a non-discriminative way.
We propose TrueTop, a novel sybil-resilient influence measurement system based
on the incoming retweets, replies, and mentions each Twitter user has. TrueTop
provides on-demand influence measurement services to various customers such as
business companies and government agencies. Given a target set of Twitter users
(e.g., those in a geographic area of interest), TrueTop outputs a ranked list of top-K
influential users for a desirable integer K ≥ 1. TrueTop is designed to be sybil-resilient
and also accurate, which means that the TrueTop output contains bounded sybil users
and the true top-K non-sybil users with overwhelming probability, respectively.
The main design challenge for TrueTop is that sybil users can arbitrarily interact
among themselves, so it is not sybil-resilient to evaluate a user’s influence directly
based on his total incoming retweets, replies, and mentions. We propose the following
method to tackle this challenge. Given the target set of users, we first construct a
weighted directed interaction graph, in which every vertex corresponds to a unique
user in the target set. An edge from vertex a to vertex b exists if user a has ever
retweeted, replied to, or mentioned user b, and the edge weight is proportional to the
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number of retweets, replies, and mentions from a to b. Imagine that the interaction
graph consists of a virtual non-sybil region with all non-sybil users and a virtual sybil
region with all sybil users. Given our previous observations, both the number of edges
and the total edge weights from the non-sybil region to the sybil region should be
much smaller than those in the reverse direction. Then we seed some carefully chosen
vertices (or users) in the non-sybil region with some credits and let every vertex in the
whole graph allocate its current credits to its direct successors proportionally to the
corresponding edge weights in every iteration. After sufficient iterations, the top-K
influential non-sybil users are very likely to stand out, as they can accumulate many
credits due to their abundant incoming retweets, replies, and mentions. In contrast,
the total credits flowing into the sybil region can be very limited, so even the sybil
users with many incoming interactions from sybil followers may end up with few
credits. We can thus achieve sybil-resilient influence measurement by counting the
final credits at every vertex.
This chapter makes the following contributions.
• We motivate and formulate the problem of sybil-resilient influence measure-
ments on Twitter.
• We propose TrueTop, a novel influence measurement system that can identify
the top-K influential users in a target set of Twitter users with high accuracy
in the presence of sybil attacks by exploiting the selectivity of non-sybil users
in interacting with other users.
• We confirm the high accuracy and sybil-resilience of TrueTop by detailed theo-
retical analysis and extensive experiments on real datasets.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 surveys the related
work. Section 5.3.5 introduces Twitter basics, our system and threat models, and our
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design objectives. Section 3.4 illustrates the TrueTop design. Section 3.5 theoretically
analyzes the accuracy and sybil resilience of TrueTop. Section 3.6 evaluates the
performance of TrueTop by detailed experiments. Section 3.7 summarizes the chapter.
3.2 Related Work
There is significant effort to explore social networks for effective sybil defenses in
various distributed systems, such as SybilGuard (155) and SybilLimit (154) for P2P
networks, SumUp (135) for online voting systems, and SybilInfer (41), SybilDefense
(142), and SybilRank (29) for online social networks. A common assumption is that
each node can be mapped into one in an undirected social network graph where
every edge corresponds to a human-established trust relation. Although the attacker
can create many sybil accounts, he cannot establish an arbitrarily large number of
social trust relations with non-sybil users. Moreover, all schemes assume that the
honest region is fast mixing and separate from the sybil region. Built upon these two
key insights, these schemes conduct varying community detection methods (140) to
limit the number of sybil users admitted into or their impact in various application
scenarios.
Recent measurement studies have questioned these two assumptions. Yang et al.
(153) showed that sybil users on the Facebook-like Renren network can have their
friend requests accepted by many non-sybil users. A similar result targeting Face-
book was reported in (26). Blending sybil users into the non-sybil community would
reduce the effectiveness of the existing sybil defenses (76). In addition, the work in
(120; 59; 101; 161; 52) showed that sybil users successfully acquired a number of follow-
ings from non-sybil users on Twitter. All these findings indicate that neither bidirec-
tional friendships in Fackbook-like OSNs nor unidirectional followings in Twitter-like
microblogging systems can be used as the trustable mirroring of real social relations.
54
Moreover, it has been shown in (105; 104) that the mixing time of many practical
and directed social graphs is much longer than previously expected. Since neither of
the two key assumptions underlying the schemes in (155; 135; 41; 140; 154; 142; 29)
holds in directed networks such as Twitter, they are not directly applicable to our
targeted scenario. Our TrueTop system does not rely on either assumption.
As a special kind of sybil users, spammers in Twitter has attracted considerable
attention in recent years. A common approach adopted by existing work (20; 125;
62; 131; 56; 133; 49; 68) is to detect spammers by measuring the behavioral difference
between spammers and legitimate users. Spammers are a special type of sybil users,
and the detection of general sybil users on Twitter remains an open challenge.
There is a rich literature for influence measurement on Twitter. Cha et al. (30)
found that the numbers of retweets and mentions serve as better metrics than the
number of followers in measuring user influence. Bakshy et al. (16) proposed to mea-
sure user influence based on his ability to post the tweets that generates a cascade of
retweets. TwitterRank (143) combines link structure and topical similarity between
Twitter users and uses a modified PageRank algorithm to calculate user influence.
Pal and Counts (114) also proposed a framework to identify topical authorities in
microblogging systems. All these schemes are vulnerable to sybil users who can forge
arbitrary information employed by these schemes for influence measurement. More-
over, many metrics used by these schemes have been incorporated into commercial
influence measurement tools (122), and the vulnerability of representative tools to
sybil attacks has been experimentally verified in (161).
Also related is the research on modelling, measuring, and analyzing the interac-
tions in OSNs, e.g., (36; 21; 145; 71; 147). Our work is the first to build a weighted
directed interaction graph from historical incoming retweets, replies, and mentions
on Twitter and use it for identifying influential users.
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3.3 Preliminaries
3.3.1 Twitter Basics
We illustrate the basic operations on Twitter to help understand our design. The
social relationships on Twitter are unidirectional by users following others. If user
A follows user B, A is B’s follower, and B is A’s followee. A user usually needs
no prior consent from his followees. Twitter also allows each user to approve/deny
every following request, but this option is relatively rarely used. A user can send
text-based messages of up to 140 characters, known as tweets, which can be read by
all his followers. Tweets can be visible to anyone with or without a Twitter account,
and they can also be protected and are only visible to approved followers. There
are three special kinds of tweets corresponding to three operations. A retweet is a
re-posting of someone else’s tweet, a reply corresponds to a response to a tweet, and a
mention refers to inserting “@username” in a tweet to ensure that the specified user
can see this tweet. Finally, each user has a timeline which shows all the latest tweets
(including original tweets, retweets, replies, and mentions) of his followees. Also note
that Twitter allows direct messages to be sent between users. Since those direct
messages are not publicly visible, they cannot be used to measure user influence.
3.3.2 System Model
TrueTop is run by a service provider (SP) offering on-demand influence measure-
ment services to customers such as viral marketers, government/military agencies, or
even individuals. Given a measurement request, the TrueTop SP first determines the
target set of Twitter users to evaluate, denoted by U . The users in U can be directly
given by the customer or identified by the TrueTop SP according to some common
features specified by the customer. For example, the customer can specify a target
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geographic region, a target age group, a target topic (e.g., music), etc. As said, True-
Top relies on incoming interactions among the users in U , i.e., the retweets, replies,
and mentions each user in U has received from all the other users in U . So we assume
that the SP has a reliable way to obtain the incoming interaction data needed, e.g.,
directly from Twitter, via crawling, or from some third-party providers of social me-
dia data. For example, Gnip (http://gnip.com/) is an authorized reseller of Twitter
data. TrueTop is designed to output a ranked list of top-K influential users in U ,
where K ≥ 1 denotes a customer-specified integer.
3.3.3 Threat Model
Let U˜ denote all possible sybil users in U . We assume that the SP knows neither
which user in U is a sybil user nor how many sybil users there are; otherwise, the
identified sybil users can be simply removed from U . Based on the recent measurement
study (59), we assume that each sybil user may have followed and also been followed
by some non-sybil and sybil users in U . There may be a single attacker controlling U˜
or multiple independent ones with each controlling an exclusive subset of U˜ . TrueTop
can deal with both cases without modification, so we focus on the more challenging
former case hereafter. The goal of the attacker is to gain high influence scores for his
sybil users and maximize the number of users in the TrueTop output.
3.3.4 Design Objectives
Let U∗K and UK denote the top-K non-sybil influential users in U and the TrueTop
output, respectively. We have two major design objectives.
• Accuracy : TrueTop should identify the true top-K non-sybil users, which means
the difference between U∗K and UK should be very small.
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• Sybil resilience: TrueTop should not identify sybil users as top-K users, i.e.,
the the intersection UK ∩ U˜ should be very small.
3.4 TrueTop Design
3.4.1 Overview
TrueTop is motivated by the observation that incoming retweets, replies, and
mentions are more trustworthy for measuring user influence than outgoing interac-
tions. So our first step is to construct an interaction graph, in which every vertex
corresponds to a unique user in the target set U , and every directed edge indicates
totally non-zero retweets, replies, and mentions from the tail user to the head user.
In addition, the weight of every edge is a non-decreasing function of related retweets,
replies, and mentions.
The next step is to choose a suitable metric to quantify the influence of every user
(vertex) in the interaction graph. TrueTop adopts weighted eigenvector centrality
(WEC for short) (108), the de facto metric for measuring the influence of a node in
a weighted directed graph. Specifically, the WEC score of every user corresponds to
his influence score, which depends on the weights of his incoming edges, the number
of his direct predecessors, and their influence scores which are further determined
by their respective incoming edges and direct predecessors. The WEC score reflects
an intuition that the influence of a user is better indicated by the interactions from
influential users than those from less influential users.
We uses iterative credit distribution for the convenience to describe and under-
stand our method. Specifically, we select some random users (called seeds) in the
interaction graph and seed each with some credits. In each iteration, we allocate
all the credits each user receives in the last iteration to his direct successors propor-
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tionally to individual edge weights. The credits each user receives in one iteration
are expected to stabilize after sufficient iterations and be proportional to his WEC
score. It can be easily shown that iterative credit distribution is equivalent to power
iteration (80), a standard technique for computing WEC scores. Since sybil users
can create arbitrary interactions among themselves, some of them may gain enough
credits to appear in the top-K list. TrueTop achieves high sybil resilience by carefully
choosing the initial seeds and also early terminating iterative credit distribution.
In what follows, we first illustrate the construction of the interaction graph in
Section 3.4.2. Next, we present an iterative credit distribution scheme over the in-
teraction graph in Section 3.4.3. Finally, we introduce how to achieve sybil-resilient
iterative credit distribution in Section 3.4.4.
3.4.2 Interaction Graph Construction
Given the target users U and their interaction data, TrueTop first builds a weighted
directed interaction graph denoted by G = 〈U ,V〉, where U is abused to denote the
vertex set, and every edge vi,j ∈ V (i, j ∈ U) is directed and indicates that there
are some retweets, replies, and/or mentions from user i to j. The major challenge
here is to determine the weight wi,j of every edge vi,j. As shown in Fig. 3.1, G can
be divided into a virtual sybil region S including all the sybil users and a virtual
non-sybil region H including all the non-sybil users. The sybil-resilience requirement
for TrueTop requires that the sum of the edge weights from the non-sybil region to
the sybil region is small, while the accuracy requirement for TrueTop demands that
the weight wi,j reflects the true influence of user j on i in the target period. Let Ii,j
denote the set of time-indexed retweets, replies, and mentions from user i to j. We
consider the following two methods for defining the edge weights.
• Sum-based. In this method, wi,j equals |Ii,j|. Sum-based edge weights satisfy
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the sybil-resilient requirement, as the total edge weights from the non-sybil
region to the sybil region are as limited as the number of retweets, replies, and
mentions from non-sybil users to sybil users. They also partially satisfy the
accuracy requirement, as the more interactions from i to j, the more influence
j likely has on i, and the higher wi,j. Sum-based edge weights, however, fail to
catch the temporal aspect of interactions. For example, consider another direct
predecessor of j, say l, where |Ii,j| = |Il,j|. Assume that the interactions in
Il,j occurred in the last few days in the target period, while those in Ii,j were
spread more evenly. It may be natural to say that j has stronger influence on
user i than on user l, but we have wi,j = wl,j for sum-based methods.
• Entropy-based. In this method, we divide the target period into µ equal-length
epochs for some system parameter µ ≥ 1 and denote the total number of
retweets, replies, and mentions from user i to j in epoch xth by dx, where |Ii,j| =∑µ
x=1 dx. Then we define the edge weight wi,j = (1 −
∑µ
x=1
dx
|Ii,j | log
dx
|Ii,j |)|Ii,j|.
The more consistent the interactions from i to j in time, the higher wi,j, and
vice versa. When all the interactions happen in a single epoch, the weight is
identical to sum-based |Ii,j|. Entropy-based edge weights can also satisfy the
sybil-resilience requirement, as non-sybil users unlikely have consistent inter-
actions to sybil users so that the total edge weight from the non-sybil region
to the sybil region can be expectedly small. In contrast to sum-based edge
weights, entropy-based edge weights successfully catch the temporal informa-
tion in the interactions while failing to reflect the volume of the interactions.
So they partially satisfy the accuracy requirement as well.
The effects of the above methods are compared in Section 3.6. There may be other
ways to define the edge weights. For example, we can let wi,j equal a linear combina-
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tion of the edge weights derived under sum-based and entropy methods, respectively;
we can also assign different weights to retweets, replies, and mentions according to
slightly different effort and/or social implication related to performing these interac-
tions. A further study on such issues is left as future work due to space constraints.
Note that we only consider retweets, replies, and mentions in the weight defi-
nitions because they are representative on Twitter and have been used in all the
existing influence measurement techniques. Some other factors could also impact the
user influence, such as following connections and favorites. As stated before, since
sybil users could easily get many legitimate followers (59; 151; 126), the following
connections fail to achieve the sybil resilience and hence should be ruled out for the
influence measurement. On Twitter, a user could favor the tweets from other users,
but there is no public Twitter API which can return the favorite user list for any
given tweet. Should a public Twitter API for retrieving favorites become available,
we can easily incorporate favorites into TrueTop.
3.4.3 Credit Distribution
TrueTop uses the WEC score of every user in G = 〈U ,V〉 as his influence score.
Specifically, let pii denote the WEC score of user i in G and W = (wi,j) denote the
normalized weighted adjacency matrix of G. The vector pi = 〈pi1, pi2, . . . , pi|U|〉 is the
dominant eigenvector of W, i.e., the solution to the equation piW = pi according to
(108).
Power iteration (80) is a common technique to compute the WEC vector pi. Let
v0 be a random vector composed of |U| nonnegative elements totalling one. In power
iteration, pi is computed in an iterative fashion as
pi = lim
t→∞
x(t) = lim
t→∞
v0W
t , (3.1)
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where x(t) = x(t−1)W with the initial x(0) = v0. If G is strongly connected, pi exists,
is unique, and is unrelated to v0. In practice, power iteration normally terminates if
‖x(t) − x(t−1)‖1 < ν for some acceptable error threshold ν (e.g., 10−9).
The WEC vector only exists in a strongly connected graph (108), in which every
vertex is reachable from every other vertex. Although G itself may be not strongly
connected in practice, it usually has a giant strongly connected component (GSCC)
which includes the majority of the vertexes and edges and is dramatically larger
than all other strongly connected components (SCCs). Since the most influential
users should have intensive interactions with other users, the top-K influential users
should be in the GSCC with overwhelming probability. Our subsequent operations
thus apply to the GSCC only. The verification of the existence of GSCC in real
datasets is deferred to Section 3.6.
TrueTop uses iterative credit distribution instead to compute pi to facilitate the
presentation. Initially, we randomly select a few users (called seeds) in G and initialize
each with the same number of notional credits totalling one. At every iteration, we
allocate the credits each user receives in the last iteration to his direct successors
proportionally to the corresponding edge weights. Let C
(t)
j denote the number of
credits at any user j ∈ U after t iterations, which are proportional to his influence
score measured after t iterations. C
(t)
j is a real number in general and can be computed
as
C
(t)
j =
∑
i∈IN(j)
wi,jC
(t−1)
i∑
k∈OUT(i)wi,k
, (3.2)
where IN(j) and OUT(i) denote the direct predecessors of user j and the direct succes-
sors of user i in G, respectively. Similarly, we can terminate credit distribution when∑
j∈U |C(t)j − C(t−1)j | < η for some acceptable error threshold η (e.g., 10−9).
We can easily show that iterative credit distribution above is equivalent to power
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Sybil RegionNon-sybil Region
Figure 3.1: The Interaction Graph With a Virtual Non-sybil Region H and a Virtual
Sybil Region S.
iteration. In particular, assume that s seeds are chosen in iterative credit distribution,
each having 1/s credits initially. We further select v0 for power iteration such that
the ith element equals 1/s if user i is a seed and zero otherwise. Then Eq. (3.2) is
apparently the element-wise expression of x(t) = x(t−1)W. Since power iteration does
not depend on a specific v0, we have x
(t)
j = C
(t)
j for any user j ∈ U after t iterations.
Iterative credit distribution described above is still subject to sybil attacks. To see
this, consider Fig. 3.1 where the interaction graph is divided into a virtual non-sybil
region H and a virtual sybil region S. We denote the total edge weights within H,
within S, from H to S, and from S to H by WH, WS , αWH, and βWS , respectively,
where α  1. Although the adversary has no control over WH and α, he can easily
manipulate WS and β to make βWS very small. Even if all the seeds are chosen from
H in the best scenario, more and more credits will flow into and stay in S as time
goes by. We have the following proposition about the vulnerability of iterative credit
distribution to sybil attacks.
Proposition 3.4.1. Assume that the total edge weights from the non-sybil region H
to the sybil region S and from S to H are α and β fractions of the total edge weights in
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H and S, respectively. The total credits in S increase monotonically with the iteration
t and asymptotically approach to α
α+β
.
Proof. Let the total credits in H and S at t-th iteration be C(t)H and C(t)S , respectively.
According to the credit distribution defined in Eq. 3.2, after the t-th iteration, the
average credits flowed from H to S and S to H are αC(t)H and βC(t)S , respectively.
Meanwhile, the total credits in the whole network is constant to 1. Hence,
C
(t)
H = (1− α)C(t−1)H + βC(t−1)S
= (1− α)C(t−1)H + β(1− C(t−1)H )
= (1− α− β)C(t−1)H + β
= (1− α− β)t−1C(1)H + ((1− α− β)t−2 + . . .+ 1)β
= (
1
α + β
− 1)α(1− α− β)t−1 + β
α + β
and
C
(t)
S = 1− C(t)H = (1−
1
α + β
)α(1− α− β)t−1 + α
α + β
Since α  1 and β  1, C(t)H will decrease monotonically and C(t)S will increase
monotonically. When t→∞, C(t)S = αα+β .
Since the adversary can well control the topology within S, most credits in S can
go to a few sybil users who may eventually appear in the top-K influential users.
3.4.4 Sybil-Resilient Credit Distribution
TrueTop adopts the following two defenses against sybil attacks such that most
credits can stay in the non-sybil region for sufficient iterations.
The first defense is to use non-sybil seeds only so that credit distribution can
start from the non-sybil region H. We propose to use verified Twitter users as seeds
64
by three reasons. First, Twitter has certified their authenticity. Each verified user
has a blue verified badge on his profile page and is followed by the official Twitter
account @verified. Second, there are many verified users available as candidate seeds.
As of April 2014, Twitter has verified more than 88,600 accounts among 255 million
monthly active users and keeps verifying more. Since G can be expected to contain
many users in practice, there should be at least one verified user in G with very high
probability. Finally, since verified users are usually public figures such as politicians,
celebrities, or business leaders, we can trust them to be very cautious in whom to
retweet, reply to, and mention. This implies that the immediate successors of verified
users on the interaction graph G are very likely to be non-sybil users as well, so are the
successors’ immediate successors. If we start credit distribution from verified users,
most credits can be expected to stay inside H after many iterations.
How many seeds should we choose? Some verified users may be very close to the
sybil region, but we cannot tell who they are. Ideally speaking, we should choose the
verified users far from the sybil region. On the one hand, if a verified user is randomly
chosen as the sole seed, he may be too close to the sybil region. On the other hand,
if we use all the verified users in G as the seeds, it is very likely that some of them
are close to the sybil region. In addition, the number of seeds affects the convergence
of iterative credit distribution: the more seeds, the faster the algorithm converges. It
is impossible to specify the decisive rules for seed selection, so we randomly choose
s ≥ 1 seeds from the verified users in G and experimentally evaluate the impact of
seed selection in Section 3.6.
How should we assign the initial credits among the s seeds? We propose two
methods as follows.
• Basic method. The total credits are evenly assigned to the s seeds. This straight-
forward method assumes that each seed has the same importance for credit
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distribution.
• Reverse-WEC. Since the credits flow out from the seeds, we can assign more
initial credits to the seeds who can quickly reach more users to speed up the
algorithm convergence. For this purpose, we conduct the credit distribution
introduced in Section 3.4.3 over an inverse interaction graph generated from G
by reversing the directions of all the edges and also setting all the edge weights
to one. The final credits at each user naturally reflects his connectivity in G. So
we select the verified users with the top-K highest credits as the seeds and then
assign to each of them the initial credits proportional to their credits obtained
via reverse credit distribution.
The second defense is to early terminate iterative credit distribution before it
converges in the whole graph G. To see the necessity and intuition for this defense,
recall that we start credit distribution from non-sybil seeds in the non-sybil region.
Since the total edge weight from the non-sybil region to the sybil region is relatively
small, we can expect credit distribution to converge much faster in the non-sybil
region than in the whole G. In addition, the most influential non-sybil users normally
have many incoming interactions and thus a rich number of credit sources in G. So
they can quickly accumulate a lot of credits to stand out much faster than other
non-sybil users. If we early terminate iterative credit distribution, most or all of the
sybil users would not get enough credits to appear in the resulting top-K influential
users, so we can achieve sybil resilience. However, if credit distribution stops too
early, some true top-K influential non-sybil users may not get enough credits to be
ranked in the top-K list, leading to an inaccurate result.
We design a simple but effective algorithm to tackle the dilemma between sybil
resilience and accuracy. The key idea is to monitor the ranking change of the can-
66
didate top-K users in two consecutive iterations. Whenever the ranking change is
no larger than an acceptable threshold, we terminate the algorithm and output the
current top-K users as the top-K influential users. This algorithm is directly built
on our observation above. Specifically, since the top-K non-sybil influential users is
more likely to stand out much faster than both sybil users and other non-sybil users
during credit distribution, their rankings are more likely to become stable in fewer
iterations as well. We detail the algorithm as follows and postpone its performance
analysis to Section 3.5.
Algorithm 1: Find the top-K influential users
input : Interaction graph G; s seed users; K; maximum number of iterations
T ; ranking-error tolerance 
output: The top-K influential users
1 Assign initial credits among s seed users by either basic or reverse-WEC
method;
2 t← 1;
3 while t < T do
4 Distribute the credit in the t-th iteration according to Eq. 3.2;
5 Rank the users by their credits and obtain the candidate top-K users R(t);
6 Compute the ranking distance d(K)(t) between R(t) and R(t−1) as in
Eq. 3.3;
7 if d(K)(t) <=  then
8 break;
9 t← t+ 1;
10 return R(t) as the top-K influential users
Let r(t)(u) and r(t−1)(u) denote the rankings of user u in iterations t and t − 1,
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respectively. We define the ranking distance d(K)(t) between R(t) and R(t−1) as
d(K)(t) =
∑
u∈R(t)(K)∪R(t−1)(K)
|r(t)(u)− r(t−1)(u)| . (3.3)
The algorithm above has two key parameters: T and . The former dictates the
maximum number of iterations, and the latter specifies the maximum ranking error
tolerance. The larger T , the longer the algorithm execution time, the more accurate
the top-K influential users, the more credits flowing into the sybil region and thus the
less sybil resilience, and vice versa. In contrast, the larger , the shorter the algorithm
execution time, the less accurate the top-K influential users, the fewer credits flowing
into the sybil region and thus the higher sybil resilience, and vice versa. In practice,
we can let  < K, meaning that each user in the current top-K list has experienced
a ranking change of less than one on average in contrast to the previous iteration.
3.5 Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the accuracy and sybil resilience of TrueTop. Recall
that U∗K denotes the true top-K influential users in the non-sybil region, UK denotes
the TrueTop output (i.e., the output of Alg. 10), and U˜ denotes all the sybil users in
the sybil region. So we can use UK ∩ U∗K and UK ∩ U˜ to measure the accuracy and
sybil-resilience of TrueTop, respectively.
To make the performance analysis tractable, we first assume that Alg. 10 runs
in the non-sybil region only, so we can conduct an upper-bound analysis about the
accuracy of TrueTop by setting the ranking error tolerance parameter  = 0 and T
extremely large such that Alg. 10 terminates only when a stable top-K user list is
found. We then show that Alg. 10 will terminate in asymptotically the same number
of iterations for  = 0, based on which we finally estimate the number of sybil users
appearing in UK . As stated before, the larger , the shorter the algorithm execution
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time, the less accurate the top-K influential users, the fewer credits flowing into the
sybil region and thus the higher sybil resilience, and vice versa. Hence by setting
 = 0, we can provide the lower and upper bounds for sybil resilience and accuracy,
respectively. As for arbitrary  > 0, we unfortunately cannot obtain the closed-form
analytical result for sybil resilience or accuracy and thus resort to experiments to
evaluate its impact in Section 3.6.
The following concepts are needed for the accuracy analysis.
Definition 3.5.1 ((Relative) Error Bound). Let pi denote the true WEC vector of
non-sybil users and the k-ranked user refer to the one with the kth highest WEC score
τk in pi. Let τ
(t)
k denote the WEC score of the k-ranked user after iteration t. Then
e
(t)
k = |τ (t)k − τk| is defined as the error bound for the k-ranked node after iteration t,
and e
′(t)
k = e
(t)
k /τk is defined as the relative error bound.
Definition 3.5.2 ((Relative) WEC gap). The WEC gap for the k-ranked node is
defined as ∆k = τk− τk+1, and ∆′k = ∆k/τk is the correspondingly relative WEC gap.
Lemma 3.5.1. Let W denote the normalized weighted adjacency matrix of the non-
sybil region with n users, among which there are s seed users. Construct v0 for power
iteration (see Eq. 3.1) such that the ith element equals 1/s if user i is a seed and zero
otherwise. Then the relative error bound for the k-ranked user satisfies e
′(t)
k ≤ λt,
where λ < 1 denotes W’s second largest eigenvalue.
Proof. According to the Perron-Frobenius theory (18), the matrix W is irreducible
and has the largest eigenvalue of 1, and all other eigenvalues are absolutely less than
1, denoted as 1 = λ1 > λ2 ≥ λ3 ≥ . . . ≥ λn > −1. Moreover, if we denote the
corresponding n eigenvectors as v1,v2, . . . ,vn, then |v1| = 1 and we denote v1 as the
WEC vector pi. Next if W is diagonalizable, then v1,v2, . . . ,vn can be orthogonal
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to expand the whole space of Rn. For the case of non-diagonalizable W, we can use
the Jordan canonical form to transform it into a diagonalizable one (121).
Since v1,v2,v3, . . . ,vn are orthogonal, v0 can be written as
v0 =
n∑
i=1
aivi (3.4)
where ai ∈ R. We argue that if W is stochastic and irreducible then a1 = 1. To see
why, we first notice that since W is stochastic, W1 = 1. It follows that vTi W1 =
λiv
T
i 1 = v
T
i 1. The eigenvector corresponding to λ1 is the stationary distribution of
Markov Chain W. Since W is irreducible, λi < 1 and λi 6= 1 when i 6= 1. Thus we
can see that vTi 1 = 0 for i 6= 1. Multiplying 1 at both sides of Eq. 3.4, it follows that
v01 = a1v11. Since both v0 and v1 are non-negative vectors with the sum of 1, we
have a1 = 1.
Thus Eq. 3.4 can be simplified as
v0 = v1 +
n∑
i=2
aivi = pi +
n∑
i=2
aivi .
Multiplying Wt at both sides and keeping using the equation viW = λiW, we
can obtain
x(t) = v0W
t = (pi +
n∑
i=2
aivi)W
t = pi +
n∑
i=2
λtiaivi .
Let λ = max(|λ2|, |λn|). As the t → ∞, λt will become dominant and it follows
that |(x(t) − pi)i| = O(λt)
Moreover, for j ∈ U \ s,∑ni=1 aivi,j = v0,j = 0. Hence,
e
(t)
j = |
n∑
i=2
λtiaivi,j| ≤ λt|
n∑
i=2
aivi,j| = λt| − v1,j| = λtpij .
Lemma 3.5.1 states that the rank of each user in iteration t approaches its true
rank for sufficiently large t.
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In addition, Ghoshal and Barabasi (60) recently found that if the WEC vector
(Pagerank in their paper) follows power law distribution, the gap between the kth
and (k + 1)th WEC scores decreases with k. We thus have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5.2. (60) If the WEC vector pi follows a power-law distribution with pa-
rameter γ, the relative WEC gap for the k-ranked user satisfies ∆′k ≈ 1k(γ−1) .
The proof of Lemma 3.5.2 is straightforward according to (60) and omitted here
due to space constraints. In Section 3.6, we show that the WEC vectors for real
Twitter datasets indeed follow the power-law distribution. We then have the following
theorem based on Lemma 3.5.1 and Lemma 3.5.2.
Theorem 3.5.1. For iterative credit distribution in a strongly-connected weighted
directed graph with the monotone-decreasing ∆′k with k, if λ
t ≤ ∆′k/2 in iteration t,
the ranked list of users with top-k credits remain the same in subsequent iterations.
Proof. The conclusion is composed of two parts. We begin with the first part, i.e.,
if λt ≤ ∆′k/2 at the t-th iteration, then x1 > x2 > . . . xk. Consider the k- and
(k − 1)-ranked nodes. Since the relative WEC gap ∆′k is monotone decreasing for k,
we have
e′k ≤ λt ≤ ∆′k/2 < ∆′k−1/2
Combined with e′k−1 ≤ λt in Lemma 3.5.1, we can get e′k−1 < ∆′k−1/2. In other words, ek = |xk − pik| ≤ ∆k/2,ek−1 = |xk−1 − pik−1| < ∆k−1/2.
By several operations, we have
xk−1 − xk > ((pik−1 − pik)− (pik − pik+1))/2 > 0
71
which holds since ∆k/pik < ∆k−1/pik−1 < ∆k−1/pik. Similarly, we can find that xk−2 >
xk, . . . , x1 > xk. Moreover, if starting from (k − 1)-ranked node (it holds as e′k−1 ≤
λt ≤ ∆′k−1/2), we have xk−2 > xk−1, . . . , x1 > xk−1 and thus x1 > x2 > . . . > xk.
Then we prove the second part, i.e., if λt ≤ ∆′k/2 at the t-th iteration, then
xk > xj, where j is from k + 1 to n. Consider the k- and (k + 1)-ranked nodes. We
have  ek+1 ≤ λ
tpik+1 < λ
tpik ≤ ∆k/2,
ek ≤ λtpik ≤ ∆k/2.
Hence,
xk+1 − xk < 0
and so for all other nodes with the rankings larger than k.
Since λt is geometrically decreasing for t, λt < ∆′k/2 holds for all the following
iterations and so does the conclusion.
Theorem 3.5.1 indicates that if there are no sybil users, Alg. 10 (or TrueTop)
can generate the true top-K influential non-sybil users if λt ≤ ∆′K/2, i.e., when t ≤
− log(2K(γ−1))/ log(λ) or t = O(| log(K)/ log(λ)|) iterations. This also corresponds
to the case of  = 0 with 100% accuracy. Since the total edge weights from/to the
non-sybil region to/from the sybil region are relatively very small, we can expect that
the sybil region has little impact on the influence rankings of non-sybil users. So the
accuracy of TrueTop under sybil attacks is tightly related to how many sybil users
can show up in the top-K list, i.e., the sybil-resilience of TrueTop, as analyzed in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.5.2. Let α be the ratio of the total edge weight from the non-sybil region
to the sybil region over the total edge weights in the non-sybil region. Assume that
the attacker wants to place as many sybils into the top-K list as possible by retaining
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all the credits flowing into the sybil region. The number of sybil users in the top-K
list after early termination in t = O(log(K)/ log(λ)) iterations is upper-bounded by
K(1− (1− α)t)/(1− α)t.
Proof. According to (60), the expected k-ranked WEC is
〈pi〉k ≈
Γ(k − 1
γ−1)
Γ(k)
According to Proposition 3.4.1, the number of credits for S after the t-th iteration is
given by:
C
(t)
S = 1− C(t)H = (1−
1
α + β
)α(1− α− β)t−1 + α
α + β
The maximum C
(t)
S can be obtained as 1 − (1 − α)t when β → 0, i.e., the sybils
conduct very limited interactions to the non-sybil users. Moreover, since the attacker
wants to place as many sybils into the top-K list as possible, he can just divide the
total credits C
(t)
S by the k-ranked WEC value. Then the number of sybils that own
〈pi〉K credits is given by
n(K) =
C
(t)
S
C
(t)
H 〈pi〉K
≈ 1− (1− α)
t
(1− α)t〈pi〉K
Here we further approximate the 〈pi〉K . For the power law distribution, 2 ≤ γ < 3.
Thus
Γ(k − 1
γ−1)
Γ(k)
>
Γ(k − 1)
Γ(k)
=
1
k
Hence, we can obtain n(K) < K(1− (1− α)t)/(1− α)t.
Accordingly, we can easily derive the lower bound for the accuracy of TrueTop
because there are at least K(2 − 1/(1 − α)t) true top-K non-sybil users in the final
top-K list. Note that since α 1 and K is usually at the scale of 1,000 and 10,000,
this upper bound is far less than K, meaning that there are only negligible sybil users
in the top-K list.
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3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we thoroughly evaluate the performance of TrueTop. We first
introduce some implementation details and the runtime performance, followed by the
datasets used in our evaluations. Next, we verify two underlying assumptions in
our design. Finally, we evaluate the accuracy and sybil resilience of TrueTop under
various sybil attacks.
3.6.1 Implementation and Runtime Performance
TrueTop is composed of two main components: the interaction graph construction
and the credit distribution with early termination. We implemented both with a total
of 2000+ lines of mixed code of Python and C++. Specifically, to efficiently handle
the large-scale interaction networks (millions of nodes and billions of edges) in a
commodity PC, we adopted the Graphchi computing framework (79) to implement
the credit distribution of TrueTop. On our desktop with 3.4GHz Intel-i7 3770 CPU,
16G Memory, a 7200RPM hard disk, and Ubuntu 12.04 LTS, one single iteration of
credit distribution took 0.3s, 2.5s, 9.2s, and 17.1s for our four datasets in Table 3.1
with 4K, 10K, 1M and 2M nodes, respectively. For a graph with 2M nodes, TrueTop
can thus find the top-1000 influential users after 1,000 iterations within less than five
hours on a commodity PC. Since TrueTop is expected to be run by a service provider
with much more powerful computation resources, its runtime performance should be
acceptable.
3.6.2 Datasets
We crawled four representative datasets with public Twitter APIs. The SF and TS
datasets include all the active users who have specified San Francisco Bay Area and
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Table 3.1: Dataset Characteristics.
SF TS Random Music
Crawling period 8/30-11/30, 2013 6/28-9/28, 2013
#users 176,506 5,827 1,999,834 999,807
#edges 1,493,924 40,031 63,803,204 34,688854
#users in GSCC
104,000 4,127 1,541,343 687,693
(58.9%) (70.8%) (77.1%) (68.9%)
#edges in GSCC
1,305,834 36,189 55,781,520 30,170,774
(87.4%) (90.4%) (87.4%) (87.0%)
#users in 2nd SCC 357 6 82 21
Tucson, Arizona in the location field of their public profiles in the crawling (or target)
period, respectively. In addition, the Random dataset contains a random set of active
Twitter users in the target period, and the Music dataset contains the active users
who have used the keyword “music” in their tweets in the target period. Each dataset
includes all the user IDs and also their time-indexed tweets during the target period,
which include original tweets, retweets, replies, and mentions. Then we constructed
two interaction graphs for each dataset according to the process in Section 3.4.2, one
for sum-based edge weights and the other for entropy-based edge weights.
Table 3.1 summarizes the basic statistics of the interaction graphs of each dataset,
which apply to both sum-based and entropy-based edge weights. As we can see,
each interaction graph has a giant strongly connected component (GSCC) which
is far larger than the second largest SCC. Since TrueTop measures user influence
based on incoming interactions, the top-K influential users are in the GSCC with
overwhelming probability. Our subsequent evaluations are thus done on the GSCC
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Figure 3.2: The Distribution of WEC Values.
in each interaction graph only. We obtained very similar evaluation results for sum-
based and entropy-based interaction graphs. Due to space limitations, we report the
results for sum-based interaction graphs in most cases.
3.6.3 Feasibility Studies
WEC Value Characteristics
TrueTop bases its early termination of iterative credit distribution on two assump-
tions. First, the WEC values of non-sybil nodes follow a power-law distribution.
Second, the relative WEC gap ∆′k decreases as k increases. Now we verify these two
assumptions.
Fig. 3.2 shows the log-log CCDF of the WEC values. We can see that all the CCDF
curves are close to straight lines with the slopes from -2 to -1 for the WEC values
larger than 10−6. Since a power-law distribution with PDF p(x) = (γ − 1)x−γ has a
CCDF F¯ (x) = x1−γ, the WEC values of each interaction graph follow a power-law
distribution with parameter γ from 2 to 3.
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(a) SF (b) TS
(c) Music (d) Random
Figure 3.3: Relative WEC Gap ∆′k.
Fig. 3.3 shows the log-log scale of ∆′k as a function of k, where the results are
shown up to k = 105 due to space constraints. We computed the WEC values by
using ν = 10−4 as the error tolerance threshold of power iterations, which led to
about 1,000 iterations. ∆′k obviously decreases with an approximate slope of -1 in the
log-log scale, which coincides well with the analysis in Lemma 3.5.2.
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Interaction Analysis
Since there is no benchmark for the real-world sybils on Twitter, we designed an
experiment to estimate the total edge weight from the non-sybil region to the sybil
region in order to verify that it is relatively very small. To catch the growing in-
telligence of Twitter sybils, we adopted the behavior of the emerging social bots
(101; 161; 52). Our experiment run as follows. We first purchased 1000 Twitter ac-
counts, then divided them to mimic legitimate activities as in (101; 161), and finally
investigated how many legitimate users will follow or interact with them. Specifically,
we divided these 1000 accounts into five groups of equal size, each corresponding to
a unique activity among following, tweeting, retweeting, mentioning, and replying.
We ran the experiment for 30 days. In each day, we let each sybil user in each group
initiate 10 activities corresponding to that group. For example, each sybil user in the
Following group followed 10 randomly-chosen new users in each dataset every day.
Except the sybil users in the Tweeting group, the sybil users in all the other groups
initiated the corresponding activities only towards randomly chosen new users in each
dataset. We also recorded the total followings/mentions/retweets/replies every sybil
group received each day. In addition, we chose the Random, SF, and Music datasets
as the target datasets in the first 14, middle 8, and last 8 days, respectively.
Fig. 3.4 shows the incoming-outgoing (I-O) ratios of each sybil group, which is
defined as the number of total followings/mentions/retweets/replies each sybil group
received every day over the total number of interactions initialized from the sybil
group in the same day (i.e., 2,000). We have two observations. First, non-sybil users
are very careful about whom to interact with and rarely interact with sybil users.
Second, sybil users can get a non-trivial number of non-sybil followers. We manually
found that most non-sybil followers are normal users out of reciprocity, social capi-
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Figure 3.4: Incoming-outgoing Ratios for Sybil Groups, Where the Same Legend is
Used in All the Figures.
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Table 3.2: The Comparison of Incoming-outgoing Ratios Between Sybil and Non-sybil
Communities Under Sum-based and Entropy-based Interaction Graphs.
Graph Model Community SF Random Music
Sum
Non-sybil 0.89 1.04 0.70
Sybil 0.08 0.08 0.08
Entropy
Non-sybil 1.54 1.15 0.60
Sybil 0.04 0.07 0.05
talists, or even spam accounts not suspended by Twitter, and this observation is in
line with prior results in (59; 151). So incoming followings are less trustworthy for
evaluating user influence than incoming replies, mentions, and retweets.
To compute the I-O ratios of the sybil and non-sybil communities, we randomly
chose 30 groups of 200 users from each of Random, SF, and Music datasets. We then
recorded the incoming and outgoing interactions of each non-sybil group every day
in the same experimental period. The I-O ratio for each sybil or non-sybil group
is redefined as the total incoming edge weight over the total outgoing edge weight.
Table 3.2 compares the average I-O ratios of the sybil and non-sybil groups for both
sum-based and entropy-based edge weights. As we can see, non-sybil communities
always have much higher I-O ratios (i.e., much more balanced incoming and outgoing
interactions) than sybil communities. Moreover, the entropy-based weight model
yields lower and higher I-O ratios than the sum-based weight model for the sybil and
non-sybil communities, respectively. We thus expect that the entropy-based weight
model can lead to better sybil resilience than the sum-based model (as shown in
Table 3.3).
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3.6.4 Accuracy and Sybil Resilience Studies
Evaluation Methodologies
Since large-scale real experiments on Twitter inevitably violate the Twitter ToS,
we resort to synthetic simulations to evaluate the accuracy and sybil resilience of
TrueTop. We used all the four datasets and obtained quite consistent results. Below
we show the evaluation results for the SF dataset only due to space constraints.
We modelled the strength of sybil attacks on Twitter by a parameter α, which
refers to the ratio of the total edge weight in the non-sybil region over that from
the non-sybil region to the sybil region. The default value of α, denoted by α∗, is
obtained from our datasets as follows. Assume that the network is composed of a
non-sybil region with n1 twitterers and a sybil region with n2 twitterers. According
to our experiments, we found that about 0.98‰ of the users in the SF dataset have
been suspended, so we set n1 = 1000n2. Moreover, assume that each non-sybil user
initiate one interaction (i.e., retweeting, mentioning, or replying) to each of the other
n1− 1 users, leading to n1(n1− 1) outgoing interactions. According to Table 3.2, the
average I-O ratio of the non-sybil community for the sum-based interaction network
is (0.89 + 1.04 + 0.7)/3 ≈ 0.88. Therefore, the n1 non-sybil users can receive about
1.88n1(n1−1) ≈ 1.88n21 incoming and outgoing interactions. Similarly, the sybil users
issue totally n2n1 interactions to the non-sybil region and receive about 0.08n2n1
interactions from non-sybil users. We thus have the following approximation
α∗ =
0.08n2n1
1.88n21
≈ 4.2 ∗ 10−5. (3.5)
We used the following method to simulate the sybil region, which has been adopted
in (155; 29). Given the interaction graph constructed from the SF dataset, we can
expect that the majority of the 104,000 users there are non-sybil users, but we cannot
tell which users are sybil or non-sybil users. So we manually attached to the original
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interaction graph a sybil region which is a complete digraph of 500 sybil users and ran
TrueTop over this augmented interaction graph. We assume the worst-case scenario
in which the attacker aims to retain all the credits flowing into the sybil region, so
there is no interaction from the sybil region to the non-sybil region. We then added
wg random links of weight one from the non-sybil region to the sybil region, which is
equivalent to assuming that there are wg accidental one-time interactions from non-
sybil users to sybil users. wg varied from 10 to 200 in our experiments. Since the total
edge weight of the original interaction graph is about 106, we effectively simulated
the parameter α from 10−5 to 2 × 10−4. To simplify the presentation, we equate wg
with α and call it the attack strength as well hereafter.
We considered three strategies for the attacker to add the wg links. In the random
attack, the attacker randomly selects wg users in the non-sybil region and adds a
link of weight one from each to a randomly chosen user in the sybil region. In the
community attack, the attacker performs a breadth-first search from a random user in
the non-sybil region until wg users are found, and it adds a link from each discovered
user to a random user in the sybil region. In the seed attack, we fixed 10 seed users in
the non-sybil region and assumed that the attacker knows all of them. The attacker
performed a breadth-first search from the 10 seed users and randomly chose wg users
closest to any of the 10 seed users. It finally adds a link of weight one from each of
them to a random user in the sybil region. Obviously, the seed attack corresponds
to the strongest attack. We conducted 50 experiments for each attack and report
the average result below. In addition, we chose 100 verified users as seed users in all
simulations.
Now we introduce some metrics to measure the accuracy and sybil resilience.
Recall that UK , U∗K , and U˜ denote the TrueTop output, the true top-K influential
users in the non-sybil region, and all the sybil users, respectively. We obtained U∗K
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by running power iteration over the non-sybil region only with the error tolerance
ν = 10−8. We measure the accuracy of TrueTop by comparing UK and U∗K via the
following two types of errors.
• Type-I error: d(K)/K, where d(K) is the distance between UK and U∗K and
computed according to Eq. (3.3). The metric measures the average rank offset
of U∗K from UK .
• Type-II error: (K − |U∗K ∩ UK |). This metric measures how many true top-K
users are missed by TrueTop.
The sybil resilience of TrueTop is inversely proportional to #sybil = |U˜ ∩ UK |. After
iterative credit distribution in TrueTop terminates, assumes that totally C credits are
retained in the sybil region. Let C1, . . . , CK denote the credits of the top-K influential
users in the non-sybil region in a non-decreasing order. Also assume that the attacker
tries to maximize #sybil by arbitrarily manipulating the topology of the sybil region
such that the C credits can flow into a few sybil users. We can derive #sybil as follows:
#sybil =

0 if C < CK ,
argmax
1≤x≤K
C ≥ xCK+1−x else.
Basic Results
Fig. 3.5 shows the performance of TrueTop under different attack strengths in random
and community attacks. In this experiment, we set K = 100 and  = 0. As the attack
strength increases from 10 to 200, the type-I error is flat with less than one, and the
type-II error is below two, both showing the high accuracy of TrueTop under different
attack strengths. Moreover, the number of top-100 sybil users, i.e., #sybil, slowly
increases as wg increases, which is as expected. #sybil, however, stays below four for
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Figure 3.5: TrueTop Performance Under Different Attack Strengths
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Figure 3.6: TrueTop Performance for Different Ks.
both attacks. In addition, larger wg is likely to increase the number of iterations and
thus make the top-K list more accurate. So we can see that the type-II error overall
decreases with increasing wg.
Fig. 3.6 shows the performance of TrueTop under different Ks in random and
community attacks. In this experiment, we set the wg = 100 and  = 0. We also
normalized #sybil by K. Although #sybil/K slowly increases with K due to more
84
0 50 100
0
2
4
6
8
10
ε
Er
ro
r
0
2
4
6
8
10
To
p−
K 
sy
bi
ls
 
 
Top−K Sybils
Type−I Error
Type−II Error
(a) Random Attack
0 50 100
0
2
4
6
8
10
ε
Er
ro
r
0
2
4
6
8
10
To
p−
K 
sy
bi
ls
 
 
Top−K Sybils
Type−I Error
Type−II Error
(b) Community Attack
Figure 3.7: TrueTop Performance Under Different s.
iterations, it is always less than 6%. In addition, both type-I and type-II errors are
always less than two, indicating the high accuracy of TrueTop.
Fig. 3.7 shows the performance of TrueTop under different s in random and
community attacks. In this experiment, we set wg = 100 and K = 100. As expected,
the larger the error tolerance , the larger both type-I and type-II errors. In contrast,
#sybil decreases with increasing  due to fewer iterations towards credit distribution
termination.
Fig. 3.8 shows the performance of TrueTop under seed attacks for both sum-based
and entropy-based edge weights. In this experiment, we set K = 100 and  = 0. In
addition, we randomly selected wg users from d = 3, 000 immediate successors of 10
random seed users, from which wg links of weight one were added to the sybil region.
We can have three observations from Fig. 3.8. First, TrueTop is still very accurate
as both type-I and type-II errors are always less than 2. Second, seed attacks can
yield more sybil users in the top-K list than both random and community attacks.
Finally, entropy-based edge weights enable stronger sybil resilience than sum-based
edge weights, as the former can dramatically increase the total edge weight in the
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Figure 3.8: Impact of Seed Attacks with Different Weight Models.
non-sybil region in contrast to the total edge weight from the non-sybil region to the
sybil region. An effective defense against the seed attack is deferred to Fig. 3.11.
Table 3.3 shows the impact of design choices on the TrueTop performance. In this
set of experiments, we set K = 100,  = 0, wg from 10 to 200, and d = 3, 000 for the
seed attack. We compared the basic and reverse-WEC methods for seed selection,
sum-based and entropy-based methods for determining edge weights, and also 10
versus 100 seed users. For simplicity, we added up the type-I errors, type-II errors,
and #sybil values under different attack strengths for each design choice, respectively.
For each pair of design choices, we subtracted the sum of the second choice from that
of the first one for the type-I error, type-II error, and #sybil, respectively. Since most
results in Table 3.3 are positive, it is clear that the second choice in each pair can
achieve higher accuracy and sybil resilience in most cases. Specifically, as expected,
the entropy-based weight model yields better sybil resilience performance than the
sum-based model.
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Comparison with Other Methods
We compare our algorithm with the following methods.
1. Kred (2). Since Kred has publish its influence score algorithm on http://kred.
com/rules, we select it as the benchmark mechanism. Kred only computes the
influence score by how many interactions a user have received in the past 1,000
days. During our 90-days experiment, we let each of the 500 sybils retweet each
other sybil once per day. Therefore, each sybil receives 44,910 interactions from
the sybils in the end. We will see that this conservative attack is sufficient for
filling the top-K list with mostly sybils.
2. Pagerank (113). One may think about using the Pagerank value of each user in
the interaction graph to evaluate his influence. Modified power iteration with
non-zero reset probability is commonly used to compute Pagerank values. We
set the rest probability to 0.15.
3. WEC by power iteration. This method corresponds to TrueTop without early
termination.
Fig. 3.9 compares the number of top-100 sybils of TrueTop with those of Kred,
Pagerank and WEC by power iteration. As we can see, TrueTop allows less than
4 sybil users in the top-100 list under both random and community attacks. By
comparison, the sybils in Kred can easily occupy 99 positions of the top-100 list. We
also expect they will occupy all the top-100 positions if more interactions between
the sybils were conducted. This is because the sybils can obtain unlimited incoming
interactions from other sybils. Under WEC with power iteration, sybil users can
occupy a significant portion in the top-100 list, as a lot more credits flow into and
stay in the sybil region when power iteration terminates in contrast to TrueTop. In
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Figure 3.9: Comparing TrueTop with Kred, Pagerank and WEC with Power Iteration
Under the Random and Community Attacks.
addition, Pagerank leads to more top-100 sybil users than TrueTop and is less sensitive
to the attack strength than WEC with power iteration. However, if we increase the
number of sybil users from 500 to 1,000 without changing the attack strength, the
top-100 sybil users under Pagerank will increase. This is because the more sybil
users, the higher probability that credit distribution jumps to the sybil region due
to resetting operations, the higher Pagerank values of some sybil users. So Pagerank
is not sybil-resilient either, which is consistent with (32). In contrast, both TrueTop
and WEC with power iteration are insensitive to the size of the sybil region.
Since WEC with power iteration is equivalent to seed-based iterative credit distri-
bution without early termination, we also compare it with TrueTop with regard to the
resilience to the seed attack. Note that Pagerank is not vulnerable to the seed attack
because it does not use any seed user. Fig. 3.10 compares the top-100 sybil users of
the two methods under the seed attack, where the number of immediate successors of
the 10 victim seed users varies from d = 5000 to 10, 000 for the fixed attack strength
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Figure 3.11: Defense Against the Seed
Attack.
wg = 100. As we can see, both methods yield more top-100 sybil users as d increases
under sum-based and also entropy-based edge weights. This result is quite intuitive:
the smaller d, the fewer nodes sharing the initial credits from the seed users, the more
credits flowing into the sybil region over the wg links, and vice versa.
An effective defense again the seed attack is to select more seed users and/or
choose the verified users with more immediate successors as seed users. The efficacy
of this defense is shown in Fig. 3.11. In this experiment, we assume that the attacker
picked up 10 random seed users and then randomly selected d immediate successors
of them for adding the wg links to the sybil region. We varied the number of seeds
from 10 to 800 for each value of d. As we can see, we can dramatically improve the
resilience of TrueTop to the seed attack by increasing both the number of seed users
and the number of immediate successors of the seed users.
Remarks
We have three remarks on the performance evaluation above. First, our evaluation re-
sults demonstrate the lower-bound performance of TrueTop. Specifically, we adopted
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a very strong attacker model by assuming that the attacker withholds all the credits
flowing into the sybil region by having zero interactions to the non-sybil region. In
practice, sybil users often try to initiate interactions with non-sybil users for other
purposes such as spamming and phishing than merely aiming to gain high influence
scores. Therefore, we can expect fewer credits to stay in the sybil region than under
our attacker model such that TrueTop shall have higher accuracy and sybil resilience
in more practical settings. Second, we admit that our evaluations are not complete
given so many design choices for TrueTop as shown in Table 3.3 and many possible
attack strategies. We have only shown some important results here as the examples
and expect similar results for other design choices and attack strategies. Finally, we
modelled the sybil behavior in accordance with prior work (101; 161; 52). There
are more advanced sybil attacks such as astroturfing (120) which could attract more
legitimate interactions from non-sybil users. Unfortunately, there is no efficient way
to simulate such advanced sybil attacks on a large scale. Instead, we use high attack
strength wg to model them in the experiment. As expected, TrueTop performs worse
for higher wg but still shows better performance in contrast to other methods. The
performance of TrueTop will certainly degrade if the sybils could completely mimic
the behavior of legitimate users, but manipulating the sybils to behave so intelligently
will involve huge adversarial effort. TrueTop can thus significantly raise the bar for
attacks on influence measurement.
3.7 Summary
Influential users are vital to accelerate large-scale information dissemination and
acquisition on Twitter. In this chapter, we presented TrueTop, the first sybil-resilient
system to measure the influence of Twitter users to the best of our knowledge. Our
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theoretical studies and also performance evaluations confirmed the high accuracy and
sybil resilience of TrueTop.
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Chapter 4
YOUR ACTIONS TELL WHERE YOU ARE: UNCOVERING TWITTER USERS
IN A METROPOLITAN AREA
4.1 Introduction
User privacy is arguably a major concern about Twitter. Specifically, user profiles
and tweets may contain sensitive information about life, work, health, hobbies, politi-
cal opinions, etc. Twitter currently offers little protection for user profiles and tweets
which are virtually visible to anyone with or without an account. 1 Consequently,
many users employ pseudonyms instead of real names in their profiles. In addition,
Twitter users often hide their home locations (location for short thereafter), which are
permanent and static city-level regions (e.g., Philadelphia) where most of their daily
activities occur. Specifically, they may either not indicate their locations or report
very general locations (e.g., state-level) in their profiles; they may not indicate their
locations in their tweets either. For example, less than 34% of Twitter users explic-
itly specify their locations in their profiles (84), only 16% of Twitter users indicate
city-level locations, and only 0.5% of tweets have a geo-tag (88).
There have been some efforts to infer a Twitter user’s hidden location. Content-
based methods (65; 33; 96; 88; 97) try to infer hidden locations based on geographic
hints such as city landmarks in tweets. For example, a user who frequently mentions
“Golden Bridge” in his tweets may indicate his location in the Bay Area. In contrast,
network-based methods (15; 100; 73; 149; 38) leverage the fact that geographically-
close people tend to form a connection or community in Online Social Networks
1Although Twitter allows a user to make his information visible to approved followers only, this
privacy enhancement is rarely used in practice.
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(OSNs) (117), so a user’s location can be inferred from those of his online neighbors
(or neighbors’ neighbors, etc). Based on different estimation techniques, all these
efforts (65; 33; 96; 88; 97; 15; 100; 73; 149; 38) seek to address the same question:
how can we infer a Twitter user’s hidden location from all his location-related tweets
and/or OSN neighbors’ locations?
This chapter targets a different and more challenging problem: is it feasible to
efficiently discover the majority of Twitter users in any city-level metropolitan area
(A) without collaborating with Twitter? Since only 16% of Twitter users register
city-level locations(88), it is infeasible to tackle our problem by directly checking
users’ tweets and profiles. In addition, directly applying any prior solution (65; 33;
96; 88; 97; 15; 100; 73; 149; 38) would inevitably involve checking every (255 million)
Twitter user’s tweets, followers, and/or followees, thus leading to a prohibitive cost.
An affirmative answer to our target problem above would have significant posi-
tive and negative impacts. On the positive side, finding the majority of the users
in a specific area can not only benefit many applications such as local event detec-
tion and recommendation, business marketing, and emergency-alert dissemination,
but also offer a feasible way to sample Twitter to facilitate the research concerning
geographically related information. On the negative side, if an attacker can infer the
majority of the Twitter users in a specific area, he could easily combine the location
information with user tweets to better profile Twitter users who may or may not
use pseudonyms, thus breaching their privacy and subjecting them to many identity-
based attacks. Moreover, the Twitter users with exposed locations are vulnerable to
large-scale location-based or geo-targeted spam campaigns (124).
In this chapter, we propose LocInfer, a novel and lightweight solution to the above
problem for the first time in literature. The design of LocInfer is driven by two conjec-
tures. First, a small but nontrivial fraction of users (15.9% on average in our datasets)
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have specified a credible location in the target area A in their personal profiles, each of
which is referred to as a seed user hereafter. Second, user communications in Twitter
exhibit strong geographic locality in the sense that the users in the same area tend to
interact more often than with those from outside. We confirm these two conjectures
through large-scale datasets involving four representative metropolitan areas in U.S.
Built upon these conjectures, LocInfer iteratively checks the immediate neighbors of
the seed set, and the users who have tight connections with the seed set become
new seeds and are added to the seed set. The final seed set contains the majority of
Twitter users in A with overwhelming probability. LocInfer is highly efficient because
only a small number of candidate users need to be checked in contrast to almost all
the Twitter users when the existing methods (65; 33; 96; 88; 97; 15; 100; 73; 149; 38)
are applied to our problem.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We motivate and formulate the problem of large-scale location inference, which
is challenging given that only a small fraction of Twitter users have specified a
credible city-level location in their personal profiles.
• We design LocInfer, a novel and lightweight solution that can uncover the ma-
jority of the Twitter users in a specific metropolitan area.
• We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate LocInfer using four large-scale
datasets. Our results show that LocInfer can successfully discover on average
86.6% of the users with 73.2% accuracy.
• We propose a countermeasure against LocInfer for the Twitter users worrying
about their location privacy and evaluate its effectiveness via simluations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 defines the problem.
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Section 4.3 validates our two conjectures through four large-scale datasets. Section 4.4
details the LocInfer design. Section 4.5 evaluates LocInfer and our countermeasure.
Section 4.6 surveys the related work. Section 4.7 summarizes the chapter.
4.2 Problem Statement, Terms and Notation
We use a directed and weighted multigraph 2 to model the diverse communi-
cations between Twitter users. In Twitter, people can follow others without mutual
consent; they can mention others in their own tweets; they can also reply to or retweet
others’ tweets. We classify these communications into two categories: following and
interacting (retweeting, replying, and mentioning), denoted by symbols F and I,
respectively. Such diverse communications are modeled as a directed and weighted
multigraph G = 〈V,E〉, where each vertex v ∈ V represents a user. We refer to a
directed edge for the following type as a following edge and a directed edge for the
interacting type as an interacting edge. A following edge eFij ∈ E is formed when
user i followed j; we call user i a follower of j and j a followee of i. In contrast, an
interacting edge eIij ∈ E is formed when user i mentioned, replied to, or retweeted j
at least once; we call user i a responder of j and j an initiator of i. To model the
interaction strength, we define w(eIij), the weight of edge e
I
ij, as the total number of
retweets, replies, and mentions from user i to j. For consistency, we also define the
weight of any following edge as one. We use NFI (u), N
F
O (u), N
I
I (u), N
I
O(u) to repre-
sent u’s one-hop followers, followees, responders, and initiators, respectively. We also
define the one-hop neighbors of u as N(u) = NFI (u) ∪NFO (u) ∪NII (u) ∪NIO(u).
Large-Scale Location Inference. Given a Twitter multigraph G = 〈V,E〉 and a
target metropolitan area A, we aim to obtain a target user list U which contains the
majority of Twitter users in A without collaborating with Twitter.
2In a multigraph, two vertices may be connected by more than one edge.
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Design goals. LocInfer is designed with the following goals.
• High coverage. The target user list U should cover the majority of Twitter users
in A. If we denote the actual Twitter users in A by U∗, the coverage can be
computed as |U ∩ U∗|/|U∗|.
• High accuracy 3 . The target users in U should be indeed located in A. The
accuracy can be computed as |U ∩ U∗|/|U |.
• Efficiency. LocInfer should only involve checking Twitter users proportional in
quantity to the population in A in contrast to existing methods (65; 33; 96; 88;
97; 15; 100; 73; 149; 38) which all need to check all the Twitter users. This
efficiency requirement is particularly important because without Twitter’s col-
laboration, the only free way to obtain the users’ information is via third-party
APIs, which is time-consum-
ing as Twitter has strict rate limits on APIs invoking (13). For example, an au-
thenticated user can only invoke the get-followers API 15 times per 15 minutes.
Hence if we invoke this API once for each of the 255 million Twitter users, it
will spend a single authenticated user about 485 years to obtain all the Twitter
users’ followers.
4.3 Conjectures Validation
As we mentioned in Section 4.1, LocInfer is built upon two important conjectures.
• Conjecture 1 : A small but nontrivial fraction of users have specified a credible
location in the target area A in their personal profiles.
3Note that coverage and accuracy correspond to the widely-used recall and precision, respectively.
In this chapter we use the coverage and accuracy to make the meaning more straightforward in the
context of user uncovering in an area.
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Table 4.1: Seed Users in Four Metropolitan Areas in U.S.
Area A
Population
#Twitter users
#seed users #seeds with
(rank in U.S.) (over #Twitter users) ≥ 1M followers
Tucson (TS) 996,544 (57th) 150,478 28,161 (18.65%) 0
Philadelphia (PI) 6,034,678 (7th) 911,236 144,033 (15.9%) 3
Chicago (CI) 9,522,434 (3rd) 1,437,888 318,632 (22.21%) 11
Los Angeles (LA) 16,400,000 (2nd) 2,476,400 300,148 (12.12%) 174
• Conjecture 2 : User communications in Twitter exhibit strong geographic local-
ity in the sense that the users in the same area tend to communicate more often
than with those from outside.
In this section, we validate these two conjectures using four large-scale datasets.
4.3.1 Data Collection
We collect ground-truth Twitter users in different metropolitan areas by checking
the self-reported locations in their profiles, a methodology that has been used to
obtain the ground truth in (65; 33; 96; 88; 97; 15; 100; 73; 149; 38). Specifically,
we use the Twitter geo-search API designed to return the recent or popular tweets
in a specified geo-circle defined by latitude, longitude, and radius (13). For any
interested area A, we convert it into a geo-circle for the geo-search API, and we do
not differentiate A and its corresponding geo-circle hereafter. The geo-search API
returns the tweets from three types of users.
• Geo-tagged users : The users who recently published some tweets with a geo-tag
in A.
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• Geo-profiled users : The users whose personal profiles containing a location in
A.
• Retweeting users : The users who recently retweeted some geo-tagged or geo-
profiled users’ tweets in A.
Among them, we only use the geo-profiled users to build our datasets, because retweet-
ing users are likely not in A, and geo-tagged users may have just traveled to some
places within the geo-circle instead of living there. Moreover, since the result of each
geo-search API invoking corresponds to a random sampling of the active Twitter
users, we keep invoking the geo-search API until no significantly more geo-profiled
users can be discovered.
The self-reported locations have been found reliable (38), but the results from the
geo-search API are still noisy for two reasons. First, the location descriptions in many
users’ profiles are ambiguous and arbitrary. For example, people living in Los Angeles
may specify their locations as “South California”, or “Los Angeles”, or “LA”, or just
“CA.” Second, the geo-search API often needs to covert a location description into a
longitude-latitude pair for comparison with the specified geo-circle. Such conversions
are often problematic and thus lead to wrong results. For example, when we searched
the users in San Francisco Bay Area, the geo-search API returned some users in other
places or even nonsense descriptions such as “somewhere you’re not” and “wherever
you not.”
We thus refine the geo-profiled users as follows. For each user, we further verify
whether his/her location description indeed contains a city name in A. For this
purpose, we first obtain the list of city names in A from the latest U.S. gazetteer data
(5) and then compare the location description with the list. If there is an intersection,
the user is considered a ground-truth user in A.
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4.3.2 Datasets
Using the above method, we collect user data in four metropolitan areas of Tuscon
(Arizona), Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Our data collection ran from
January to June 2014. Table 4.1 summarizes the four datasets. As we can see, the
four populations vary from one million in TS to 16 millions in LA, from the not-so-
popular areas (e.g., TS) to popular areas (e.g., LA). Note that all the metropolitan
population information is from the U.S. Census Bureau.
4.3.3 Conjecture Validation
To validate the first conjecture above, we estimate the number of Twitter users
for each area according to the eMarketer report claiming that 15.1% of U.S. people
are using Twitter as of Feb. 2014 (50). As we can see from Table 4.1, the seed users
range from 12.12% in LA to 22.21% in CI with the average ratio of 15.9%. This result
is consistent with the measurement in (88) and implies that we have almost crawled
all the users who have specified their city-level locations in these areas.
To validate the second conjecture above, we first define three locality metrics. In
particular, for the multigraph G = 〈V,E〉 defined in Section 4.2, let V ′ denote any
subset of V . We define follower locality lfollower(V
′), followee locality
lfollowee(V
′), and initiator locality linitiator(V ′) as
lfollower(V
′) =
|NFI (V ′) ∩ V ′|
|NFI (V ′)|
, lfollowee(V
′) =
|NFO (V ′) ∩ V ′|
|NFO (V ′)|
,
and linitiator(V
′) =
w(NIO(V
′) ∩ V ′)
w(NIO(V ′))
,
(4.1)
respectively, where NFI (V
′), NFO (V
′), and NIO(V
′) represent the followers, followees,
and initiators of V ′, respectively, and w(·) represents the total weight of the corre-
sponding interacting edges.
We let V ′ equal the seed users in each area and then compute the corresponding
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Table 4.2: Locality in Each Area. Each Element is Composed of Three Values,
Representing the Locality for the Seed Users in Each Area, the First Type of Random
User Set, and The Second Type of Random User Set, Respectively.
A lfollower(U) (%) lfollowee(U) (%) linitiator(U) (%)
TS 8.1 | 0.08|0.04 9.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 12.8 | 0.5 | 0.2
PI 4.9 | 0.4 | 0.2 8.4 | 1.5 | 0.6 14.9 | 2.7 | 1.2
CI 6.9 | 1.0 | 0.5 10.3| 3.3 | 1.3 16.9 | 5.2 | 2.6
LA 1.5 | 0.9 | 0.5 8.4 | 3.1 | 1.2 17.0 | 5.0 | 2.5
Table 4.3: Breaking Down the Initiator Locality by Three Types of Interactions.
A Replying (%) Retweeting (%) Mentioning (%)
TS 14.41 10.61 13.37
PI 14.05 12.95 16.99
CI 17.46 14.23 18.50
LA 15.43 15.44 19.05
locality. To do so, we crawl all the followers and followees of each seed user, and we
also crawl the latest 600 tweets of each seed user to extract their initiators. For the
comparison purpose, we build two types of random user sets. First, we merge the four
seed sets into a single set from which we randomly select the same number of users
as the seeds in each area. Second, we randomly select from the whole Twitter system
the same number of users as the seeds in each area and compute their corresponding
locality. We build 10 different user sets for both random user sets.
Table 4.2 shows the results of the locality analysis. We can see that the three
locality values of the seed users in each area are always much higher than those of the
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Figure 4.1: The Average Local Neighbors of the Seed Users.
random user sets. This result confirms our conjecture that physical proximity plays a
big role in enabling online communications in Twitter. Moreover, Table 4.2 shows a
higher percentage of a user’s initiators in the same area than that of his/her followees.
It is not surprising because a user may follow many people in different areas but often
interact with only a few selected followees. In addition, we can see that the followee
locality is much higher than the follower locality except in TS. The reason can be
explained as follows. A celebrity user such as @rihanna can easily attract millions of
followers from around the world, but she may only follow relatively fewer people. So
we can expect a higher percentage of her followees in the same area (Los Angeles)
than that of her followers. Since each of the areas except Tuscon has a large number
of celebrity users, the followee locality is much higher than the follower locality. In
contrast, Tuscon is a much smaller area with relatively few celebrity users, so we
can expect similar followee and follower locality. Table 4.3 also shows that mentions,
replies, and retweets contribute similarly to the initiator locality of each seed set, so
we do not distinguish them in the LocInfer design.
Finally, although interacting communications (replies, mentions, and retweets)
show much stronger locality than following communications, Fig. 4.1 shows that the
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corresponding interacting edges (i.e., initiators) are much fewer than the following
edges (i.e., followers and followees), meaning that people interact less than they follow
others. Moreover, we also observe that people usually interact with the ones who they
follow or follow them. In particular, let us define the overlap between NIO(V
′) and
NFI (V
′) ∪NFO (V ′) for each area as
|NIO(V ′) ∩ (NFI (V ′) ∪NFO (V ′))|
|NIO(V ′)|
.
Our analysis shows that the average overlap for the four areas is 96.2%.
4.4 LocInfer
As stated before, our goal is to uncover the majority of Twitter users in an area
A. A naive solution is to use existing location inference methods (65; 33; 96; 88; 97;
15; 100; 73; 149; 38) for estimating the location of every Twitter user and then select
the ones in A. However, these methods are impratical for our problem. In particular,
they would require crawling the followers, the followees, and many tweets for all the
255 million active Twitter users. Since Twitter has strict rate limits on data crawling
(13), the crawling process for these methods will be time-consuming. In addition, the
network-based methods (15; 100; 73; 149; 38) need to store and process the edges of
the whole Twitter graph, thus leading to prohibitive storage and processing costs.
Now we present LocInfer, an efficient and effective three-step system to identify
the majority of users in A. As mentioned earlier, LocInfer is built upon two conjec-
tures which have been experimentally validated in Section 4.3. First, we can find a
nontrivial number (15.9% from our datasets) of users who have explicitly indicated
a location in A through their personal profiles. These users are referred to as seed
users (or seeds) in A and denoted by S. Second, user communications in Twitter
exhibit strong geographic locality in the sense that users in the same area tend to
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have more intensive communications with each other in Twitter than with those from
outside. Based on these two conjectures, LocInfer first builds a seed set S (step 1
in Section 4.4.1) and then checks the one-hop neighbors of the seed set S, which
constitute a candidate set denoted by C (step 2 in Section 4.4.2). Because of non-
trivial seed set S and the strong geographic locality, C will cover the majority of
the users in A, but also include many users outside. Hence LocInfer chooses the
candidate users who have tight connections with S as new seeds and add them to
S, and this process continues until some termination conditions are met (step 3 in
Section 4.4.3). The final seed set S contains the majority of Twitter users in A with
overwhelming probability. LocInfer is highly efficient because it only checks a much
smaller set of Twitter users in contrast to all the Twitter users if existing methods
(65; 33; 96; 88; 97; 15; 100; 73; 149; 38) are applied.
We notice that many community structures (e.g., a group of people in different
locations with common interests or past experience like classmates and colleagues)
rather than the geographic community may also yield strong inter-connect-
ions. Hence LocInfer may include some users outside A in the candidate set C.
However, the impact of such outside users is minimal because LocInfer only selects
the users in the target area A as the seeds S and only chooses the target users who
have strong communications with S later.
4.4.1 Step 1: Finding Seed Users
The first step in LocInfer is to extract the seed users who are most certainly in
A. To that end, we use the same method as in Section 4.3 by invoking the Twitter
geo-search API to obtain the geo-profiled users and then refine them by checking their
location descriptions to build the seed set S in A.
It is possible that some people may specify the fake home locations in their profiles,
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and it is infeasible to completely pinpoint and exclude such users. Fortunately, such
self-reported locations have been verified to be very reliable (38) and have been used
as the ground truth in (65; 33; 96; 88; 97; 15; 100; 73; 149; 38). Meanwhile, we may
accidentally exclude some users indeed in A, which is quite acceptable given our focus
on obtaining a reliable seed set in this step. We admit that more advanced methods
can be used for the seed searching and refinement, which are left for the future work.
4.4.2 Step 2: Finding Candidate Users
Based on the nontrivial number of seed users, the second step then is to construct
a candidate-user set C from the one-hop neighbors of S that potentially covers the
majority of Twitter users in A but is also much smaller than the set of all Twitter
users. Below we first discuss how we decide the candidate users in C and then
theoretically analyze the coverage of C.
Choosing C
We first build the candidate set C from the one-hop neighbors of S. The underlying
intuition is based on the two conjectures validated in Section 4.3. Specifically, The
second conjecture indicates that the users in the same geographic area tend to com-
municate more densely among themselves than to those from outside. On the one
hand, if a user has very limited communications to all the seed users in S which occu-
pies about 15.9% of the total users in A, with high probability he/she is not in A; on
the other hand, a user that is indeed in A is very likely to have direct communication
with some seeds. We therefore choose to build the candidate set C from the one-hop
neighbors of S, denoted as N(S).
Two details need further consideration. As defined in Section 4.2, each Twitter
user has four kinds of neighbors in G = 〈V,E〉: followers, followees, initiators, and
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responders. Which neighbors should we choose for each seed user? We observe from
Fig. 4.1 that many Twitter users may follow a large number of other users, but
they tend to subsequently interact with relatively few followees. Since people usually
interact with the ones who they follow or follow them (with averagely 96.2% of overlap
as stated in Section 4.3) and C should cover as many users as possible in A, we consider
all the followers and followees of each seed user in this step. Moreover, since each
user in Twitter can follow arbitrary users without prior consent, the unidirectional
following relationship is not a reliable indicator of geographic closeness. To deal
with this issue, we propose to only select the candidate users to be the followers and
followees of each seed user in S with each having at least t followees and t followers
in S, where t is a system threshold.
More formally speaking, for each user u ∈ NFO (S) ∪NFI (S), we compute nFi (u) =
|NFI (u) ∩ S| and nFo (u) = |NFO (u) ∩ S|. If both nFi (u) and nFo (u) are no less than t,
user u is added to the candidate set C and ignored otherwise.
Alg. 2 implements the overall process. Specifically, we first create a followee
counter and a follower counter for each user in NFO (S) ∪ NFI (S). Then we traverse
the followee and follower list of each seed and increase the corresponding followee and
follower counters. If both the followee and follower counters exceed t, we choose the
user u as a candidate.
Coverage of C
The number of candidate users (i.e., |C|) is determined by both the number of seed
users (i.e., |S|) and the system parameter t. A natural question is whether C can
cover the majority of users in target area A. It is important because the new seeds
(or equivalently the target users) will be found only from C.
To analyze the coverage of C, we first define the following terms and notation.
106
Algorithm 2: Obtain the candidate set C by only checking the followee and
follower lists of the seed set S.
input : S,NFO (S), N
F
I (S), t
output: the candidate set C
1 C ← ∅; co[u]← 0,∀u ∈ NFO (S); ci[v]← 0,∀v ∈ NFI (S);
2 for u ∈ S do
3 co[v] + +,∀v ∈ NFO (u); ci[v] + +,∀v ∈ NFI (u);
4 end
5 for u ∈ NFO (S) do
6 if co[u] ≥ t and u ∈ NFI (S) and ci[u] ≥ t then
7 C ← C + {u};
8 end
9 end
10 return C.
We call users i and j mutual followers if they follow each other. Let GA = 〈VA, EA〉
be a subgraph of the Twitter multigraph G = 〈V,E〉, where VA ⊆ V is the set of the
Twitter users in the target area A, and EA ⊆ E is the set of the directed following
edges among the users in VA. Consider a seed set S ⊆ VA with s = |S| = α|VA|
users, where α ∈ (0, 1]. Let N t(S) denote the set of the followers and followees of S,
each having at least t followers and t followees in S, where t is the system threshold
stated before. The coverage ratio of C is defined as r(t) = |N
t(S)∪S|
|VA| . We then have
the following theoretical results about the coverage of C given |S| and t.
Theorem 4.4.1. Assume that each user in VA has on average dm mutual followers in
VA. When |VA| is large enough, the expected coverage ratio is r(t) ≥ 1− e−αdm(1−α)∑t−1
i=0
(
s
i
)
( p
1−p)
i, where p = dm|VA|−1 .
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Proof. We first construct an undirected graph G′ = 〈VA, E ′〉, where an edge e′ij ∈ E ′
is formed if and only if users i and j are mutual followers. Let N
′t(S) be the set of
neighbors of S in G′, each having at least t neighbors in S. We proceed to define the
coverage of S in G′ as r′(t) = |N ′t(S) ∪ S|/|VA|.
We now compute r′(t). Since each user has on average dm edges in E ′, the prob-
ability of one user connecting to any other user is p = dm|VA|−1 . Moreover, since there
are s = α|VA| seed users, the probability of any non-seed node u connecting to less
than t seed users in G′ is given by
ρ =
t−1∑
i=0
(
s
i
)
pi(1− p)s−i = (1− p)s
t−1∑
i=0
(
s
i
)
(
p
1− p)
i . (4.2)
When the number of users in VA is large, we have
lim|VA|→+∞(1− p)s = lim|VA|→+∞(1− dm/|VA|)α|VA|
= e−αdm .
Since there are |VA|−s non-seed users, the expected number of non-seed users connect-
ing to t or more seeds in S can be computed as (|VA|− s)(1− ρ) = |VA|(1−α)(1− ρ).
When |VA| is large, we have
r′(t) = |N ′t(S) ∪ S|/|VA|
= 1− (1− α)ρ
≈ 1− (1− α)e−αdm
t−1∑
i=0
(
s
i
)
(
p
1− p)
i.
Since each edge in E ′ corresponds to two directed edges in E, all the users in
N
′t(S) must belong to N t(S). On the other hand, a user in N t(S) may not appear
in N
′t(S). For example, consider a user who has exactly t followers and t followees in
S in graph G, where none of his followers and followees are the same. Then this user
is an isolated vertex in G′, and he is certainly in N t(S) but not in N
′t(S). Therefore,
we have N
′t(S) ⊆ N t(S) and r′(t) ≤ r(t), and the theorem is proved.
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Corollary 4.4.1. r(t = 1) ≥ 1− e−αdm(1− α).
Corollary 4.4.2. r(t = 2) ≥ 1− e−αdm(1− α)(1 + αdm).
Since |VA| is often large in practice, Theorem 4.4.1 indicates that the coverage
ratio r(t) approaches 1 when αdm is large enough. Moreover, the choice of t involves
a tradeoff between the crawling cost and the coverage. Specifically, the larger the t,
the fewer the candidates in C, the smaller the crawling cost, the more likely to miss
some users in A (i.e., the lower coverage), and vice versa. The size of S also affects
the choice of t. On the one hand, if S constitutes a relatively large portion of the
users in A (say, α = 30%), it may be safe to use larger t because many users in A
are more likely to have more followees and followers in S. On the other hand, if S
constitutes a relatively small portion of the users in A (say, α = 10%), it may be safe
to use smaller t to avoid excluding too many users in A.
Here we illustrate how many seeds are needed to achieve a nearly 100% coverage.
Assume that each user in A has on average 15 mutual followers (i.e., dm = 15).
According to Corollaries 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, when t = 1, 20% of the users as seeds can
cover 96.02% of the target users in A, and when t = 2, 20% and 30% of the users
as seeds can cover 84.07% and 95.72% of the users in A, respectively. Similarly, if
dm = 30, only 10% and 15% of the users as seeds can cover 95.52% and 95.99% of the
users for t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. These results indicate that when each user
has sufficient mutual followers in A, the followers and followees of a small number of
seeds can cover the majority of the target users in A.
4.4.3 Step 3: Finding Target Users U
Although the candidate set C covers nearly all the users in A for proper t, it may
contain many users not in A who nevertheless have at least t followees and also t
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followers in the seed set S. For example, social butterflies (151) or social capitalists
(59) have been reported to automatically follow back whoever follows them, and users
may also follow each other due to reciprocity (151; 59). We thus design the next step
to identify the target user set U in A from C using both the following and interacting
connections among the users.
Our key observation as stated is that each target user is very likely to demonstrate
significant locality with the seed user set S. In other words, we expect that the target
users form a strong local community with the seed users. From the initial seed set S,
we iteratively check the candidate users in C, and the candidate who has the highest
locality value with the seeds becomes a new seed and is added to S. The process
iterates until certain conditions are met.
How should we compute the locality of Twitter users with diverse communica-
tions? Inspired by the Eq. (4.1), we consider three types of locality for any candidate
user u ∈ C: follower locality lfollower(u), followee locality lfollowee(u), and initiator
locality linitiator(u), which are computed as
lfollower(u) =
|NFI (u) ∩ S|
|NFI (u)|
, lfollowee(u) =
|NFO (u) ∩ S|
|NFO (u)|
,
and linitiator(u) =
w(NIO(u) ∩ S)
w(NIO(u))
,
(4.3)
where NFI (u), N
F
O (u), and N
I
O(u) are u’s followers, followees, and initiators, respec-
tively, and w(·) denotes the total weight of the corresponding interacting edges.
We also consider two methods to integrate the three types of locality. First, we
choose the maximum one among them as u’s locality, i.e.,
l(u) = max{lfollower(u), lfollowee(u), linitiator(u)} . (4.4)
Second, their weighted combination is used as the locality of u, i.e.,
l(u) = 1lfollower(u) + 2lfollowee(u) + 3linitiator(u) , (4.5)
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where 0 ≤ 1, 2, 3 ≤ 1 and 1 + 2 + 3 = 1. In this report, we choose each of them
to be 1/3 for simplicity and leave other possible assignments as the future work.
Finally, we iteratively find the target users based on one of their five types of
locality with regard to the seed set S. In each iteration, we compute the locality for
each candidate u ∈ C according to Eq. (4.3), Eq. (4.4), or Eq. (4.5). The candidate
with the highest locality is removed from C and added to S as a new seed, as this
user contributes most to the tightness of the community around S. In addition, the
follower, followee, and/or initiator locality values of the remaining candidates in C
need be updated in every iteration. Here we just use the followee locality to illustrate
the updating operation. Let l
(m)
followee(u) denote the followee locality for candidate u
in iteration m ≥ 0, where l(0)(u) can be computed by using the initial seeds in S.
Assuming that u∗ has been chosen as a new seed in iteration m, we update the followee
locality for candidate u as
l(m+1)(u) =
 l
(m)(u) + 1/|NFO (u)| if u∗ ∈ NFO (u),
l(m)(u) o.w.
(4.6)
Follower and initiator locality can be updated similarly, and we may need to update
the overall locality according to Eq. (4.4) or Eq. (4.5). The iteration terminates
when the seed set S contains a desired number of users in A, denoted by τA. Then
the sought target users correspond to all the users in A. The complete process is
summarized in Alg. 3, which is implemented using a max-priority queue (39).
The termination threshold τA can be chosen in two ways. First, we can set τA as
the estimated number of Twitter users in A, e.g., about 15.1% of the population in A
if A is in U.S. (50). Second, τA can be chosen according to the level of confidence we
desire. In particular, our algorithm essentially ranks all the candidate users according
to our confidence about their locations in A. The later a candidate user is added to
U , the lower confidence we have that he is indeed in A. Therefore, if we want to
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Algorithm 3: Identify target users in A from C.
input : S,C, τA
output: U , i.e., the users in A
1 U ← S;
2 Compute l(u),∀u ∈ C, according to Eq. (4.3), (4.4) or (4.5);
3 Q← ∅;
4 for u ∈ C do
5 INSERT(Q, u);
6 while |U | < τA do
7 u∗ ← EXTRAC–MAX(Q);
8 U ← U + {u∗}, S ← S + {u∗};
9 for u ∈ NFI (u∗) do
10 INCREASE–KEY(Q, u, l(u) + 1/|NFO (u)|);
11 return U .
obtain a set of target users in A with high confidence, a small τA should be used; if
we want to cover more users in A, a larger τA is suitable.
We now analyze the complexity of Alg. 3. In Lines 4-5, we build a max-priority
queueQ based on each candidate’s locality value, of which the complexity isO(|C| log |C|).
The loop beginning from Line 6 is used to find the target user one at a time. In each
iteration, we extract the maximum value from the priority queue Q in Line 7, set it
as a new seed in Line 8, and update the locality value of all its followers in Lines 9-10.
The complexity of Line 6-10 is O(τAd log(|C|)), where d is the average degree in A.
Hence the overall complexity of Alg. 3 is O((|C|+ τAd) log(|C|)).
One may wonder why we do not add more candidates to C once a candidate
is added as a new seed to S. We have shown in Section 4.4.2 that the candidate
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users discovered through the initial seed set S cover the majority of users in A with
overwhelming probability. It is thus unlikely that we can identify more candidate
users from newly identified seeds, which has been validated by our simulations in
Section 4.5.3. We thus choose not to add more candidates in each iteration.
4.4.4 Cost Analysis
We now analyze the cost of LocInfer, which consists of the crawling cost and
computation cost, and briefly compare it with the existing methods.
We first analyze the crawling cost of LocInfer, which is important given the tight
rate limitations Twitter enforces on data crawling. First, Step 1 in LocInfer involves
invoking the Twitter geo-search API continuously to obtain the initial seed set S and
needs to crawl some geo-tagged users’ tweets. Second, Step 2 requires crawling the
followees and followers of each seed user in S. Finally, Step 3 needs to crawl the
followees, followers, and initiators of each candidate user in C. Recall that d denotes
the average number of followers and followees each seed user has. Our datasets in
Section 4.3 show that d is approximately 600. It has also been reported that 15.1%
U.S. people use Twitter (50) and that 15.9% of Twitter users report city-level locations
and become seeds in LocInfer. In LocInfer, a user is chosen as a candidate if he has
t followers and t followees in S. So we can expect that the candidate set size |C|
is much smaller than d|S|, i.e., 14.4 times the population in the target area A. In
contrast, all previous (potential) solutions (65; 33; 96; 88; 97; 15; 100; 73; 149; 38)
involve crawling all the Twitter users. Thus LocInfer has a much smaller crawling
cost, which makes it practical.
The computation cost of LocInfer is dominated by the third step with the com-
plexity of Alg. 3 being O((|C| + τAd) log(|C|)), where d is the average neighbors of
each user and τA is the number of target users in A.
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4.4.5 Countermeasure
LocInfer aims to discover the majority of users in any target area even if many of
them do not disclose their locations explicitly in their personal profiles. We propose
a simple countermeasure here to alleviate the possible concerns of some sensitive
users about their location privacy. Since LocInfer discovers a user’s location based
on his tight connections with other users in the same area, the user can effectively
hide his home location by following, retweeting, mentioning, and replying Twitter
users outside his home area on a regular basis. This strategy is meaningful because
people can follow or interact with others who are in different areas but share the same
interests. For example, a user in New York City and the other in Los Angeles may
interact in Twitter because they were university classmates in Dallas or knew each
other in a concert. The efficacy of this countermeasure is evaluated in Section 4.5.5.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we thoroughly evaluate LocInfer. As stated before, this chapter
targets a different problem with existing work (65; 33; 96; 88; 97; 15; 100; 73; 149; 38),
and hence we will not compare LocInfer with them head to head but could incorporate
with them in our future work.
4.5.1 Methodology
To evaluate LocInfer, we first need build a testing multigraph G = 〈V,E〉 formed
by both users known to be and not be in a target area A, where one challenge is that
we cannot directly determine all the Twitter users in A.
To tackle this challenge, we adopt the method used by existing work (65; 33; 96;
88; 97; 15; 100; 73; 149; 38). Specifically, since the self-reported locations have been
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found reliable (38), for each area A in Table 4.1, we treat all the seed users in S
discovered in the first step as the positive ground truth (i.e., they are indeed in A)
and randomly partition S into a seed subset S of size α|S| and a testing subset T of
size (1− α)|S|.
For the negative ground truth, we check the followers and followees of S and
record the set of users who have specified a location outside A and randomly choose
β fraction of these users, where β is set as the ratio of seed users over the estimated
number of Twitter users in A, as shown in the fourth column of Table 4.1. We denote
by Θ the resulting user set and let V = S ∪ Θ. We finally compute edges among
all the users in V according to their followings and interactions by analyzing their
followers, followees, and the latest 600 tweets.
We then apply LocInfer to the testing multigraph G. Specifically, we first use S as
the seed set and apply Alg. 2 to generate the candidate set C. We then apply Alg. 3
to C to generate the target user set U by choosing a τA. Following the definitions in
Section 4.2, the coverage can be computed as |U ∩ S|/|S|, and the accuracy can be
computed as |U ∩ S|/|U | (|U | = τA).
Unless stated otherwise, we choose t = 2 when building the candidate set C with
Alg. 2 for LA and t = 1 for all other three datasets, and set α = 0.159, the average
ratio for the four datasets in Table 4.1. The testing multigraphs are summarized in
Table 4.4.
4.5.2 Accuracy
We first evaluate the accuracy of LocInfer. We compute five locality values for
each user, including follower locality, followee locality, initiator locality, and the two
locality values defined in Eq. (4.4) and Eq. (4.5), respectively.
Fig. 4.2 shows the accuracy of LocInfer for the four datasets, where α = |S|/|S| =
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Table 4.4: The Testing Multigraphs for the Evaluation. (α = 0.159)
A |S| |S| |T | β |Θ|
TS 28,161 4,478 23,683 18.65% 162,446
PI 144,033 22,901 121,132 15.9% 630,321
CI 318,632 50,662 267,970 22.21% 1,529,431
LA 300,148 47,724 252,424 12.12% 710,085
LA PI TS CI
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Figure 4.2: The Accuracy of LocInfer.
0.159 and τA = |S|. We can see that the five locality metrics all lead to high ac-
curacy in each area, and initiator locality has the worst performance among them.
Specifically, the average accuracy of four datasets for each locality are 73.2%, 72.6%,
62.3%, 72.4%, 71.9%, respectively. The reason is that initiator locality depends on
interacting edges (corresponding to replies, mentions, and retweets) which are much
sparser than following edges in the directed Twitter multigraph as shown in Fig. 4.1.
Therefore, if many users in A only follow many people but do not interact with them
subsequently, they may be reachable from seed users through following edges but not
from interacting edges. We will show the coverage for different locality metrics in
the following Section 4.5.3. Moreover, the locality defined in Eq. (4.4) and Eq. (4.5)
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Figure 4.3: Detailed Accuracy Illustration.
have nearly the same accuracy with both the follower and followee locality. This
is expected because about 96.2% of the seed set’s initiator neighbors are from their
followers or followees, as indicated in Section 4.3.
To shed more light on the accuracy of LocInfer, we set τA = |C| so that U = C∪S
when Alg. 2 terminates, i.e., every candidate user is eventually added into S. Let U ′
denote the newly discovered users (may not in A), i.e., U ′ = C. We partition U ′ into
100 bins of equal size |U ′|/100 according to the order they are added, where the bins
of smaller indexes contain the users discovered earlier. Let xi denote the number of
positive ground-truth users in the i-th bin. Fig. 4.3 shows the accuracy of the i-th
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Figure 4.4: The Impact of α.
bin, which is defined as the ratio of the number of positive ground-truth users in the
i-th bin and the number of users in each bin and is computed as 100xi/|U ′|. We
can see that the accuracy in each bin decreases as the bin index increases, which is
expected, as the later the users are added to U ′, the less likely they are indeed located
in A.
Fig. 4.4 shows the impact of α = |S|/|S| on the accuracy of LocInfer. As expected,
the accuracy under all locality metrics increases as α increases. The reason is that the
larger the α, the more seeds, and the easier the target users in A can be discovered.
The downside is that more seeds lead to a larger candidate set and thus higher crawling
and computational cost, as Alg. 2 needs to check all the neighbors of the seeds.
Fig. 4.5 shows the impact of t on the accuracy by varying t from one to six.
Specifically, Fig. 4.5a shows the accuracy for four areas using the followee locality,
while Fig. 4.5b shows the accuracy for different locality metrics by using the PI
dataset. Both figures show the accuracy decreases as t increases. This is expected
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Figure 4.5: The Impact of t.
because increasing t will result in the decrease in the size of candidate set and hence
miss more users in the target user list who have no chance to appear in the candidate
set. However, there is a tradeoff between the accuracy and cost because smaller
candidate set will also bring the lower crawling and computational cost.
4.5.3 Coverage
Fig. 4.6 shows the coverage of LocInfer when α = 0.159 with the desired number
of target users (i.e., τA = |U |), varying from zero to the whole candidate set size |C|.
We use both the followee and follower locality in this experiment. As expected, the
larger τA, the more users in T contained in U , the higher coverage, and vice versa.
When we set τA = |C|, the average coverage of these four locations by using followee,
follower, and initiator locality is equal to 86.3%, 86.6%, and 79.7%, respectively. As
stated, since the interacting edges (corresponding to replies, mentions, and retweets)
are much sparser than following edges in the directed Twitter multigraph as shown
in Fig. 4.1, the initiator locality has less coverage than the followee and follower
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Figure 4.6: The Tradeoff Between the Coverage and Accuracy. The Solid and Dash
Curves are the Coverage and Accuracy; the Marks ,4, ◦,× Represent TS, PI, CI,
and LA, Respectively.
locality. Moreover, the average coverage by using the follower or followee locality in
Fig. 4.6 is consistent with Corollary 4.4.1. Specifically, the average number of mutual
followers dm for four datasets is 7.8, 9.0, 11.6, and 11.6, respectively. According to
Corollary 4.4.1, when α = 0.159, r(t = 1) ≥ 82.3% which coincides with our results.
4.5.4 Accuracy and Coverage Tradeoff
Fig. 4.6 also shows the anticipated tradeoff between the coverage and accuracy.
As we can see, the larger τA, the more the positive ground-truth users will be added
to U , resulting in higher coverage. However, a larger τA will also introduce negative
ground-truth users into U , resulting in lower accuracy. This tradeoff could guide us
to choose the parameter τA. On the one hand, if one desires higher coverage, a large
termination threshold τA should be used, but it is possible that many users in U may
be not indeed in A. On the other hand, if one wants to be certain that the users
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Figure 4.7: Countermeasure Efficacy.
discovered by LocInfer are most likely in A, a smaller τA should be used at the cost
of possibly missing some users indeed in A.
4.5.5 Effectiveness of Countermeasure
To evaluate the efficacy of this countermeasure, we let each user in the testing set
T in each area additionally follow or be followed by a certain number of users from Θ
who are not in A, and we refer to those following edges as camouflage edges. Fig. 4.7
shows the accuracy result under this countermeasure. As we can see, the accuracy
of LocInfer decreases as the number of camouflage edges increases, highlighting the
efficacy of the countermeasure. Besides adding random following edges, a user can
also retweet, mention, and reply to random users on a regular basis to counteract
LocInfer, which is expected to yield the similar results as these interactions can also
decrease the geographic locality.
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4.6 Related Work
In this section, we briefly present the existing work mostly related to this chapter.
Inferring a Twitter user’s hidden location has been widely studied in the com-
munity, which can be categorized as contented-based and network-based methods.
Content-based methods (65; 33; 96; 97) try to infer the user’s location by his tweets.
For example, Cheng et al. (33) proposed a probabilistic framework to estimate a
Twitter user’s location based on his tweets, resulting in placing 51% of Twitter users
within 100 miles of their home locations. Mahmud et al. (97) further improved this
result to 64% for city-level location inference. Hecht et al. (65) thoroughly studied
the location profiles for the Twitter users and found that 34% of the users either left
them empty or just non-geographic information. They also inferred the user’s country
and state information by checking their tweets. Network-based methods try to esti-
mate a Twitter user’s locations by his neighbors (15; 100; 73; 149; 38). Jurgens (73)
aimed to infer all the users’ location by building a global networks and then propa-
gating location assignments from several seeds. Yamaguchi et al. (149) built several
distributed landmarks and then inferred a user’s location based on the connections
with them. Compton et al. (38) inferred the locations of all the users in Twitter by
minimizing their distances with the labelled users. Moreover, Li et al. (88) combined
the content and network information to obtain the more accurate estimation. All
these schemes seek to address the same question: how can we infer a user’s hidden
location from all his location-related tweets and/or neighbors’ locations? This report
targets a different problem: could we discover all or the majority of Twitter users in a
metropolitan area? Directly adopting these existing methods to address our problem
will result in scanning the whole Twitter network. Moreover, the accuracy of LocInfer
outperforms the state of the art in (97).
122
This chapter is also related to privacy disclosure and protection in OSNs in general.
Li et al. (87) used the neighbors’ locations to infer the location in the emerging
location-based social networks. Sun et al. (127) protected the location privacy on
the social crowdsourcing networks. Mao et al. (98) used the tweets to detect the
Twitter users’ situational leak such as vacation status, drunk status, and medical
conditions. Dey et al. (43) leveraged the information from neighbors to estimate the
age of Facebook users. Mislove et al. (102) also used the local connections around the
Facebook users to infer their hidden attributes such as major, college, and political
view. Our work is complementary to these work and also highlights that current
OSNs have emerged as an arguable threat to users’ privacy.
4.7 Summary
This chapter presented LocInfer, a novel system that is able to discover the major-
ity of Twitter users in any geographic area. Detailed experiments confirmed the high
efficacy and efficiency of LocInfer. We also proposed a countermeasure to hide the
locations of sensitive users from LocInfer and evaluated its efficacy with experiments
driven by real datasets.
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Chapter 5
YOUR AGE IS NO SECRET: INFERRING MICROBLOGGERS’ AGES VIA
CONTENT AND INTERACTION ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction
Age information is much scarcer in microblogging systems than in traditional
online social networks (OSNs). In a traditional OSN such as Facebook or LinkedIn,
the users aim to maintain their personal identities and social connections with friends,
so their personal profiles often contain true birthdate, school finishing/enrollment
time, and other sensitive information, which can be directly used to infer accurate user
ages (43). As more open social-networking platforms, however, microblogging systems
are more informal than traditional OSNs in terms of maintaining social identities such
that their user profiles often have no specific age-related information.
Age information in microblogging systems have important applications in both
positive and negative ways. As an example for the positive aspect, the ability to
select a group of users in the specific age range can enable numerous social and health
studies such as investigating the diet habits of the college students between 18 and 22
years old and monitoring the workout habit of elderly or middle-aged people. The age
information is also useful for cost-effective business marketing. For example, to launch
a viral marketing campaign for a new wearable device via Twitter, a known strategy
is for the marketer to seed the product with a few selected influential users from 30 to
50 years old who can potentially influence a disproportionately large number of others
and also quickly trigger a cascade of influence (160). As an example for the negative
aspect, being able to infer the age and other latent attributes based on the users’
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public information such as tweets can help the adversary better profile the users for
planning more advanced attacks such as spam campaigns or phishing attacks aiming
at the elderly.
Accurate age inference is still an open challenge in microblogging systems due to
three reasons. First, as stated before, the age information in microblogging systems is
scarce. The microblogging service provider such as Twitter offers no explicit channel
for users to indicate their age information. Therefore, existing methods that inferring
a user’s personal attributes directly from his/her online social neighbors’ (102; 43; 90)
are inapplicable because the neighbors’ age information is also missing. Second,
the microblogging messages (microblogs for short) posted by the users are highly
unstructured, noisy, and massive. For example, each tweet in Twitter is composed
of at most 140 characters, and hence microbloggers have created various slang and
abbreviations to express their feelings and opinions, such as “wish4u a gr8 day”
meaning “wish for you a great day.” There are about 500M tweets per day, and each
user is allowed to send up to 1000 tweets per day. These constrains make traditional
text analysis for regular documents inapplicable in our context (67). Finally, the
content information of the microbloggers is connected by online interactions such as
following and retweeting. Traditional content analysis treating each user’s content
information independently fails to explore such rich online interactions.
In this chapter, we propose a new framework to infer microbloggers’ ages by seam-
lessly integrating the content and interaction information on microblogging systems.
Our key idea is driven by the presence of homophily, which has been discovered in
many social studies (156). In our context, homophily refers to the tendency of a
microblogger to associate and bond with similar others. For example, two colleague
alumni in the same age group would be more inclined to follow each other in mi-
croblogging systems. In addition, the microbloggers with more intensive online inter-
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actions are very likely to have more similar content information in their microblogs.
To fully leverage the presence of homophily in microblogging systems, this chapter
aims to answer two critical questions. First, how can we model both the content
and interaction information in microblogging systems? Second, how can we effec-
tively combine the content and interaction information together to accurately infer a
microblogger’s age?
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• We motivate and formally define the age inference problem in microblogging
systems with both content and interaction information.
• We propose MAIF, a unified framework to model and seamlessly integrate both
the content and interaction information by considering the homophily of the
content information among connected microbloggers.
• We thoroughly evaluate the proposed framework on a real-world dataset with
54,879 Twitter users, the largest in the community. Our results show that MAIF
can achieve up to 81.38% inference accuracy and outperforms the state of the
art by 9.15%.
• We outline some countermeasures for those wishing to preserve age privacy if
our system were in place.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the back-
ground and defines the problem. Section 5.3 details the age inference framework.
Section 6.4 evaluates the proposed framework. Section 6.5 surveys the related work.
Section 6.6 summarizes this chapter and future work.
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5.2 Background and Problem Statement
In this chapter, we use Twitter as a representative microblogging system to il-
lustrate our proposed framework. In what follows, we briefly introduce Twitter and
then formally define the age inference problem.
After registering an account in Twitter, a user can post text-based microblogging
messages of up to 140 characters, known as tweets. S/he can also retweet, reply to,
mark favorite any other public Twitter user’s tweets. The user can also mention
anyone else in the tweet by @someone. Unlike Facebook-like OSNs, the social rela-
tionships in Twitter are unidirectional by users following others. If user A follows
user B, A is B’s follower, and B is A’s followee. In this chapter, we call A and B are
friends if and only if A and B follow each other.
In this chapter, we are interested in classifying a user into one of c predefined
age groups, which are further defined according to a widely-used adult development
model (86) in Section 5.4.1. We do not want to infer the user’s exact age for two
main reasons. First, we observed that the majority of commercial advertisements and
online surveys focus on the users of a specific age group. Hence our framework can
well satisfy the requirements of such important applications. Second, there are no
enough labeled users to infer exact ages. Nevertheless, our framework is flexible and
extensible to infer the exact age by having one group per age as long as there are
sufficient labeled users.
We assume that there is a set of labeled users in Twitter with explicit age infor-
mation specified through tweets or other sources. As stated before, labeled users in
microblogging systems are scarce. To tackle this challenge, we design a novel method
to collect sufficient labeled users for building and evaluating our proposed framework.
The details for labeled user collection are postponed to Section 5.3.1.
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Problem Formulation. We formally model the microblogger’s age inference
problem as follows. Let U denote a set of n labeled users, UF ⊆ U denote the union
of each labeled user’s friends in U , Xu represent the microblogging messages of each
user u ∈ U in the past year from the same given date, and Y ∈ Rn×c be an age-label
matrix in which c is the number of classes, and Yi,j is equal to 1 if user i is in age
group j and 0 otherwise. We aim to build a classifier W to automatically assign the
age labels for unknown users according to their microblogging messages. Here we
leverage online interaction information (if there is) to train the classifier but do not
need it for labeling unknown users, which is critical for the usability of the framework
because the labeled users are scarce and so for the interactions between the unknown
and labeled users.
5.3 Microbloggers’ Age Inference Framework
As mentioned before, it is very challenging to infer the age information of Twitter
users because of the tweets’ unstructured, noisy, and massive nature as well as the
scarcity of labeled users in Twitter. In this section, we first conduct an analysis of a
dataset which is crawled via a novel method, and the analysis motivates the design
of our microblogger’s age inference framework (MAIF for short). Then we present a
content metric to model each user u’s tweet set Xu in Section 5.3.2. Next, we adopt
a sparse representation method to model the content information for age inference in
Section 5.3.3 and then use community structure to model the interaction information
in Section 5.3.4. Finally, we integrate the content and interaction information to
formulate the age inference problem as a convex optimization problem in Section 5.3.5
and then present our solution in Section 5.3.6.
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5.3.1 Data Crawling and Analysis
We design a method to crawl the ground-truth labeled users. Inspired by (156; 90),
we found that many users like to send their birthday greetings to their friends by
posting a tweet containing two parts: a phrase of “happy yth birthday” where y is
the age of the friend, and a mentioned user who is likely to be the friend’s Twitter
name. For example, user A has posted a tweet “Happy 24th Birthday to my best
friend @B.” It is clear that user B is 24 years old now. We then use Twitter’s
Streaming API to record all the tweets which contain one of the keywords “happy
yth birthday” with y ranging from 14 to 70. Since the tweets are noisy, we use the
following tricks to refine the collected tweets. First, we only select the tweets which
mention only one person because it is very difficult to determine which user has the
age information if more than one user have been mentioned. Moreover, if the tweet
sender and the mentioned user are not friends, the tweet is excluded. This trick is to
deal with the cases that the sender may just mention and require a celebrity to greet
the sender’s friend (e.g., an ordinary person, not mentioned). Since our framework
relies on credible interactions among the users, such tweets and the corresponding
users should not be considered. Finally, each user mentioned in the remaining tweets
is assigned an age label y from the tweet, and we check the labeled users manually
to exclude the users who are obviously not at the labeled age. The readers can check
(77) for more details on how to crawl and analyze the Twitter system.
Based on the above method, we crawled the largest age-based ground-truth Twit-
ter dataset in the community which is composed of 54,879 labeled users, each user’s la-
beled friends, and each user’s tweets from June 1, 2014 to May 30, 2015. Fig. 5.1 shows
the age distribution of our dataset, which is consistent with the result in (156; 90).
As we can see, 88.06% of labeled users are aged below 24, which is expected because
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Figure 5.1: The Age Distribution in the Ground-truth Dataset.
young people are more likely to explicitly express their greetings using the social me-
dia. We notice that the dataset is biased toward young people, as Pew shows that
47% of Twitter users are older than 30 years old (46). However, the datasets with
the similar distribution have been used in many previous work (156; 90), and it is
still valuable and reliable for motivating our system design. We will also evaluate the
impact of the biased dataset on system performance in Section 6.4.
Fig. 5.2 shows the generation gap (61) in terms of the word usage. Specifically,
we selected six keywords, “home”, “hate”, “support”, “look forward”, “high school”,
“hard work”, and check how many users at each specific age have used them in their
tweet corpus. We can see that people with different ages have different keyword usage
patterns. For example, users aged from 18 to 21 increase the usage of “home” because
they might leave home for colleges; older people are less likely to use “hate” because
they are more mature, but they are more likely to use “hard work” because they are
highly engaged in the professional work; etc.
Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4 demonstrate the social homophily in Twitter. Specifically, we
first investigate the similarity in the ages of the users who have online interactions.
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For this purpose, we measure the age difference of each friend pair in the dataset and
draw the distribution in Fig. 5.3. To evaluate the impact of dataset bias, we also
calculate the expected distribution of the age difference. To that end, we let each
user befriend with each of other 54,878 users, and then measure the number of user
pairs with a specific age difference. As we can see, in the original dataset, 40.84% of
friend pairs have the same age, and 93.64% of the pairs have the age difference within
5 years while only 14.21% and 63.32% of the pairs in the fully-connected network
have the same age and the age difference within 5 years, respectively. To measure
the corpus similarity of each friend pair, we treat each user’s tweets as a set of words
and compute a Jaccard metric as |A∩B||A∪B| , where A and B denote the word sets for the
two users involved, respectively. For all the friend pairs with the same age difference,
we average their Jaccard similarities. As shown in Fig. 5.4, the corpus similarity
decreases as the age difference of a friend pair increases.
We can draw two observations from the above analysis. First, the users at different
ages have different topics in their tweets due to the age gap. Second, because of the
social homophily (156), a user is more likely to befriend with thoses of the similar
age, and their tweet topics tend to have higher similarity than the friend pairs with
large age difference. These two observations drive us to design a framework to well
integrate the content and interaction information to infer a Twitter user’s age.
5.3.2 Model Tweets by τ -gram
Given the Xi of tweets of any labeled user i ∈ {1, · · · , n} in the past year, we
first need to construct a mathematical model to represent it. Here we use a feature
matrix X ∈ Rn×m to model labeled users’ tweets, where m refers to the dimension of
a feature space F in the whole message space. In what follows, we describe how to
construct the feature space F and then the feature matrix X.
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We first remove stop words in a stop-word list, 1 in which the words such as
“the” and “those” are considered more general and meaningless. Then we conduct
stemming (116) to reduce inflected words to their stem forms such that the words with
different forms can be related to the same word. For example, “watch”, “watching”,
and “watched” are all reduced to “watch”.
Next, we represent the feature space for the cleansed tweets using a τ -gram tech-
nique, which is widely used for statistical text analysis. The τ -gram technique splits a
give message into sequences of τ contiguous words, each referred to as a τ -gram with τ
ranging from 1 to the message length. For example, consider a tweet {“Playing basket-
ball against those guys was a bad idea”}. After removing stop words and performing
stemming, we have {“play basketball against guy bad idea”}. The corresponding
1-grams are {“play”, “basketball”, “against”, “guy”, “bad”, “idea”}, and the corre-
sponding 2-grams are {“play basketball”, “basketball against”, “against guy”, “guy
bad”, “bad idea”}. We let Ni denote the τ -grams of Xi for each user i ∈ U for all
possible values of τ . Then we choose the top m most frequent τ -grams in
⋃
1≤i≤nNi
as the feature space F .
Finally, we use the Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) tech-
nique (85) to derive each element Xi,j in X. Specifically, let Γ(j) be the number of
times a τ -gram j appears in the τ -gram list Ni of user i, Γ∗i = maxj∈Ni Γ(j), and
Γ′(j) denote the number of users in U whose τ -gram lists contain j. We define
Xi,j = (0.5 + 0.5 ∗ Γ(j)
Γ∗i
) ∗ log( n
Γ′(j)
) . (5.1)
The above normalization based on Γ∗i is necessary because the users normally have
very different tweet sets and thus different τ -gram lists. We refer interested readers
to (85) for the details of the TF-IDF technique.
1http://www.lextek.com/manuals/onix/
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It is a common practice to use 1-grams and 2-grams only for high computational
efficiency without significantly sacrificing the analysis accuracy. So the feature space
and matrix can be constructed very quickly in practice.
5.3.3 Modeling Content Information
Given the feature matrix X ∈ Rn×m and the age-label matrix Y ∈ Rn×c, a
traditional method to build the classifier W is Least Square optimization(81), which
learns a weighted model to minimize the estimation and the labeled data by solving
min
W
1
2
‖XW −Y‖2F , (5.2)
where ‖A‖F represent the Frobenius norm of matrix A which is defined as ‖A‖F =√∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 A
2
i,j.
The traditional Least Square method for a large feature set can lead to overfitting
(134) in that the learned model may be too specific due to the limited training data
and thus be inaccurate for inferring the ages of unknown users. Moreover, it has been
observed in many domains that the underlying representations of many objects are
sparse. For example, a signal could be efficiently reconstructed by far fewer samples in
compressive sensing (17); when people speed-read documents, they may seek a sparse
representation with key phrases or words instead of fully understanding every single
word (99). These sparse features represent the given object more accurately and
efficiently by capturing its underlying essence. In addition, by selecting a sparse and
meaningful group of τ -grams rather than non-intuitive ones for each user, it could help
sociologists, market planners and even the public to understand the behavior of the
people in different age groups. To find and explore these sparse features in our feature
space, we can improve the model defined in Eq. (5.2) by assigning higher weight to
the most representative τ -grams. One widely-used method(134) is to introduce the
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`1-norm regularization for the weight matrix W as follows,
min
W
1
2
‖XW −Y‖2F + λ1‖W‖1, (5.3)
where ‖W‖1 =
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 |Wi,j|, and λ1 is the parameter to control the sparse
regularization. By adding this `1-norm constraint to the minimization problem, it
enforces the coefficients of many non-representative features in W to be zero, thus
making these features have no effect on the prediction model. With this strategy, we
select relatively more “important” features (equivalently, τ -grams) to represent each
age group.
5.3.4 Modelling Online Interaction Information
The content information in Twitter is networked. As shown in Section 5.3.1, peo-
ple within the same age group have higher probability to share content similarity
and also befriend with each other. For example, two college classmates follow each
other on Twitter, often discuss final exam preparations for the same course, and/or
cheer for the wins of their college sports teams. Given such observations, the content
model in Eq. (5.3) should assign higher weights to similar τ -grams, such as “final”
and “exam”, so that the two users can be classified into the same age group with high
probability. How to achieve this, however, is challenging because the two users very
likely also tweet on different topics. Below we present how to model the online in-
teractions among labeled users and then how to integrate the interaction information
into the content model in Eq. (5.3).
We use the community concept to model the online interactions among the labeled
users. For this purpose, it is worth noting that we can construct an undirected
social graph from the labeled dataset, where each vertex corresponds to a labeled
user, and an edge exists between two users if and only if they are friends (i.e., each
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other’s follower and followee). It has been widely reported that the users with the
similar attributes such as ages would connect with each other more than the users
with different attributes, hence forming a local community (102). The community
structure can be inferred by maximizing the modularity (109), which is defined as
follows.
Definition 5.3.1 (Modularity). Given an undirected graph G = 〈U , E〉, where |U| =
n is the user set, and eij ∈ E equals 1 if users i and j are friends and equals 0
otherwise. Assume that G has been partitioned into k communities, and that each
user belongs to one and only one community. The modularity of this partition is
defined as
Q =
1
2t
∑
i,j
(eij − didj
2t
)δ(Ci, Cj), (5.4)
where t = 1
2
∑
i,j eij is the number of edges in G, di =
∑
j eij is the degree of user i,
Ci is the community containing user i, and the δ−function δ(Ci, Cj) is 1 if Ci = Cj
and 0 otherwise.
The intuition behind the modularity is as follows.
didj
2m
represents the expectation
that any two users with degree di and dj could form an edge in the graph. If they
are connected (i.e., eij = 1) and are in the same community (i.e., Ci = Cj), they will
contribute to the whole modularity Q. If they are not connected (i.e., eij = 0) but are
in the same community (i.e., Ci = Cj), they will reduce the modularity Q. Finally, if
they are in different communities (i.e., Ci 6= Cj), they have no impact on Q. Hence,
the more edges in the same community, the higher its modularity.
Next, we present how to infer the community structure by maximizing the mod-
ularity. Let matrix G ∈ Rn×n represent the adjacent matrix for graph G where Gi,j
equals 1 if eij = 1 and 0 otherwise. Let matrix C ∈ Rn×k represent a community
partition for G where Ci,j is 1 if user i is in community j, and 0 otherwise. Note that
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∑
j Ci,j = 1 since any user belongs to one and only one community. Then we could
formulate the community partition problem as
max
C
Tr(CMCT), s.t. CCT = I (5.5)
where
M = G− dd
T
2t
(5.6)
where d is the degree vector for G, and Tr(A) =
∑
i Ai,i represents the sum of the
diagonal elements of A. Since this problem is NP-hard (109), we resort to the widely
used Louvain method (24) to obtain the approximation result.
After the community structure C is obtained, we expect that the users from the
same community are in the same age group. Therefore we can use the community
structure to improve our model in Eq. (5.3). To that end, inspired by (130), given Yˆ
as the estimated age group labels for all the users in U , we first compute the scatter
of user pairs who are in the same community but have been estimated in either the
same age group or two different age groups as:
S =YˆTFFT Yˆ (5.7)
where F is the weighted community indicator matrix, which can be obtained from C
as
F = C(CCT )−
1
2 , (5.8)
where Fij equals
1√
fj
if user i is in community Cj with fj users and equals 0 otherwise.
It can be easily found that in Eq. (5.7), since YˆT Yˆ is a diagonal matrix with
the (i, i)-th element equal to the number of users in the i-th age group, the (i, i)-th
element of S measures how many user pairs in the i-th age group are in the same
community, and the (i, j)-th (i 6= j) element of S measures how many user pairs in
the i-th age group and j-th age group are in the same community. Therefore, in order
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to classify the users in the same community into the same age range, we just need to
maximize the sum of (i, i)-th element in S, i.e.,
max
W
Tr(S). (5.9)
Note that we ignore the user pairs who are in the same community but in different
age groups because they violate the community structure.
5.3.5 Integrating Content and Interaction Information
Many existing methods on age estimation use either content or interaction infor-
mation independently by assuming that these two pieces of information are unrelated.
This assumption is not valid according to the intuition and also our data analysis in
Section 5.3.1. So we propose to integrate both the content and interaction information
into a unified model.
Particularly, since Yˆ = XW, Eq. (5.9) can be re-written as
max
W
Tr(WTXTFTFXW). (5.10)
By considering both the content information and interaction information, the age
estimation problem defined in Eq. (5.3) could be reformulated as follows,
min
W
1
2
‖XW −Y‖2F + λ1‖W‖1 −
λ2
2
Tr(WTXTFTFXW), (5.11)
where λ1 and λ2 are the parameters for sparse regularization (for content information)
and integration of interaction information, respectively. By varying these two param-
eters, we could set the importance of sparse regularization and interaction integration
on the original Least Square model.
5.3.6 An Optimization Algorithm
The problem defined in Eq. (5.11) is non-smooth because the `1 regularization
‖W‖1 is not differentiable. Hence we transform it into its differentiable Lagrange
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dual function as:
min
W
1
2
‖XW −Y‖2F −
λ2
2
Tr(WTXTFTFXW),
s.t. ‖W‖1 ≤ z,
(5.12)
where z ≥ 0 is the radius of the `1-ball and has a one-to-one correspondence with λ1.
Let
f(W) =
1
2
‖XW −Y‖2F −
λ2
2
Tr(WTXTFTFXW), (5.13)
we can see that f(W) is a smooth objective function, and the optimization problem
is convex which can be solved by gradient descending methods. It is known (22) that
the gradient step
W(k) = W(k−1) − 1
t(k)
5 f(W(k−1)) (5.14)
for solving the smooth optimization problem in Eq. (5.12) can be treated as finding the
minimum Euclidean projection (28) of W(k) defined above on the `1-ball ‖W‖1 ≤ z,
which is
W(k) = arg minWMt(k)(W,W
(k−1)), (5.15)
Mt(k)(W,W
(k−1)) =f(W) + 〈W −W(k−1),5f(W(k−1))〉
+
t(k)
2
‖W −W(k−1)‖2F ,
(5.16)
where t(k) is the step size, 〈A,B〉 = Tr(ATB) denotes the matrix inner product, and
5f(W(k−1)) = XTXW(k−1) −XTY − λ2XTFTFXW(k−1). (5.17)
Let U(k−1) = W(k−1) − 1
t(k)
5 f(W(k−1)). The Euclidean projection in Eq. (5.15)
has a closed-form solution (93) as follows,
w
(k)
j =

(1− λ1
t(k)‖u(k−1)j ‖
)u
(k−1)
j if ‖u(k−1)j ‖ ≥ λ1t(k)
0 o.w.
(5.18)
where w
(k)
j and u
(k−1)
j are the j-th rows of W
(k) and U(k−1), respectively.
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Algorithm 4 details the algorithm which comprises an outer loop and an inner
loop. The inter loop from Line 4 to 9 searches the step size t(k) to solve the gradi-
ent step defined in Eq. (5.15) according to Eq. (5.18). The outer loop then updates
the W(k). To accelerate the gradient descent in Eq. (5.15), we build a linear combi-
nation of W(k) and W(k−1) as H(k) in line 3 (70). The algorithm terminates when
|f(W(k))− f(W(k−1))| ≤ |f(W(k−1))|. Similar to the proof in (93), given the termi-
nation parameter , it is easy to verify that the convergence rate of our algorithm is
O( 1√

).
Algorithm 4: Classier Training for Age Inference
input : X,Y,F, λ1, λ2, 
output: W, i.e., the feature-to-label matrix.
1 Initialize W(k) ← 0, η(0) ← 0, η(1) ← 1, k ← 1;
2 while |f(W(k))− f(W(k−1))| > |f(W(k−1))| do
3 Set H(k) ←W(k) + η(k−1)−1
η(k)
(W(k) −W(k−1)) ;
4 while True do
5 Set U(k−1) ← H(k−1) − 1
t(k)
5 f(W(k−1)) ;
6 Compute w
(k)
j according to Eq. (5.18) ;
7 if f(W(k)) ≤Mt(k)(H(k−1),W(k)) then
8 break;
9 t(k) ← 2× t(k−1) ;
10 W←W(k), η(k) ← 1+
√
1+4(η(k−1))2
2
, k ← k + 1 ;
11 return W.
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5.3.7 Inferring Age Group of an Unknown User
After we build a classifier W, we can estimate the age range of any unknown user
u as follows. We crawl the tweets from u as Xu in the past year and then build the
τ -gram list Nu. Based on the feature space F , we then construct the feature vector
xu ∈ R1×m by calculating the TF-IDF of each τ -gram in F according to Eq. (6.1).
The final step is to estimate the age group with the maximum likelihood as follows,
arg max
i={1,2,...,c}
xuwi, (5.19)
where c is the number of age groups, and wi ∈ Rm×1 is the i-th column of the classifier
matrix W. Note that this step needs no interaction information from user u. This
feature can be very useful because it makes our algorithm above directly applicable
to an arbitrary unknown user with or without interactions with labeled users in the
classifier W.
Note that MAIF needs the labelled users and their content/network information to
build the classifier W, which can be crawled by the method presented in Section 5.3.1.
Due to the scarcity of the age information, the network information between the
labelled users might be limited. However, MAIF could work even with zero network
information, and as shown in the evaluation below, the richer the network information,
the better the performance.
5.4 Evaluation
In this section, we thoroughly evaluate the proposed framework. Specifically, we
want to answer these four questions:
1. How accurate is the proposed framework in comparison with other age inference
schemes?
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2. What is the impact of dataset bias on the performance?
3. What is the benefit of integrating both the content and social interaction infor-
mation?
4. What is the impact of key parameters in the framework?
In what follows, we first introduce the dataset as well as the evaluation methodology
and metrics. Then we seek to answer the above questions. Finally, we briefly dis-
cuss possible countermeasures for sensitive users to preserve their age privacy if our
framework were deployed.
5.4.1 Dataset, Methodology and Metrics
We first partition the Twitter users into five groups according to Levinson’s adult
development model (86):
• Group 1: 14-18. This group is for juvenile and adolescence users. Since Twitter
only allows the users older than 13 years to access the service, we start this
group from 14 years old.
• Group 2: 19-22. According to Levinson’s model, this group is a transition phase
from the pre-adulthood to the early adulthood. People in this age group are
usually enrolled in the college.
• Group 3: 23-33. This group is the “time for building and maintaining an
initial mode of adult living.” People within this age group are beginning their
professional career, building the family, or getting prepared for their career by
further graduate study.
• Group 4: 34-45. This is the phase of early adulthood to define a new era which
belongs to them.
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• Group 5: > 46. This group include people from 46 to 65 who are in their middle
adulthood and people who are older than 65 in the phase of the late adulthood.
We use two datasets to evaluate the proposed framework, as shown in Table 5.1.
First, the original dataset crawled in Section 5.3.1 is partitioned to five age groups
as described above. Fig. 5.1 shows that the age distribution is highly biased toward
Group 1 and 2, which occupy 88.06% of all the users. This is because the young
people are more active in posting their birthday greetings to their friends. We first
evaluate MAIF on this original dataset. Moreover, to evaluate the impact of the
dataset bias, we build a comparable and balanced dataset as follows. We keep all the
users in Group 3, which have 2,986 users, and then randomly sample the same number
of users from both Group 1 and 2. After sampling, the network is less connected.
Specifically, in the original dataset, each user has on average 1.06 friends within the
dataset in contrast to 0.141 friends in the sampled dataset.
We use cross validation to evaluate the proposed framework. Specifically, given
a ground-truth dataset composed of users who have indicated their ages, we split it
into five subsets and conducted the experiment by five rounds. In each round, we
choose four different subsets to build the classifier W, then apply it to the remaining
subset to estimate the users’ ages, and finally compare them with the ground truth.
Since we aim to classify a user into c(c > 2) groups, we derive both the separate
accuracy for each group and the overall accuracy for all the groups from the confusion
matrix 2 . For each age group i, we denote the number of true positives, false positives,
true negatives, and false negatives by #TPi,#FPi,#TNi, and #FNi, respectively. Then
we define the Precisioni, Recalli, F− scorei as the separate accuracy for age group
2Here we didn’t use the confusion matrix directly because it is not efficient to compare the MAIF
with several baseline methods. However, the derived separate and overall accuracy can represent
well the confusion matrix.
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i as follows:
Precisioni =
#TPi
#TPi + #FPi
; Recalli =
#TPi
#TPi + #TNi
;
F− Scorei = 2× Precisioni × Recalli
Precisioni + Recalli
.
(5.20)
We then define the overall accuracy as X =
∑c
i=1 riXi, where X represents Precision, Recall,
or F− score, and ri is the ratio of users in age group i over the whole dataset, which
is listed as the age distribution in Table 5.1.
5.4.2 Assessing Accuracy
We first evaluate the accuracy of the proposed framework and compare it with
both the state-of-the-art methods and the baseline methods summarized as follows.
• Content-based methods I. The state-of-the-art content-based method is pro-
posed by (110) to use the linear regression model with the `2 regularization,
which is equivalent to adding ‖W‖F to the least square method defined in
Eq. (5.2). We use the top-10000 1-gram and 2-gram as the features to infer the
age information.
• Content-based methods II with sparse representation. We use the least square
method with the `1 regularization in Eq. (5.3) to evaluate the inference perfor-
mance by including the sparse representation for the content information.
• Neighbor-based method I. We infer the age information from neighbors’ con-
tent information as used in (156; 31). Specifically, for each user i, we use the
least square method with the `1 regularization in Eq. (5.3) to estimate the age
information of i’s f friends who are not in the labeled user set, and then set the
average value as i’s age information. In the experiment, we set f be 10 and 20.
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• Neighbor-based method II. We infer the age information from labeled neigh-
bors’ age information as used in (43; 90). Specifically, we implement the more
advanced method in (90) which assigns a weight between every friend pair in the
labeled user set and then uses the label propagation to estimate the unknown
users’ ages. We use 80% of the users as the training set and the remaining as
the testing set.
• The proposed framework. We set both λ1 and λ2 in the Eq. (5.11) to be 1
for the general experiment, and we will explore the effects of parameters later.
Moreover, we set the size of the feature space m = 10, 000 with 5,000 of 1-grams
and 2-grams each and the termination condition  = 10−4 in Alg. 4.
For each method, we compare the separate accuracy of each group and the overall
accuracy, as shown in Table 5.2. We could draw three conclusions from the overall
accuracy. First, the proposed MAIF is better than all other four methods, verifying
that our framework can accurately integrate the content information and the interac-
tion information, which are the essential behavior pattern of twitterers, to infer the
age information. Second, the sparse representation in Content-II method outperforms
the least square in Content-I, meaning that the content information in microblogging
services is indeed sparse, and that the sparse features could represent age groups more
accurately. Third, directly inferring the age information from labeled neighbors’ age
information as in Neighbor-II method is not effective for the dataset. The reason is
that the age information in Twitter is so scarce that many users lack the neighbors
who have specified their ages. As we can see from Table 5.1, the average friends in the
original dataset is 1.06, meaning that every labeled user only has average one friend in
the dataset. To overcome this issue, MAIF leverages the community structure which
contains more users and integrates it with the content information.
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As for the separate accuracy, we could see that although MAIF outperforms other
methods in Group 1 and 2, all methods have low accuracy for the remaining groups.
We conjectured that the low accuracy for Group 3 to 5 is caused by the bias of the
dataset. To verify this conjecture, we applied these five methods on the sampled
dataset described in Table 5.1 and obtained the results in Table 5.3. The results
show that MAIF outperforms all other four methods in both average and separate
accuracy. Moreover, the accuracy of MAIF for each age group on this dataset is
significantly balanced than on the original dataset, which justifies our conjecture and
also answers the second question stated in the beginning of this section.
5.4.3 Performance of the Content and Interaction information
Since the proposed MAIF framework explores content and also interaction infor-
mation, we aim to investigate the contribution of each type and the benefit of the
integration. Specifically, we consider the following methods.
• Content-only methods. We use both the widely-used Support Vector Machine
(SVM) (128) and the least square with the `1 regularization in Eq. (5.3) to
evaluate the performance on the content feature matrix X.
• Network-only methods. We use the adjacent matrix G as the feature matrix
and then apply both SVM and the least square with the `1 regularization in
Eq. (5.3) on them.
Fig. 5.5 shows the overall accuracy of content-only methods, network-only meth-
ods, and the proposed framework. As we can see, MAIF outperforms both content-
only and network-only methods, meaning that the accuracy will increase if we inte-
grate both content and interaction information instead of considering only one type
of information. Moreover, content-only methods perform better than network-only
149
 Metrics
PrecisionRecall F-score
Ac
cu
ra
cy
0.6
0.8
1
SVM_Content
L1_Content
SVM_Interaction
L1_Interaction
MAIF
Figure 5.5: The Performance of Separate
Information.
102
100
λ2
10-2
100
λ1
0
0.5
1
F-
sc
or
e
Figure 5.6: The Impact of the Parame-
ters λ1 and λ2.
n ×104
1 2 3 4 5
Ac
cu
ra
cy
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Recall
F-score
Precision
Figure 5.7: The Accuracy Under Differ-
ent Dataset Sizes.
Training set size
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ac
cu
ra
cy
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Recall
F-score
Precision
Figure 5.8: The Accuracy Under Differ-
ent Training Set Sizes.
methods, indicating that content information is more reliable and contributes more
than the network information to infer the age information. Again, we conjecture that
this is caused by the scarcity of the age information in Twitter and hence the scarcity
of the network information between the labeled users.
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5.4.4 Exploiting the Parameters
We show the impact of λ1 and λ2 in Fig. 5.6. As stated before, the parameter
λ1 indicates the weight of the sparse representation of the content information, and
the parameter λ2 indicates the weight of interaction information. As we can see,
both parameters lead to smooth and meaningful results when they are between 0.01
and 100. Moreover, when λ2 increases from 0.01 to 100, the overall accuracy first
increases and then decreases; similar trend holds for λ2. Hence we expect a local
optimal parameter pair for λ1 and λ2 to be both 1. Moreover, the accuracy in this
range is smooth and has limited variance, suggesting that in practice we could choose
these two parameters from 0.01 to 100.
Fig. 5.7 show the impact of the dataset size. Given the original dataset with
54,879 users, we randomly sample 5000, 10000, 20000, 30000, 40000, and 50000 users,
respectively, and use five-fold cross validation to yield the results. As we can see,
increasing the dataset size improves the accuracy because of the richer content and
network information. Specifically, the more users, the richer content and network
information which could better represent the users in a specific age group, and hence
the higher accuracy.
Our algorithm is stable in terms of other parameters. Fig. 5.8 demonstrate the
impact of the training set size. 50% of the training set means that only 50% of the
80%, which equals 40%, of the users in the whole dataset are used as the training set
to predict the remaining 20% of users. The training set size varies from 50% to 100%
(corresponds to 40% to 80% of all users). As expected, increasing the training set
can slightly improve the accuracy. However, the improvement is less significant than
increasing the dataset size, as shown in Fig. 5.7. The reason is that the training set,
which has 40% of the 54,879 users, is still large enough to obtain the good results
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even if we only use 50% of the training set. Moreover, we have evaluated the impact
of feature space size m (from 5000 to 20000), the different combinations of 1-gram
and 2-gram in the feature space, and the variant definitions of TF-IDF in Eq. (6.1),
and obtained similar results, which are omitted here due to space constraints.
5.4.5 Countermeasures
The above experiments demonstrate the efficacy of using the public content and
interaction information to infer the age information, one type of highly-private per-
sonal attributes. Since the social homophily and generation gap always exist, it is
very challenging for twitterers to evade the inference demonstrated in this chapter. In
order to preserve their privacy, one way is to set “protected”—a function provided by
Twitter—the critical information such as followers, followees, and even all the tweets,
such that only authorized users could visit while the unauthorized third party will fail
to infer due to the absence of content and interaction information. Another way is to
diversify the content and/or interaction information by posting with the style from
other age groups and/or following people with different ages. As shown in Fig. 5.5,
the absence of one type of information will lower the inference performance, so the
age privacy can be protected to some extent. Nevertheless, this chapter mainly aims
to demonstrate a more effective method to infer the hidden age information from
public content and interaction information in Twitter. More privacy implications of
our framework and the thorough investigation of countermeasures are beyond the
scope of this chapter.
5.5 Related Work
In this section, we briefly present the existing work mostly related to this chapter.
There has been some effort to infer hidden age information in microblogging sys-
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tems. Nguyen et al. tried to classify the user ages from different angles such as age
range, exact age, and life stage with the 1-grams constructed from the tweets (110).
Oktay et al. proposed a method to infer users’ age range by investigating their names.
The idea is that different generations have different preferences on the baby naming
(112). Liao et al. use the ages of online neighbors to infer the age of a given user
(90). Dey et al. also used the similar method to infer the user age in Facebook (43).
However, this method requires that some neighbors have specified their ages, which
cannot be satisfied in microblogging systems where age information is scarce.
Other hidden attributes such as location (88; 97; 38; 159), gender (118), political
preference (156), and ethnicity (31) have also been inferred by either the content
information and/or the interaction information. Mislove et al. used the local con-
nections around the Facebook users to infer their major, college, and political view
(102). Location information has attracted many attentions recently. The content
with geographical hints could be used to infer users’ locations (97). Since about 16%
of Twitter users have specified their locations, inferring users’ locations from their
neighbors’ locations can be more effective (88; 38) than inferring their ages from their
neighbors’ ages. Besides the privacy threats by inferring these sensitive attributes,
there have been growing security issues against social network users (26; 161; 162).
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose MAIF, a novel framework which explores public con-
tent and interaction information in microblogging systems to infer the hidden ages of
microbloggers. We thoroughly evaluate MAIF using a real-world dataset with 54,879
Twitter users. Our results show that MAIF can achieve up to 81.38% inference ac-
curacy and outperforms the state of the art by 9.15%.
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Chapter 6
PRIVACY PRESERVING SOCIAL MEDIA PUBLISHING
6.1 Introduction
User-generated social media data are exploding. Twitter, the most popular mi-
croblogging service, generates 500 million tweets per day by 320 million monthly active
users as of December 2015. Facebook, the largest online social network with about
1 billion daily active users as of June 2015, generates 4 new petabytes of data per
day. People use social media platforms to communicate with their friends, share their
daily life experiences, express their opinions on political/social events and commercial
products, etc.
Closely tied to human beings in the physical world, large-scale social media data
have tremendous usages by various data consumers and have become one of the most
profitable resources for social media service providers (55). For example, companies
use the data to learn the behavior of their customers, monitor the public responses
to their products, deliver online advertisements more cost-effectively, and uncover
the trends that may impact their businesses; public policy makers explore the data
to obtain the demographic information for making strategic decisions; public health
agencies analyze the data to identify and predict disease outbreaks; and sociologists
leverage the data to study the social behavior and establish new social network theo-
ries. In a typical social media mining application, the data consumer demands a set
of users and their social media data (such as profiles, recent posts, and friends), which
satisfy some desirable criterion. For example, company A may request the data of all
the users who mentioned the company in the past week after a public relation crisis.
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The disclosure of complete and intact social media data exacerbates the threats to
user privacy. For example, many users mention their vacation plans in publicly visi-
ble tweets without knowing that criminals can exploit such information for targeted
break-ins and thefts (98). Criminals may identify potential victims nearby by directly
browsing/searching social media platforms, and smarter ones can exploring the search
APIs offered by social media platforms. The data acquired in this traditional way
are only small and random samples of all the qualifying data. For example, Twitter
claims that their Search API only “searches against a sampling of recent tweets pub-
lished in the past 7 days” (137). If the criminals could access the complete and intact
social media data in the target area, they can identify all potential victims to plan
large-scale break-ins. In addition, social media mining applications are increasingly
sophisticated and powerful. If complete and intact social media data are available,
lots of sensitive information the users do not explicitly disclose could still be inferred,
such as age (156; 158), location (88; 159), language (110), and political preferences
(31).
There is a natural conflict between data utility and user privacy in social media
data publishing. On the one hand, data consumers want complete and intact social
media data to maximize the data utility, which is also the most profitable case to social
media service providers. The maximum data utility is achieved unfortunately at the
biggest sacrifice of user privacy. On the other hand, social media service providers
are also motivated to protect user privacy due to legal concerns, public relations, and
many other reasons. For example, they may intentionally add random noise to the
data before releasing them to data consumers. User privacy is thus better protected
but at the loss of data utility.
A growing body of work studies privacy-preserving publishing of social graphs
and falls into two directions. The first line of research (64; 94; 129) aims at vertex
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privacy by publishing social graphs with anonymous user IDs, and the research effort
is to prevent the adversary from linking anonymous IDs to corresponding users in
the real social network. The other line of research targets link privacy (103; 92), and
the main effort is to publish social graphs with real user IDs but perturbed links by
deleting some real edges and adding some fake ones. Neither line of work considers
the privacy of user data and thus cannot be directly applied in our context.
In this chapter, we propose a framework for privacy-preserving social media data
publishing. The framework consists of a data service provider (DSP), numerous social
media users, and a lot of data consumers. The DSP can be either a social media service
provider itself such as Twitter or Facebook, or a third-party data company such as
Gnip and DataSift which resells the data obtained from social media service providers.
Data consumers can be an arbitrary individual or entity in public or private sectors.
They are interested in statistical information that can be mined from social media
data, rather than real user IDs. A data consumer submits a data request to the DSP,
which specifies the query conditions. The DSP responds with a data set satisfying
the query conditions, in which each user ID is anonymized.
Although there can be various attacks on social media data publishing, we consider
a user-linkage attack as the first effort along this line. In this attack, a malicious data
consumer attempts to link random or selected anonymous IDs in the received data set
to real IDs on the social media platform, so he can obtain the latest social media data
about the victims or other sensitive information not covered by his previous query.
We assume that existing sophisticated techniques such as (64; 94; 129; 103; 92) are
adopted to preserve both link privacy and vertex privacy in the anonymized data
set, so the attacker cannot uncover real IDs based on either vertexes or edges. Our
focus is to perturb user-generated data such that they cannot be exploited for the
user-linkage attack.
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It is very challenging to design effective defenses against the user-linkage attack
while achieving high data utility. First, social media data are highly unstructured
and noisy. Specifically, unlike traditional documental content, social media data are
composed of a large mount of short and informal posts. For example, each tweet allows
at most 140 characters. So users tend to use slang and abbreviations to express their
feelings and opinions, such as “u have a gr8 day” meaning “you have a great day.” This
phenomenon makes traditional privacy-preserving techniques on structured databases
inefficient (54). Second, social media data are extremely large in quantity and contain
a lot of redundancy. For example, many users have intensive interactions with their
friends in the forms or replies and retweets, or they may post many tweets on a
single topic. Finally, different data consumers may have diverse social media mining
applications with totally different utility functions, so the data they request from the
DSP may differ significantly in variety and/or quantity. So it is almost impossible for
the DSP to adopt a universal mechanism to preserve the same level of user privacy
while satisfying the utility requirements of various data consumers.
Our defense against the user-linkage attack in this chapter consists of three steps.
First, we map the complete and intact data of all the users into a high-dimensional
user-keyword matrix. Second, we add controlled noise to the user-keyword matrix to
satisfy differential privacy (47), the most popular privacy model lately. Finally, the
perturbed user-keyword matrix is disclosed to the data consumer, where each user
ID is anonymized. If the social graph corresponding to the data set is also needed,
existing defenses such as (64; 94; 129; 103; 92) should be adopted to preserve both
link privacy and vertex privacy. Our defense applies to a wide range of social media
applications. For example, the data consumer can infer demographic information
about the target population from the perturbed data set.
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Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We are the first to coin the problem of privacy-preserving social media data
publishing to the best of our knowledge, for which a system model is also pro-
posed.
• We propose a novel mechanism to guarantee differential user privacy while main-
taining high data utility in social media data publishing. The popular Laplacian
mechanism to achieve differential privacy suffers from the curse of dimension-
ality (19) and can bring huge noise to the original dataset which significantly
reduces data utility. We define a new metric called -text indistinguishabil-
ity whereby to design a mechanism to break the constraint of the Laplacian
mechanism.
• We thoroughly evaluate the proposed defense on a real-world dataset with re-
gard to user privacy and data utility. Our results show that high-level privacy
protection can be achieved without significantly sacrificing data utility. For ex-
ample, we show that our mechnism can reduce the privacy leakage by as much
as 64.1% by reducing only 1.61% of utility in terms of classification accuracy.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the prob-
lem statement. Section 6.3 illustrates our design for differentially privacy-preserving
social media publishing. Section 6.4 evaluates the utility and privacy aspects of our
mechanism by detailed experiments. Section 6.5 surveys the related work. Section 6.6
concludes the chapter.
6.2 Problem Statement
In this section, we first describe the system model for social media data publishing,
followed by the adversary model. Next, we briefly argue that current publishing
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Figure 6.1: Social Media Data Publishing. The Data Consumer Submits a Query to
Request the Data of Everyone Who Tweeted the Keyword “SuperSunscreen” in the
Past 48 Hours. The Data Service Provider Then Return All the Qualifying Users
with Anonymous IDs and Their Recent 1,000 Posts.
policies of major social media service providers are vulnerable under our adversary
model. Finally, we state the design objectives.
6.2.1 Social Media Data Publishing
We consider a system with three parties: social media users, social media data
service providers, and social media data consumers, as shown in Fig. 6.1.
• Social media users use the social media to connect with their friends and/or
ones they have followed and generate the original texts which could be set either
private or public. Public users are searchable either directly via the social media
service provider’s website or APIs or from the external tool such as Google. By
setting his/her profile private, a private user only allows the authenticated users
to access the profile and is not searchable from other users. However, the social
media service provider still has full access to all the private and public data per
user agreements.
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• The social media data service provider (or DSP for short) hosts and provides
most likely paid access to social media data. A DSP can be a social media
service provider such as Twitter or Facebook itself. It can also be an emerging
third-party data company such as Gnip or DataSift, which partners with social
media service providers to provide social media data services. For example, Gnip
and DataSift both have authorized access to Twitter’s Firehost engine whereby
to have access to complete, intact, and realtime Twitter data. The DSP can
publish the data according to the privacy policies and agreements (detailed in
Section 6.2.3) which users consent to when signing up for using social media
services. Generally, the DSP has full rights to use all the hosted data for their
businesses and also share the data with data consumers. For example, the DSP
can sample the whole user space according to data consumers’ requests, assign
an anonymous ID to each sampled user, process the original data from each
user according to data requests, and finally deliver the processed data to data
consumers.
• Data consumers purchase social media data from the DSP whereby to run var-
ious social media mining algorithms to extract useful information. A data
consumer can be an individual, a business, a government agency, a research
institution, or any other entity in public and private sectors who is aware of
the growing importance of social media data. A data consumer typically sends
to the DSP a request specifying its query conditions, pays for the request, and
then receives the data. For example, company A may request the data of all
the users in the west coast who have tweeted the keyword “company A” in the
past week. After receiving the data from the DSP, it can explore advanced so-
cial media mining algorithms to identify critical market trends and analyze the
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users’ demographic information such as age, location, education level, income
level, marital status, occupation, religion, and family size.
We emphasize that a data consumer currently cannot obtain complete and intact
social media data without the DSP’s support. For example, social media service
providers publish public APIs which allow a data consumer to crawl their platforms,
but data crawling via public APIs has critical limitations that hinder the retrieval of
complete data in need. First, each API call only returns a random and small sample
of the whole data satisfying the query conditions. Second, such public APIs often
have a rate limit on how many queries a data consumer can run in a particular time
period. For example, Twitter users can make 180 requests/queries per 15 minutes to
get others’ timelines (136). Finally, a nontrivial set of users (e.g., 11.84% for Twitter
(12) and 52.8% for Facebook (44)) set their data private such that unauthorized data
consumers have no way to search for and obtain these private data. As a result, the
data consumer needs to request the complete data in need from the DSP who has the
complete dataset.
6.2.2 Adversary Model (User-Linkage Attack)
The DSP is assumed to be fully trusted by both social media users and data
consumers. On the one hand, social media data are increasingly important profit
venues of social media service providers. For example, it is reported that data licensing
has already account for more than 10% of Twitter’s total revenue. So the DSP is
motivated to provide high-utility data services to data consumers. On the other
hand, the DSP is obligated to protect the privacy of social media users due to legal
concerns, public relations, and many other reasons. The framework we propose allow
the DSP to strike a good balance between data utility and user privacy.
Some advanced social media users may be privacy-aware and have taken some
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actions to protect their privacy. For example, the statistics in (12) and (44) show
that 11.84% of Twitter users and 52.8% of Facebook users set their accounts private,
respectively. As said, the DSP still has access to the complete data despite the users’
privacy settings. In addition, the users’ effort to protect their privacy fails in the
presence of the attack outlined below.
Our focus is to defend against the user-linkage attack, which can be launched by a
curious or even malicious data consumer. Assume that the DSP has anonymized every
user ID in the dataset and also taken existing defenses such as (64; 94; 129; 103; 92)
to guarantee link and vertex privacy. There are two possible versions of the user-
linkage attack. In the first version, the attacker locates some target users by random
browsing or searching via public APIs on the social media platform. It knows that
these users must be in the received dataset under anonymous IDs. Existing defenses
only consider link and vertex privacy via various obfuscation mechanisms, and no
attention has been paid to text data. Armed with the text data of the target users
with real IDs, the attacker can easily locate the corresponding anonymous IDs in the
dataset. In the same way, the attacker can link the real IDs of the initial target users’s
friends to the corresponding anonymized IDs, and so on. The attacker eventually can
uncover all the mappings between real and anonymous IDs in the dataset, despite the
DSP’s anonymization effort even based on existing advanced defenses (64; 94; 129). In
the second version, the attacker tries to learn more information beyond the received
dataset. It starts by finding some interesting posts/tweets in the anonymized dataset
and then easily locating the real users by performing simple text matching on the
social network platform. Once the real users are located, the attacker can learn their
latest information and even other information the attacker’s original query does cover.
To highlight the danger posed by such user-linkage attacks, assume that the at-
tacker is an intelligent criminal. He first sends a query for all the users in a target
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physical region who tweeted “vacation” in the past month. Then he locates valuable
targets in the anonymized dataset by running sophisticated social media mining algo-
rithms. Next, he uses the user-linkage attack to find out the real IDs of these valuable
targets and track their realtime statuses on the social media platform. Finally, the
attacker can well plan break-ins and thefts aiming the victims who mentioned future
vacation plans. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to notice and study the
defense against such text-based user-linkage attacks which can be extremely danger-
ous.
6.2.3 Vulnerability of Current Social Media Data Publishing Policies
Social media data and their sharing policies are critical for the business of social
media service providers. The typical business model is that users can use social media
services for free, but in return they have to allow social media service providers to
fully access, record, use, and profit from their public/private data. In this section,
we review the current data publishing policies of Facebook and Twitter, two repre-
sentative social media service providers and further highlight the need for privacy-
preserving social media data publishing. Note that we have absolutely no intention
to compare/critize/judge these data publishing policies which are in effect for various
technical and non-technical reasons.
In particular, Facebook 1 claims that “We want our advertising to be as relevant
and interesting as the other information you find on our Services. With this in
mind, we use all of the information we have about you to show you relevant ads,”
and “We transfer information to vendors, service providers, and other partners who
globally support our business, such as providing technical infrastructure services,
analyzing how our Services are used, measuring the effectiveness of ads and services,
1https://www.facebook.com/policy.php
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providing customer service, facilitating payments, or conducting academic research
and surveys.” Similarly, Twitter 2 allows third-party data consumers to access both
the private and public user data, as they claimed “We engage service providers to
perform functions and provide services to us in the United States, Ireland, and other
countries. We may share your private personal information with such service providers
subject to obligations consistent with this Privacy Policy and any other appropriate
confidentiality and security measures, and on the condition that the third parties
use your private personal data only on our behalf and pursuant to our instructions.”
These publishing policies are obviously subject to the aforementioned user-linkage
attack, regardless of whether advanced defenses such as (103; 92) are incorporated to
protect link and vertex privacy.
6.2.4 Design Objectives
We consider the following problem within the aforementioned social media data
publishing framework. After receiving a data query from the data consumer, the DSP
searches the entire social media database to generate a dataset D, which contains all
the users satisfying the query and their published texts (e.g., tweets, retweets, and
replies) during the period specified in the query. Each user in D is assigned an
anonymous ID to provide baseline user privacy. The data consumer may also request
the social graph associated with D, in which case we assume that existing defenses
such as (64; 94; 129; 103; 92) are adopted to preserve link and vertex privacy such
that it is infeasible to link an anonymous ID to the real user based on his/her vertex’s
graphical property in the social graph. Our focus is to let the DSP transform the raw
dataset D into a new one D′ by perturbing the user texts according to the following
three requirements.
2https://twitter.com/privacy?lang=en
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• Completeness : each data item in D can be mapped to a unique item in D′, and
vice versa. In other words, no user is added to or deleted from D to create D′.
• Privacy Preservation: The user texts in D′ can be used to link any anonymous
ID in D′ to the corresponding real user ID with negligible probability. This
means that text-based user-linkage attacks can be thwarted with overwhelming
probability.
• High Utility : D′ and D should lead to comparable data utility at the data
consumer when conducting common data mining tasks such as statistical ag-
gregation, clustering, and classification.
6.3 Differentially Privacy-Preserving Social Media Data Publishing
In this section, we present a novel technique to achieve differentially privacy-
preserving social media data publishing with the aforementioned design goals in mind.
Inspired by geo-indistinguishability from (14), which is proposed to protect location
privacy, we propose a novel notion of text-indistinguishability as the foundation of
our technique. In what follows, we introduce the background on text modelling
Section 6.3.1 and differential privacy in Section 6.3.2. We then present the concept of
text-indistinguishability in Section 6.3.3, followed by our technique in Section 6.3.4. A
working example is subsequently given in Fig. 6.3.5. Finally, we theoretically analyze
our technique in Section 6.3.6 and make some remarks in Section 6.3.7.
6.3.1 Text Modeling
As stated before, social media service providers such as Facebook and Twitter
currently publish the original data set D to the data consumer, which contains the
complete and intact user texts. We assume that there are n users in D, each assigned
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an anonymous ID. There are two obvious drawbacks for this publishing method. First,
although this method can enable the maximum data utility, it is vulnerable to the
text-based user-linkage attack. Second, the data consumer cannot directly use the
original texts which are highly unstructured and noisy, as mentioned in Section 6.1.
For example, common machine learning algorithms such as SVM and K-means require
the input for each user to be a vector. Therefore, from the perspectives of both privacy
protection and data usability, the DSP needs to transform each user’s texts into a
numerical vector. Here we introduce text modeling, a standard process to achieve
this goal.
We first remove stop words in a stop-word list, 3 in which the words such as
“the” and “those” are considered more general and meaningless. Then we conduct
stemming (116) to reduce inflected words to their stem forms such that the words
with different forms can be related to the same word. For example, “play”, “playing”,
and “played” are all reduced to “play”.
Next, we represent the keyword space for the cleansed texts using a τ -gram
technique, which is widely used for statistical text analysis. The τ -gram technique
splits a give message into sequences of τ contiguous words, each referred to as a τ -
gram with τ ranging from 1 to the message length. For example, consider a tweet
{“#SuperSunscreen is really useful, and I like its smell”}. After removing stop words
and performing stemming, we have {“supersunscreen really useful like smell”}. The
corresponding 1-grams are {“supersunscreen”, “really”, “useful”, “like”, “smell”},
and the corresponding 2-grams are {“supersunscreen really”, “really useful”, “ useful
like”, “like smell”}. We let Ni denote the τ -grams of Xi for each user i ∈ [1, n] for all
possible values of τ . Then we choose the top m most frequent τ -grams in
⋃
1≤i≤nNi,
each of which is referred to as a keyword hereafter.
3http://www.lextek.com/manuals/onix/
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Finally, we use Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) (85) to
derive each element Di,j in the eventual dataset. Specifically, let Γ(j) be the number
of times a τ -gram j appears in the τ -gram list Ni of user i, Γ∗i = maxj∈Ni Γ(j), and
Γ′(j) denote the number of users whose τ -gram lists contain j. We define
Di,j = (0.5 + 0.5 ∗ Γ(j)
Γ∗i
) ∗ log( n
Γ′(j)
) . (6.1)
The above normalization is necessary because the users normally have very different
tweet sets and thus different τ -gram lists. Interested readers are referred to (85) for
more details about TF-IDF. We abuse the notation by letting D = [Di,j] ∈ Rn×m
denote the dataset after text modeling as well, which is essentially an n × m user-
keyword matrix. We also let Ui := 〈Di,1, . . . , Di,m〉 denote the text vector of user i
(i ∈ [1, n]), i.e., the ith row in D.
It is a common practice to use 1-grams and 2-grams only for high computational
efficiency without significantly sacrificing the analysis accuracy. So the keyword space
and user-keyword matrix can be constructed very quickly in practice. Also note that
the DSP needs to publish the τ−gram name of each column. Otherwise, the data
consumer has no idea about the physical meaning of the released data.
6.3.2 Why Differential Privacy?
The text model above has two important implications. First, it makes the un-
structured social media data structured by reducing the keyword dimension from
unlimited to m. Second, since the keyword space is composed of the top m most
frequent τ -grams, the users’ privacy has been largely improved in contrast to the
original intact text data. For example, when a user has a tweet saying “The last class
with students at CSE561, #MIT”, the word “CSE561” or even “MIT” has very low
probability to be selected in the keyword space. Therefore, this critical information
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has been hidden by the text modeling process. The privacy threat, however, cannot
be completely eliminated. For instance, the 1-grams such as “last”, “class”, and “stu-
dent” may still be released. These pieces of information can at least tell that the user
is a professor or teacher. By combining other text information such as “computer”
and “software,” the attacker can further link the target user to a college professor
teaching computer science. Such inferences can be continued until the target is linked
to one or a few real IDs on the social media platform.
Differential privacy is a powerful technique to protect such linkage attacks. Pro-
posed by Dwork et al.(47; 48), differential privacy protects the individual user’s pri-
vacy during the statistical query over a database. If each user in the database is
independent, 4 with any side information except the target him/herself, the attacker
cannot infer whether the target user is in the database or which record is associated
with him/her (74). Providing arguably the strongest analytical protection for user
privacy, the differential privacy model can be more formally defined as follows, which
is tailored for our social media data publishing framework.
Definition 6.3.1 (-Differential Privacy (47)). Given a query function f(D) with an
input dataset D ∈ Rn×m and a desirable output range, a mechanism K(·) with an
output range R satisfies -differential privacy iff
Pr[K(f(D1)) = R ∈ R]
Pr[K(f(D2)) = R ∈ R] ≤ e
 (6.2)
for any datasets D1, D2 ∈ Rn×m that differ on only one row.
Here  is called the privacy budget. Large  (e.g. 10) results in large e and
indicates that the DSP can tolerate large output difference and hence large privacy
loss (because the adversary can infer the change of the database according to the large
4The dependence among the users will hurt the privacy guarantee as indicated in (74; 91).
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change of the query function f(·). By comparison, small  (e.g., 0.1, e0.1 = 1.1052)
indicates that the DSP can tolerate small privacy loss.
Differential privacy models can be interactive and non-interactive. Assume that
the data consumer intends to execute a number of statistical queries on the same
dataset. In the interactive model, the data consumer submits to the DSP the con-
ditions for constructing the dataset D and also a desirable statistical query function
f . Instead of returning D to the user, the DSP only responds with K(f(D)), where
K(·) perturbs the query result. In contrast, the DSP in the non-interactive model
designs a mechanism K(·) to transform the original dataset D into a new dataset
D′ = K(f(D)). Finally, D′ is returned to the data consumer which can execute
arbitrary statistical queries locally.
6.3.3 -Text Indistinguishability: a New Notion
Our problem can be formulated according to a non-interactive differential privacy
model as follows. Let us use an identity query fI(·) as the query function such that
f(D) = D. Our goal is to find a mechanism K(·) to transform the original user-
keyword matrix (or dataset) D into a new one D′ = K(D) such that -differential
privacy can be achieved. Instead of transforming the entire dataset D as a whole, a
more straightforward approach is to perform the transformation for each row individ-
ually, i.e., adding noise to each row Ui ∈ D to produce a new row U ′i ∈ D′.
The Curse of Dimensionality. The Laplacian mechanism (47) is a popular tech-
nique for providing -differential privacy, but it suffers from the curse of dimension-
ality. To see it more clearly, recall that -differential privacy is defined over the
query function f and unrelated to the dataset because Eq. (6.2) holds for all pos-
sible datasets. What matters is the maximum difference between f(D1) and f(D2)
(∀D1, D2 ∈ Rn×m), which is called the sensitivity of the query function f defined as
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follows,
S(f) = max ‖f(D1)− f(D2)‖1 . (6.3)
For the identity query fI(·) which transforms each text vector (row) in D to a new
vector in D′, the sensitivity can be furthered defined as
S(fI) = max ‖Ui − Uj‖1 (6.4)
where Ui ∈ Rm and Uj ∈ Rm are any two arbitrary vectors based on TF-IDF (see
Eq. 6.1).
The Laplacian mechanism can achieve -differential privacy by adding the Lapla-
cian noise to the query result (47), i.e.,
KLp(fI(Ui)) = Ui + (Yi1, · · · , Yim), i = 1, . . . , n , (6.5)
where Yij are drawn i.i.d. from Lap(S(fI)/) ∝ e−|x|/S(fI).
The Laplacian mechanism unfortunately decreases the utility of the transformed
dataset. Specifically, the larger the dimension m from the output of the identity query
function fI(·), the larger the sensitivity S(fI), the larger deviation of the Laplacian
noise. Moreover, the large noise accumulated from the high dimension will be added
to each single element of KLp(fI(U)), leading to the so-called curse of dimensionality.
Specifically, from the definition of the text vector Ui in Eq. (6.1), the norm of each
element in Ui should be less than log(n)(≈ 11.5 when n = 100000). When the
dimension m (e.g., 10000) is large enough, the added Laplacian noise has deviation
O(m), which can easily exceed the norm of original text element (≈ 11.5).
-Text Indistinguishability. The root cause of the curse of dimensionality is that
the noise added to a single element in every text vector Ui (∀i ∈ [1, n]) is proportional
with the L1-sensitivity of Ui. To tackle this problem, we need to limit the sensitivity
of the whole text vector to the norm of the vector, instead of the individual element.
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To begin with, we need to generalize the concept of differential privacy defined
in Definition 6.3.1. The generalization of differential privacy was first proposed by
Andre´s et al. for location privacy (14), where the privacy budget is proportional to
the physical distance between any two users. They also propose the concept of geo-
indistinguishability such that the service provider reports similar distribution with
the difference bounded by ed(loc1,loc2) for any two users at locations loc1 and loc2,
respectively. Inspired by this work, we let d(Ui, Uj) denote the Euclidean distance
between Ui and Uj, which are any pair of text vectors in the user-keyword matrix D.
We further redefine the privacy budget as d(Ui, Uj) and propose the notion of -text
indistinguishability as follows.
Definition 6.3.2 (-Text Indistinguishability). Given the user-keyword matrix D =
[Di,j] ∈ Rn×m, a mechanism Kt(·) satisfies -Text Indistinguishability iff
Pr[Kt(Ui) = U
∗ ∈ Rm|Ui]
Pr[Kt(Uj) = U∗ ∈ Rm|Uj] ≤ e
d(Ui,Uj) , (6.6)
where Ui and Uj are any user text vector pair in D, and U∗ is a text vector in perturbed
user-keyword matrix D′.
The above definition means that any two vectors Ui and Uj in D can be trans-
formed (or perturbed) by the mechanism Kt(·) into the same vector in D′ with proba-
bility ≥ 1− ed(Ui,Uj). In other words, the more similar two text vectors are, the more
non-distinguishable they are after transformation, and vice versa. The maximum pri-
vacy budget is given by rmax, where rmax denotes the maximum Euclidean distance
between two text vectors in D. As in the original -differential privacy mechanism,
the larger the privacy budget, the larger the privacy loss the DSP can tolerate, and
vice versa. The following theorem gives the upper bound of rmax, based on which
the DSP can select  to ensure an acceptable privacy budget.
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Theorem 6.3.1. Given the user-keyword matrix D ∈ Rn×m built according to Eq. (6.1),
the maximum Euclidean distance between two text vectors is rmax ≤
√
m log(n).
Proof. According to the definition in Eq. (6.1), a text vector U has the maximum
norm
√
m log(n) when each of its element is equal to the maximum value log(n). It
follows that rmax ≤ ‖U1 − U2‖ ≤ ‖U‖ ≤
√
m log(n).
The upper bound above is almost unreachable in practice, as it requires that all
the m keywords be used by only one user. So rmax in practical scenarios is far less
than
√
m log(n). But if the DSP chooses  according to
√
m log(n), the effective
privacy budget for many text-vector pairs is actually very small, implying that these
text-vector pairs are very likely to be indistinguishable after perturbation.
6.3.4 Achieving -Text Indistinguishability
In this section, we propose a mechanism to achieve the -text indistinguishability.
To this end, we first assume rmax to be infinite and then finite.
Mechanism for Infinite rmax
The mechanism Kt(fI(·)), designed for the identity query fI(·), maps each text vector
U ∈ Rm of the dataset D to a new U ′ with the same dimension m. To that end, we
write the perturbed U ′ as:
U ′ = U + dΘ
where d is a random variable indicating the Euclidean distance between U and U ′,
and Θ is an m-dimensional random vector drawn from the m-dimensional unit hy-
persphere. The mechanism is then composed of two steps: the generation of the
magnitude and the direction. Since the drawing of Θ is straightforward, we focus on
generating d. Similar to the Laplacian mechanism (47), we let d deviate from the
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center U according to the Laplacian distribution,
g(d) = e−d (6.7)
where d ranges from zero to infinity. It is easy to check that
∫ +∞
0
g(d) = 1.
The CDF of d is given by
C(d = r) =
∫ r
0
e−xdx = 1− e−r. (6.8)
The CDF above tells us how to generate a random d. Specifically, given a user
text vector U , we want to generate a perturbed vector which has at most d Euclidean
distance from U . Since d follows the PDF defined in Eq. (6.8), given a random
probability p ∈ [0, 1], we can obtain
d = C−1 (p) = −
log(1− p)

. (6.9)
We now show that the proposed mechanism satisfies -text indistinguishability.
Theorem 6.3.2. The mechanism Kt(fI(·)) defined above achieves the -text indis-
tinguishability.
Proof. Given two user text vectors Ui and Uj, the probability quotient of being per-
turbed the same vector U∗ can be computed as
Pr[U = U∗|Ui]
Pr[U = U∗|Uj] =
Pr[d(U∗, Ui)]Θ1
Pr[d(U∗, Uj)]Θ2
= e(d(U
∗,Ui)−d(U∗,Uj)) ≤ e(d(Ui,Uj)).
(6.10)
Here Θ1 and Θ2 can be canceled because both are drawn from the m-dimensional
unit hypersphere with the same probability, and the inequity holds because of the
triangle inequity. Therefore, the conclusion holds.
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Mechanism for Limited rmax
The mechanism Kt(fI(·)) in last section maps the user text vector U to U ′ with
potentially infinite distance. However, we have demonstrated in Theorem 6.3.3 that
any text vector pair have the Euclidean distance bounded by rmax. Here we present
how to truncate the mapping into a specific rmax. We denote the corresponding
mechanism as Kr(fI(·)).
As we can see from Fig. 6.2, C(d = r) will approach to one quickly as r increases.
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Figure 6.2: The CDF of d with Different s.
Therefore, we define a tolerance parameter γ to indicate how much of CDF will
be outside rmax. In other words,
1− γ = C(d = rmax) = 1− e−rmax
⇒  = − log(γ)
rmax
. (6.11)
The algorithm of Kr(fI(·)) is listed in Alg. 5. Given the tolerance parameter γ
and rmax, we compute the  according to Eq. 6.11 in Line 1. Then for each Ui in
the dataset D, we draw the noise vector dΘ by two steps: (1) obtain the magnitude
randomly in Line 3 by using r = C−1 (p) where p is the random CDF, and (2) compute
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the direction Θ in Line 4 by drawing a random vector from the unit m-dimensional
hypersphere. Line 5 adds the noise to U to get U ′.
Algorithm 5: Perturbation algorithm for mechanism Kr(fI(·))
input : rmax, γ,D = {U1, . . . , Un}
output: Perturbed dataset D′ = {U ′1, . . . , U ′n}
1 Compute  according to Eq. (6.11);
2 For each Ui, i = 1, . . . , n ;
3 Select a random number p ∈ [0, 1], and compute the radius d according to
Eq. (6.9) ;
4 Select a random vector N ∈ Rm, and normalized it to have unit L2 norm, i.e.,
Θ = N/‖N‖2 ;
5 U ′i = Ui + dΘ ;
We also show that the mechanismKr(fI(·)) achieves the -text indistinguishability.
Theorem 6.3.3. The mechanism Kr(fI(·)) defined above achieves the -text indis-
tinguishability within rmax.
Proof. For each text vector U , with the probability of 1−γ, the perturbed text vector
U ′ has the Euclidean distance less or equal to rmax from U . The rest steps follow the
proof of Theorem 6.3.2, and the conclusion holds.
6.3.5 A Working Example
Fig. 6.3 gives a simple example for our system operations. Here the data consumer
wants to find the users who have posted about a sunscreen product “SuperSunscreen”.
The DSP finds three qualified users with tweets as “Use #SuperSunscreen with mom,
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Use #SuperSunscreen 
with mom, very 
useful
Cheated after using 
#SuperSunscree
Great 
#SuperSunscree!
Intact dataset TFIDF Matrix
Text 
Modeling Perturbation
Published Matrix
use supersunscreen mom cheat great use  supersunscreen   mom   cheat       great
Figure 6.3: The Illustration of Differentially Privacy-preserving Social Media Data
Publishing. Given Three Users with Intact Dataset, We First Use the Text Model to
Build a Matrix D, Then Add the Controlled Noise, and Finally Release the Perturbed
Matrix D′ and the Keywords in Each Column.
very useful”, “Cheated after using #SuperSunscree ”, and “Great #SuperSunscree!”,
respectively.
The first step is to remove the stop words, conduct the stemming, and then com-
pute the TF-IDF matrix defined by Eq. 6.1. We obtain the 1-gram lists for these
three users as “use(2), SuperSunscreen, mom”, “cheat, use, SuperSunscreen”, and
“great SuperSunscreen”, respectively. Consider the 1-grams keyword space as “use,
SuperSunscreen, mom, cheat, great”, we can build the TF-IDF matrix D as follows.
D =

U1
U2
U3
 =

0.4055 0 0.8240 0 0
0.4055 0 0 1.0986 0
1.0986 0 0 0 0
 .
Then we apply the perturbation algorithm in Alg. 5 to generate a perturbed matrix
D′ as follows:
D′ =

0.5151 0.0302 0.9210 0.2012 0.0321
0.7121 0.0139 0.1023 1.3453 0.0245
1.3214 0.0218 0.3084 0.0021 0.0083
 .
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Figure 6.4: Determine  by γ and rmax.
The DSP then release D′ and the keyword space to the data consumer for machine
learning tasks. As we can see, the perturbed matrix largely reduce the distance
between each user text vector by sacrificing little utility. We will evaluate the tradeoff
between the privacy and utility later.
6.3.6 Performance Analysis
Privacy budget
As shown in Eq. (6.11), , which is the constant scale of the privacy budget d,
can be determined by γ and rmax, as shown in Fig. 6.4. As we can see, for rmax
from 1 to 104 and γ from 1 to 10−16,  is always less than 2. Moreover, since 
is reversely proportional to rmax, the whole privacy budget d is less than − log(γ)
(because d ≤ rmax), which is relatively small. The small privacy budget is critical for
differential privacy mechanisms because a large budget result in a large privacy loss.
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Break the Curse of Dimensionality
As stated in Section 6.3.3, the original -differential privacy notion and the corre-
sponding Laplacian mechanism suffer the curse of dimensionality for perturbing the
text vector. The reason is that the noise strength added to each element in the text
vector has a scale of S(fI)/, where S(fI) is the L1 sensitivity of the text vector and
proportional to the dimension m. We now estimate the scale of the noise strength for
the mechanism Kr(fI(·)).
Theorem 6.3.4. Given a text vector U ∈ Rm, by applying the mechanism Kr(fI(·)),
the expected noise strength for each element in U is unrelated to the dimension m.
Proof. According to Eq. (6.9), we can obtain
E(d) =
∫ 1
0
−1− p

dp =
1
2
.
Combining Eq. (6.11) and the upper bound of rmax in Theorem 6.3.3, we can obtain
E(d) =
2rmax
log(γ)
< −2
√
m log(n)
log(γ)
.
Here E(d) is the expected noise strength for the whole vector U . Therefore, the
expected strength for each element in U is
E(d)√
m
< −2 log(n)
log(γ)
which is unrelated to the dimension m.
Moreover, by setting the γ to extremely small (e.g., 10−16), the upper bound
approaches 1. Note that according to Theorem 6.3.3, this upper bound is rather
loose. Therefore, the expected noise strength for each element is far less.
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(α, δ)-usefulness
The mechanism Kr(fI(·)) also satisfies (α, δ)-usefulness defined by (25).
Definition 6.3.3 ((α, δ)-usefulness). A -text indistinguishability mechanism K sat-
isfies (α, δ)-usefulness iff for every user text vector U , with the probability at least δ,
the perturbed text vector U ′ satisfies d ≤ α.
Theorem 6.3.5. The mechanism Kr(fI(·)) defined above achieves the (α, δ)-usefulness.
Proof. It can be easily seen according to the CDF of the random variable d in
Eq. (6.8).
6.3.7 Remarks
We have three remarks to make on our design.
First, the proposed -text indistinguishability and Kr(fI(·)) mechanism can be
used to protect the privacy in other contexts as long as the dataset D is homogeneous,
meaning that each column should have a similar numerical range. The reason is that
the model generalizes and represents the whole vector by its L2 norm, while ignoring
the difference for each element in the vector. If the element in each row vector is
different, the generalization could become meaningless. Nevertheless, the proposed
mechanism break the curse of dimensionality, and it is an interesting topic to extend
the proposed model to heterogenous datasets.
Second, the mechanism in Alg. 5 could generate a perturbed vector with very
large norm (> rmax). However, the attacker cannot obtain any external information
from this abnormality. The reason is that the probability for any user who has this
abnormality is random. Moreover, the probability is negligible. For example, when
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rmax = 100 nd γ = 10
−8, the probability of abnormality is 10−8. In general, the less
γ, the less the abnormality, and vice versa.
Third, rmax is important for our mechanism, and we can further reduce rmax by
clustering to define the (k, )-text indistinguishability. Specifically, we can partition
the dataset into k clusters by grouping the close vectors in a cluster, and then conduct
the -text indistinguishability independently within each cluster. Since each local
group has a smaller rmax, less noise is added to the original dataset, leading to higher
data usability. Obviously, the larger the K, the less the privacy and the higher the
usefulness, and vise versa. We leave this extension as future work.
6.4 Evaluation
In this section, we use both a real-world dataset and simulations to evaluate the
proposed -text indistinguishability mechanism Kr(fI(·)) in three aspects: the privacy
and usefulness, the utility on a typical machine learning task, and the defense against
the user-linkage attacks.
6.4.1 Dataset
As stated before, the data consumer aims to use the social media data to do
the demographics analysis. Here we use a ground truth Twitter user dataset with
known age information similar to (158). Specifically, a user A has age x if one of
his friends has posted a tweet with the format “Happy x-birthday to A”. We used
Twitter Streaming API to monitor these tweets and the ground-truth users. We then
manually check the consistency between the claimed age information and the tweets
they have posted to. Finally, we found 5,710 users, which consist of 2,855 users who
are at least and less than 25 years old, respectively. We crawled one year of their
recent tweets and obtained 3,363,706 tweets. We then removed the stopping words
180
and conducted the stemming as stated in Section 6.3.1, and built the TF-IDF matrix
according to Eq. (6.1) for the following experiments. Because of the randomness
during the noise generation, we run each of the experiment 100 times and report the
average results.
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6.4.2 Privacy and Usefulness
We first check rmax in the real-world dataset above. To start with, Fig. 6.5 shows
the loose upper bound with different dimension m stated in Theorem 6.3.3. We set
the number of users n = 5710. The upper bound is a sublinear function with m, and
increases from 200 to 1000 when m ranges from 1000 to 10000.
We also measure rmax in the dataset as shown in Fig. 6.6. Specifically, we compute
rmax as the maximum L2 norm of each row vector from the dataset D. As we can see,
although the rmax increases sublinearly with m, the magnitude is much less than the
upper bound in Fig. 6.5. The reason is twofold. First, because we built the TF-IDF
dataset by choosing the most m frequent grams, the IDF term in Eq.( 6.1) is much
less than log(n). Second, the TF part is less than
√
m because the text vector is
sparse (each user has only used limited grams when m is large).
Given rmax, Fig. 6.6 demonstrates the expected noise strength added for each single
element in the text vector. As we can see, the noise strength is fairly stable with the
dimension m, which is consistent with Theorem 6.3.4. Moreover, the expected noise
strength ranges from 0.02 to 0.03, and is comparable to the original data. Therefore,
the proposed mechanism can tolerate an arbitrary dimension, i.e., breaking the curse
of dimensionality.
Fig. 6.7a and Fig. 6.7b show the (α, δ)usefulness of the mechanism at different
rmax and γ, respectively. As we can see, with probability δ, the distance between the
original text vector and the perturbed vector is within α, which verifies Theorem 6.3.5.
6.4.3 Performance on Classification
We evaluate the mechanism on classification, one of the typical applications from
the machine learning community. As stated before, each user has the ground-truth
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Figure 6.8: The Performance of Classification.
age information. We can then build a binary classifier to determine whether a user
is younger than 25 years old or not. We use the Support Vector Machine (SVM)
(128) algorithm to evaluate the classification performance on both the original and
the perturbed datasets by ten-fold cross validation.
Fig. 6.8a demonstrate the accuracy with a changing γ. The straight and crooked
lines represent the original and perturbed datasets, respectively. As we can see, the
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smaller γ, the higher the performance for the perturbation mechanism. This result
is not surprising. Specifically, Theorem 6.3.4 indicates that the smaller γ, the less
the noise added to the original dataset. However, small γ will increase the privacy
budget scale  and hence the privacy loss.
Fig. 6.8b demonstrates the accuracy of the original dataset (straight line) and the
perturbed datasets with different rmax (crooked curves). As we can see, the smaller
rmax, the better the accuracy because smaller rmax will incur less noise. However, less
noise will cause a high privacy loss because the attacker can infer the victim given
the huge difference between two perturbed vectors.
Fig. 6.8c and Fig. 6.8d show the classification performance on m = 5000. As
we can see, both figures show the similar trend for m = 1000, meaning that the
mechanism works well at various dimensions. Moreover, the performance when m =
5000 is slightly better than that when m = 1000. The reason is that more keywords
lead to better classification.
6.4.4 Defense Against User-Linkage Attacks
Our mechanism is designed to defend against the user-linkage attack. The defini-
tion of -text indistinguishability in Definition 6.3.2 and the corresponding mechanism
in Alg. 5 show that any user can be perturbed to other text vector with certain prob-
ability. Therefore, the perturbation can make the user-linkage attack more difficult
to conduct. To evaluate the effectiveness of our mechanism, we need to model the
strength of the attacker in terms of user inference. We consider two attack models
here.
In inference attack I, we assume that the attack knows t elements of the victim’s
text vector, and t vary from 0 to m. We then build an estimated vector U ′ by keeping
these t elements and setting other unknown elements to zero, and check whether the
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estimated vector U ′ is in the K-nearest vector set in both the original D and the
perturbed D′. It is expected that the larger the t, the stronger the attack, the higher
the inference rate. We set m = 1000 and γ = 10−8. We conduct the experiment by
1000 times and report the average results.
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Figure 6.9: The Performance of Inference Attack I.
Fig. 6.9 shows the inference rate among the 1-nearest and 10-nearest vectors for
rmax = 100 and 200. We can make two observations. First, all the four curves show
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that the perturbation algorithm makes the user linkage attack much more difficult.
Specifically, when the t increase from 300 to 600, the inference rate increase quickly
from 0 to 100% for the original dataset. The inference rate then stay at approximate
100% when t is larger than 600. By comparison, the inference rate for the perturbed
dataset is at most 68.8% for rmax = 100 (K = 10) and 44.6% for rmax = 200 (K = 10),
respectively. Second, Fig. 6.9 demonstrate the tradeoff between the privacy and
usefulness in terms of rmax. Specifically, on the one hand, the mechanism’s inference
rate for rmax = 200 is less than the rate for rmax = 100. The reason is that larger
rmax results in larger noise and hence higher-level privacy protection. On the other
hand, larger rmax results in lower classification performance as indicated in Fig. 6.8.
The tradeoff also holds in terms of γ.
In inference attack II, we assume that the attack knows the noisy but the whole
text vector of the victim. To that end, we randomly select a victim vector U∗ from D,
add a noise vector N with the magnitude s where 1/s is the attack strength, and then
check whether the noisy vector U˜ = U∗ + N is in the K-nearest vector set in both
the original D and the perturbed D′. We use the Euclidean distance to represent
the difference between any vector pair. Obviously, it is expected that the weaker the
attack strength, the higher the inference rate.
Fig. 6.10 show the inference rate among the 1-nearest and 10-nearest vectors for
rmax = 100 and 200. We can make the similar observations as in the inference attack
I. First, the perturbation algorithm makes the user linkage attack much more difficult.
Specifically, when the reverse attack strength s increases, the inference rate for the
perturbed dataset decreases to about 30% for K = 1 and 40% for K = 10, meaning
that the attacker has limited power to infer the victim. By comparison, the inference
rate for the original dataset is always 100% when s is less than 17. The reason is each
user text vector is very distinguishable. When s > 17, the inference for the original
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Figure 6.10: The Performance of Inference Attack II.
dataset decreases dramatically because the measured rmax for this dataset is 15.1 for
m = 1000, as indicated in Fig. 6.6. Second, Fig. 6.9 demonstrate the tradeoff between
the privacy and usefulness in terms of rmax.
Moreover, users’ privacy has not largely sacrifice the utility. For example, as a
typical setting, when rmax = 100 and γ = 10
−8, the inference rate with s = 15 and
K = 10 is 47.7%, and the classification accuracy is reduced by only 1.61%. Therefore,
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the proposed mechanism can achieve high privacy guarantee with little utility loss.
Note that there is a peak point for the inference rate on the perturbed dataset
in Fig. 6.10. This is because that the perturbation also adds the noise vector in the
similar way as in the inference attack II. For different rmax, the perturbed vectors
have different Euclidean distance from the original vectors. Recall that U ′ and U˜
are the perturbed vector and the estimated vector from the attacker for the victim
U∗, respectively. When the difference between d(U∗, U˜) and d(U∗, U ′) is small, the
inference rate will increase. However, in reality, the attacker has little knowledge on
the whole text vector for the victim. Therefore, it is difficult for them to conduct this
type of inference.
6.5 Related Work
This section reviews the most relevant work.
6.5.1 Privacy on Social Media Platforms
Social media platforms host the network and also text information. The privacy
threat of both pieces of information has been studied widely. For the privacy threat
from the network information, existing results show that an anonymous social graph
can be de-anonymized by seed information (107; 69) and community structures in
the social graph (111). As for the privacy threat from text information, sophisticated
machine learning algorithms can be used to infer a lot of sensitive information, such
as age (156; 158), location (88; 159), language (110), and political preference (31).
On the defense side, the research community only attempts to protect user pri-
vacy from the perspective of network information. The research efforts fall into two
directions. The first line of research (64; 94; 129) aims at protecting vertex privacy by
publishing social graphs with anonymized user IDs, and the research effort is to pre-
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vent the adversary from linking anonymized IDs to corresponding real IDs in the real
social network. The other line of research targets link/edge privacy, and the research
effort is to publish social graphs with real user IDs but perturbed edges by publishing
an obfuscated social network to protect users’ privacy (103; 92). Our paper is the
first to protect the privacy from the text information and is complementary to these
efforts.
Some other work protects the social media users’ privacy from the architectural
aspect. For example, Cristofaro et al. proposed the Hammingbird (40) to replace
the Twitter system, and Papadopoulos et al. proposed a K-subscription system to
protect the user’s privacy in Twitter (115). However, although these systems have
strong privacy guarantee, they might be difficult to be widely adopted in practice.
6.5.2 Differential Privacy
Privacy-preserving data publishing has been thoroughly studied and surveyed in
(54). The majority of work surveyed in (54) focuses on the traditional database
instead of the unstructured social media data.
In this paper, we adopt the non-interactive differential privacy model with com-
pleteness, which has been studied in (72) for differentially-private PCA and in (89)
for differentially private compressive sensing. However, the first work cannot be used
for the nonnegative text analysis or the same-dimension perturbation, and the second
cannot defend against the user-linkage attack. There are other non-interactive differ-
ential privacy mechanisms such as (106) and (146). However, they cannot guaranteed
the completeness of the one-on-one mapping. Differential privacy has also been ap-
plied in many other applications, such as location (14; 91), compressive sensing (89),
and health data (42).
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6.5.3 Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
Also related is privacy-preserving machine learning (27; 148). These schemes use
a different system model where the users are distributed entities and have the control
on how to share their data. We use a different system model where all the end users
share their social media data with the trusted data service provider. Moreover, these
schemes are designed for specific machine learning algorithms, while our framework
targets more general data mining applications.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the vulnerability of the existing social media data
publishing model and also designed the first privacy-preserving publishing framework.
We pointed out that the existing -differential privacy and the popular Laplacian
mechanism suffers from the curse of dimensionality and makes the perturbed data
useless. We then proposed the -text indistinguishability and designed a mechanism
to achieve it. We evaluated the mechanism’s privacy and usefulness guarantees, as
well as its high effectiveness on classification and strong defense against the user-
linkage attack.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The architectural openness and people’s growing engagement continuously make
the microblogging services the easy targets for the various targets. In this disserta-
tion we uncover a number of challenging security and privacy issues in microblogging
services and also propose corresponding defenses. As for the security side, we demon-
strate that the social botnet, a group of collaborative social bots under the control
of a single botmaster, can facilitate the spam distribution and digital-influence ma-
nipulation. We also propose the corresponding countermeasures and evaluate their
effectiveness. Moreover, in the context of finding top-K influential microbloggers, we
propose the first sybil-resilient system TrueTop to find the top-K influential users
in microblogging services with very accurate results and strong resilience to sybil at-
tacks. We thoroughly evaluated its performance on real-world datasets. As for the
privacy side, we demonstrate that microblogging systems’ structural openness and
users’ carelessness could disclose the later’s sensitive information such as home city.
We propose and evaluate LocInfer, a novel and lightweight system to uncover the
majority of the users in any metropolitan area by exploring the geographic locality
that the users in the same area have more interactions than the ones from different
areas. We demonstrate one more privacy issue by proposing a novel machine learn-
ing framework MAIF that leverages public content and interaction information in
microblogging services to infer users’ hidden ages. To defend against these privacy
threats, we propose the first privacy-preserving social media publishing framework to
let the microblogging service providers publish their data to any third-party without
disclosing users’ privacy and meanwhile meeting the data’s commercial utilities.
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This dissertation is far from perfectness. For the future work, we can extend our
dissertation in following directions.
First, Chapter 2 lists two representative attacks by social botnets and their coun-
termeasures. Additional attacks and corresponding defenses can also be investigated.
For example, the social botnets might be used to manipulate the public opinion in
the crisis or significant events.
Second, Chapter 3 assumes that the sybil users have difficulty to obtain the trust
from the legitimate users. Recently measurement show that the sybils have become
more and more intelligent to break this constraint. How to deal with sybil’s evolving
intelligence is one of our future work for the TrueTop system.
Third, the LocInfer system in Chapter 4 only uses the network information to infer
the location of Twitter users. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the content information
can also be combined to infer the attributes. Therefore we can exploit how to integrate
the content information with the network information to infer the location of Twitter
users. One possible direction is we can further refine the users in the candidate set
by checking their content information.
Fourth , we can do many additional work for MAIF in Chapter 5. We seek to
incorporate more interaction information such as retweets, replies, and mentions into
MAIF. In addition, we will evaluate the performance of MAIF for other microblogging
systems such as Tumblr. We also plan to thoroughly investigate the privacy implica-
tions of MAIF and possible countermeasures for the microbloggers particularly wary
of their age privacy.
Fifth, in the privacy-preserving social media data publishing framework in Chap-
ter 6, we will evaluate the mechanism on more applications, various attack models,
extend the framework to heterogenous datasets, and investigate the (K, )-text indis-
tinguishability mentioned in Section 6.3.7.
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